Portland State University

PDXScholar
Dissertations and Theses

Dissertations and Theses

Summer 8-28-2013

Building Bridges with Social Capital in the European
Union
Peter Andrew Noordijk
Portland State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/open_access_etds
Part of the Other International and Area Studies Commons, Other Public Affairs, Public Policy and
Public Administration Commons, Social Policy Commons, and the Social Welfare Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Noordijk, Peter Andrew, "Building Bridges with Social Capital in the European Union" (2013). Dissertations
and Theses. Paper 1091.
https://doi.org/10.15760/etd.1091

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations
and Theses by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. Please contact us if we can make this document more
accessible: pdxscholar@pdx.edu.

Building Bridges with Social Capital in the European Union

by
Peter Andrew Noordijk

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy
in
Public Affairs and Policy

Dissertation Committee:
Birol Yesilada, Chair
David Kinsella
Melody Valdini
Shawn Smallman

Portland State University
2013

© 2013 Peter Andrew Noordijk

i

ABSTRACT
A culture of accommodation and tolerance is a necessary part of
establishing and preserving a functional multi-national and multi-ethnic European
Union. Civil society organizations and their associated social capital have been
shown to foster civic capacity and achievement of public policy goals. However,
social capital that is based on group identity can also contribute to a sense of
intolerance towards out-groups, undermining the stated tolerance objectives of
the social pillar of the European Union. States with a strong presence alongside
civil society are expected to be curb the development of the exclusionary bonding
form of social capital in favor of bridging social capital which will improve progress
toward policy goals.
This study tests the link between government capacity, social capital and
tolerance using data from the 1990-2009 waves of the World Values Survey and
European Values Study. Using path analysis and multi-level models of the
relationships between political capacity, social capital and intolerance, the model
establishes that government capacity enhances bridging social capital and which
increases social tolerance. The study fills a gap in understanding how government
capacity and policy can result in improved social capital even with greater diversity.
A proposed relationship between political capacity and bonding forms of social
capital was not supported.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
In 1997, Article 13 of the Treaty of Amsterdam gave the European
Community the right to “take legislative action to combat discrimination based on
sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.”
This declaration of the right to action placed an additional responsibility on
European member states to proactively meet the human rights objectives to which
they had agreed in both the Maastricht treaty in 1992, and as members of the
Council of Europe and signatories to the European Convention on Human Rights.
The Treaty of Amsterdam, however, obliges the Union to penalize member states
found to be in violation of the requirements to protect fundamental human rights
(Ram 2003; FRA 2007b).
On February 15, 2007 the Justice and Home Affairs Council of the
European Union made permanent an agency to monitor and provide technical
assistance in meeting the social harmonization goals of Pillar III (The E.U.M.C., the
Predecessor of the F.R.A. 2007). Social rights items, as outlined in the Amsterdam
Treaty, are the protection of human rights, the promotion of democratic values,
and to combat ethnic, racial, gender, and religious discrimination. Promotion of
these rights and values is part of the Aquis Communitaire and the obligation of
member states (Wood and Yeşilada 2002; Van Oudenaren 2005). As Europe
adds new members with vastly divergent recent cultural, political, and ethnic
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composition as well as different levels of development and civil society traditions,
the problems of harmonizing outcomes in an issue that touches on mass-belief
systems and economic experience are exacerbated. The many states of the
European Union are tasked with achieving the social tolerance goals of the Union,
but are accorded deference in how to achieve those goals because of the unique
structure of the Union. The emphasis on national sovereignty over issues of
“home affairs” like immigration and social tolerance, means that the Union’s
mechanisms for promoting inclusion are limited to policy diffusion and monitoring
— there is little scope for punishment, and even monitoring functions like review
of national laws by the Fundamental Rights Agency have been challenged
(Kjaerum 2009). The challenge is to find the conditions that have led to success in
extending social tolerance to traditional out-groups. One of the main areas
associated with successful public policy in general, and in this area specifically,
has been strong a strong reserve of social capital.
The central hypothesis is that higher government capacity leads to
reduced intolerance by fostering the development of a particular form of social
capital, bridging social capital, and through the direct mechanism of repressing
expressions of intolerance. Social capital can be thought of as networks of
relationships that individuals are able to access to meet their needs. It can be
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conceptualized as having two main forms, bridging and bonding social capital
networks.
Bridging social capital is associated with reduced intolerance expressed
towards groups of outsiders. This works through several mechanisms. Civil
society institutions can generate social capital that can foster either in-group
bonding or between group bridging relationships, depending on their structure
and purpose. The first mechanism is improved civic capacity as bridging capital is
associated with more effective communities with a more effective political and civil
society policy nexus (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti 1993; Putnam 1994). The
development of bridging capital leads to an indirect path of improving tolerance by
expanding the community’s ability to solve problems thereby reducing competition
for resources, and a direct path of government ability to suppress intolerant acts
or organizations. A second mechanism that is also a direct path is also at work,
this is the contact path. As actors from “outgroups” interact in civil society,
refereed contact with minorities reduces the xenophobic nature of the majority
community.
In contrast, bonding social capital is conceived as very tight networks that
do not extend outside of an individual’s social identity group. Bonding social
capital is marked by an in-group or family focus of the network, and organizations
that are provide resources to group members. Weak government participation in
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society limits the ability of individuals to access services outside of their “self-help”
organizations, reinforcing the centrality of the identity group and stunting the
development of broader networks of contacts.
The political capacity of governments, should constrain the type of social
capital civil society groups (such as religious groups) generate. The combination
of strong political capacity and a government interest in promotion of tolerance is
expected to be associated with more bridging capital. The government will be
able to constrain expressions of intolerance, and facilitate implementation of
policy. Also, stronger governments reduce the competition for resources, or
narrow-self help nature of some tightly bonded identity or family based bonding
capital structures. Higher government capacity, should lead to more bridging
forms of social capital, and therefore, more civic capacity and less intolerance.
Societies with strong governments and strong social capital are expected to
generate more successful tolerance outcomes than those with other combinations
of government capacity and social capital.
The research questions are several-fold: Is bridging-social capital
associated with better (lower) intolerance rates? Does relative political capacity
lead to improved social tolerance? Does relative political capacity provide
conditions for intensified bridging forms of capital? and finally, what conditions
mediate any relationship between government capacity and intolerance.
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1.3 Hypotheses Related To Research Question
Hypothesis 1: Increased relative political capacity will be associated with
lower levels of Intolerance in the European Union and accession states.
Hypothesis 2: Relative political capacity will reduce Intolerance by
encouraging bridging forms of social capital and constraining bonding forms.
Hypothesis 2.1: Bridging social capital (Trust-based) is associated with
reduced Intolerance.
Hypothesis 2.2: Increased relative political capacity will intensify bridging
forms of social capital.
Hypothesis 2.3: Increased relative political capacity should constrain
bonding forms of social capital, and constrain the relationship with Intolerance.
Hypothesis 3: More local allocation of state resources will foster stronger
community engagement. Controlling for other factors, local expenditure should be
associated with both increased social capital, and reduced intolerance.
Hypothesis 4: Government intention (measured by right-wing participation)
interacted with relative political capacity should have a stronger effect on
intolerance than relative political capacity measured alone.
In addition to analyzing the relationships between extractive capacity and
intolerance through the mechanism of social capital, local government policies in
two Dutch cities, Rotterdam and Utrecht, are discussed in light of their intentional
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promotion of social capital as an instrument for achieving better social integration
and tolerance.
1.4 Plan Of Dissertation
Chapter two, following this introduction, provides a review of the literature
that informs this analysis and highlights the data challenges and underpins
sources of the research questions. In the literature review, social tolerance as a
policy goal of the European Union is established. The limits placed on available
public policy tools in the European model of governance are also reviewed in
chapter two. There is also a discussion and overview of the challenge in defining
and measuring intolerance in a multi-year and multi-national comparison. The
different forms of social capital and their relationships to intolerance and civic
capacity are reviewed, as well as the interaction between government capacity
and the forms of social capital. Finally, a comparative measure of government
capacity, or penetration in society that can be used to test the relationships
proposed is discussed.
Chapter three (methodology) introduces the models that will be used to
test the hypotheses. In chapter three, the different variables and their
characteristics are also developed. A discussion of the challenge faced by
missing data, and the technique used to address this issue is presented.

Noordijk

Social Capital and Tolerance

7

Chapter four presents the analysis of three types of models used to
investigate the relationships between political capacity, social capital, and
intolerance. A path model is constructed to investigate the direct and indirect
relationships between political capacity and intolerance, specifically focusing on
bridging social capital as a mediator between political capacity and intolerance.
Several multi-level regressions are then used to explore the relationships more indepth and analyze interactions between the effects of social capital and political
capacity on intolerance. Other covariates are also introduced to control, or as
elements of interest. Participation in government of right-wing parties and the
ratio of local to total spending are included as estimates of government intention,
and potential policy effectiveness respectively.
Chapter six presents a more in-depth look at the national and local policy
contexts for two Dutch cities that intentionally incorporate social capital as part of
their strategy to address social intolerance. The national policy context of the
Netherlands is informative because it is one of the early migration destination
countries, and one of the first to begin analyzing social phenomenon to construct
national policy to address intolerance towards minorities. In the Netherlands, the
implementation of social policy occurs primarily at the municipal level, and the
examination of municipal policy in two major Dutch cities illustrates that cities
consciously use social capital enhancing programs to meet social tolerance goals.
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The cities also participate in policy diffusion networks that help identify and spread
best practices. The emergence of several of these programs has paralleled this
research project.
This analysis contributes specifically to the present problems facing the
European Union as it adapts to its newly dynamic and multi-cultural nature. The
analysis contributes to synthesizing the fields of Political Science and Public
Administration by integrating comparative politics concepts of relative political
capacity and the ability of the state to promote specific social objectives.
Understanding the relationship between state political capacity and intolerance in
a cross-nationally comparable way provides an important tool in understanding
conditions for successful policy implementation.
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CHAPTER 2: STATE OF THE PROBLEM AND REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
2.1: Status Of Fundamental Rights In The European Union And The Open
Method Of Coordination
The European Union must be considered a multi-cultural polity, if it is to be
considered a polity at all. The Aquis Communitaire, now represented by the
Lisbon treaty, contains human rights guarantees referenced by the Maastricht
Treaty in 1992, which incorporated both the Council of the European Union’s
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and the Council of
Europe’s Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2009;
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
as Amended by Protocol No. 11 2009). The Charter requires that all states
adopt a much more coordinated effort at decreasing intolerance and increasing
forms of social inclusion. Despite having only created the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union in 2000, and only giving it legally binding effect in
2009, the European Union member states have been obligated to perform their
responsibilities under the Council of Europe’s Convention on Human Rights. As all
the members of the European Union share prior treaty obligations to protect
human rights, the opinion of the European Court of Justice, proscribed the
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Commission from promulgating laws that could impinge on Human Rights under
the Rome Convention (Commission 2009). In response to the European Court
Justice Rulings, in 1977 the Commission, the Parliament, and the Council of
Ministers issued a joint declaration vowing to protect human rights. Subsequently,
through a series of declarations, treaties and institutions, The European Union has
paid special attention to the problem intolerance throughout the series of recent
expansions since the early 1990s.
The pursuit of social tolerance and the responsibility to combat racism and
xenophobia, as well as discriminatory violence, are policy areas that bridge both
the former Pillar I and Pillar III areas as defined by the Maastricht Treaty. As the
competency of much of the issue falls in the Pillars of the European Union that are
defined by inter-governmentalism not pooled sovereignty, therefore an institutional
response to the issues that is uniform across the European Union is impossible.
Even after the ratification of the Lisbon treaty, the issues of social intolerance still
fall primarily in the competency domain of national governments (Fight against
Racism and Xenophobia 2010).
European institutions like the European Union and the Council of Europe
and the European Court of Human Rights have all started down a path of
standardizing expectations of how minorities are to be treated. However, Koenig
and others note that there has been an element of a European identity backlash of
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the sort anticipated by Ignatieff (1993) in his book about identity, “Blood and
Belonging”. Koenig (2007) finds that as the European Institutions have been
pushing standards of treatment, the relationship between religious institutions and
the state have evolved into something with salience to establishing national
identity. That is, he observes that “traditional” religions of certain states have
become an important national marker in an increasingly harmonized Europe, with
the effect of marginalizing minority religious groups.
The single best manifestation of the public policy regime being offered to
address the issue was the creation, in coordination with the Council of Europe, of
a plurilateral institution to monitor, research and coordinate national policy
responses to intolerance, the European Union Monitoring Center to Combat
Racism and Xenophobia. This organization and its methods were early model of
what was to become known as the Open Method of Coordination, where the state
of a public policy problem is assessed for each member, then benchmarks are set,
and a network for policy exchange is created. A means for “shaming and naming”
countries that are not meeting benchmarks or implementing changes is the
principle method of coercion (Nedergaard 2007; Velluti 2007; de Ruiter 2008).
The OMC is a coordination-style of governance, with partners from the different
governments, the Union, and non-governmental groups networked together in a
form of institutionalized policy-diffusion.
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The Open Method of Coordination is a system of coordinated intergovernmentalism, it is marked by the following characteristics. Quoted from
Radulova (2007), page 369 ;
“In its fully-fledged form, the method involves the following processes :
• fixing guidelines for the Union combined with specific timetables for
achieving the goals which they set in the short, medium and long terms;
• establishing, where appropriate, quantitative and qualitative indicators
and benchmarks against the best in the world and tailored to the needs of
different member states and sectors as a means of comparing best
practice;
• translating these European guidelines into national and regional policies
by setting specific targets and adopting measures, taking into account
national and regional differences;
• periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review organized as mutual
learning processes.“
The European Union Monitoring Center (EUMC) predated the establishment
of the OMC but bears many of its hallmarks. The EUMC was a center jointly
supported by the European Union and the Council of Europe, which recruited
national partners, both official and non-governmental, to assess the current state
of intolerance and to offer and implement policy solutions. It was conceived as
collaborative, a center to collect information on the states of intolerance in each of
the member states, it collected information on the “best practices” in data
tracking, and in policy, and provided a forum for the diffusion of policy back to
national partners (The Eumc, the Predecessor of the Fra 2007). As in other Open
Method of Coordination structures, the EUMC worked extensively with national
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partners (National Focal Points) and non-governmental agencies in a network
structures. Like other OMC structures, the EUMC, and its successor, the FRA,
have no power to implement or enforce policy
As the EUMC began to conduct studies on the type and nature of social
intolerance in EU member states, it was apparent that the development of
benchmarks was impossible. There were many different legal traditions, different
record keeping, and no uniform data from country to country, or even within
countries. Also, as noted in the annual reports from the Fundamental Rights
Agency and contributors such as Dijkstra, Geuijen and De Ruijter (2001), there is a
big distance between paper rights and the actual experiences of discrimination on
the ground in EU member states (European Union Agency for Fundemental Rights
Annual Report 2008). Also, the requirements for citizenship to member states
determine the rights of immigrants, some countries are jus sanguine (bloodbased), and others jus solis (birthplace) based citizenship states. The European
Union’s extension of citizenship to minority immigrant populations, is therefore,
contingent on the state in which immigrants reside.
The trends observed by the Fundamental Rights Agency of the EU are not
terribly encouraging in light of the different polices, or lack of policies of member
states. The FRA report from 2007 shows that ethnic or religious minorities are
substantially less likely to be employed or employed at their level of qualifications
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compared to their peers (FRA 2007a). They also note that many EU countries,
including Bulgaria, Denmark, Greece, France, Italy, Austria, Portugal, Romania
and Finland did not have legislation, or institutions to monitor and prosecute
discrimination against individuals until the implementation of the Racial Equality
Directive of the Amsterdam Treaty (Trends and Developments 1997-2005Combating Ethnic and Racial Discrimination and Promoting Equality in the
European Union 2007).
The European Union has taken the issues of social tolerance seriously
since the 1977 joint statement. However, as the issues surrounding intolerance
are centered in areas outside the scope of the community method, and outside
the competency of the Union, the responses to the problems of racism and other
forms of social intolerance, had been left largely to the member states. It is not
until more recently, the late 1990s and onward, has there been a coordinated and
institutionalized response to the phenomenon of social intolerance.
2.2: Intolerance In Europe
Intolerance in Europe has been a subject of broad study, but unfortunately,
little systematic measurement. Studies have largely found the expected directions
of correlation of intolerance by education level, age and conservatism; less of the
first, and more of the last two are correlated with intolerance with some qualitative
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differences in national contexts. However, the record on religiosity and intolerance
is mixed and more strongly related to qualitative characteristics of religion and
national context. Also, the rate of in-migration is not clearly associated with
intolerance as might be assumed. Migrants seem to move to the wealthier
countries with greater job opportunities. Those countries also seem to have more
tolerant populations than poorer ones.
Studies on correlates to racism in different European countries find a variety
of observations. In general, education is inversely correlated with ethnic or
religious intolerance. However the education effects vary in a number of different
studies, as data from surveys and qualitative research indicate that educational
practices in some Central and Eastern European (CEE) states actually reinforce
racial and religious bigotry against Roma and religious out-groups or historical
national rivals (Hello, Scheepers and Gijsberts 2002; Mudde 2005). A number of
theories on the genesis of anti-immigrant and anti-minority attitudes and behaviors
postulate a material basis for intolerance (Coenders, Lubbers and Scheepers
2005d).
Additionally to competition for scarce resources, loss of status for groups
sharing demographic features with immigrants, or who believe they have lost
status because of social shifts also drives the perception of threat from unfamiliar
“others” (Norris 2005). Observations that opposition to immigrants is apparent in
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both groups perceiving direct competition for jobs, such as the less educated,
lower skilled workers, and self-employed people seems to lend support to both
notions of threat (Coenders, Lubbers and Scheepers 2005a; Coenders, Lubbers
and Scheepers 2005b).
However, several studies show that even controlling for income, education,
and employment status, other factors, such as age, political self-placement, forms
of religious adherence, authoritarian personalities and the presence of racist
political parties or actors in society all correlate with intolerance towards minorities
(Altemeyer 1996; Coenders, Lubbers and Scheepers 2004). At least in the
European cases, contact between groups, as in urban settings or in integrated
cities, an element of social capital, seems to reduce the intolerance impulse
(Coenders, Lubbers and Scheepers 2005c). It is clear that there are motivations
beyond simply economic threat for intolerance.
Another study of immigration into European Union states analyzed
migration with respect to several hypothesis; (a) migration is largely from colanguage states or former colonies of European powers, (b) migration is generally
driven by economic factor, particularly labor market demand, (c) finally that
migration is driven by the generosity of social welfare benefits. The authors find
that there is support for the labor market factor and the prior colonial experience
thesis but not for the benefit generosity hypothesis popular with right-wing
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politicians (Hooghe, Reeskens, Trappers and Meuleman 2008). In a slight
contradiction to Hooghe’s findings, and a caution for using support for restrictive
immigration as proxy for racism, Coenders et al, found that while overall racist
attitudes were lower in Western Europe than in the southern or CEE states,
attitudes towards repatriation policies were somewhat stronger (Coenders,
Lubbers and Scheepers 2008a). This may be a reflection of the increased
salience of repatriation policies in states with recent immigrants flow, whereas
Southern and Eastern Europe have been primarily transit states, so they have
fewer people to consider threats worthy of repatriating .
Another study that offers an interesting twist on the observations of the
impact of immigrant or minority populations on attitudes towards out-groups.
Semyonov and co-authors (Semyonov, Raijman and Gorodzeisky 2008) find
expected relationships between political position, social vulnerability, and
destination country GDP. They find a positive correlation between recent
immigration flows and negative perceptions of foreigners. Most interestingly, they
find a very strong relationship between perceived immigration flows and negative
attitudes towards immigrants. That is, regardless of reality, those who think flows
are large, think foreigners are a cultural or economic threat, regardless of actual
flow sizes . This means there is a real problem for using actual census or
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immigrant flow data combined with opinion surveys as there may not be a good
relationship between actual and perceived conditions.
While relatively few of the recent accession states are included in this
analysis, a number of studies have shown that the new batch of states have
higher rates of intolerance than the established European Union members. This
lack of progress towards minority rights in the accession countries is attributed to
several factors relating to the idea of subsidiarity and the practice of the Open
Method of Coordination (Rechel 2008). Rechel (2008, 179-181) claims that the
lack of clear guidelines or laws on the implementation of minority rights in EU
countries, combined with the lack of enforcement of recommendations in old EU
countries, and the absence of pressure related to the rights of minorities as a
condition to accession all combined to undermine EU influence on minority rights.
The Acquis and a Council directive required the passage of national level
legislation, but there has been little evaluation of the effectiveness or resources put
into countering intolerance in accession states.
A study about national contexts and how issues are framed have examined
what contributes towards hostile feelings towards immigrants. The analysis tested
the effects of unemployment conditions in the host country during the survey
period and during the respondent’s coming of age. They also tested survey
responses during periods of political framing of immigration issues that
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emphasized outgroups’ failures to assimilate, and tested the effect of assimilation
versus multicultural framing in laboratory groups (Coenders, Lubbers, Scheepers
and Verkuyten 2008b). In both surveys and laboratory experiments, they found a
strong correlation for intolerance when assimilation framing was both in the public
domain and included in questionnaires. The implications of this study are stark
and resonate with Tarrow’s observations on framing as well as psychology
observations on the availability bias. Political actors are able to use scape-goating
or out-group framing to create a more intolerant social environment simply by
activating that reference frame (Tarrow 1998).
Despite data indicating strong anti-Roma, religious, and sexual orientation
intolerance in Eastern accession countries, Mudde (2005) notes that the new
accession states are not “hotbeds of racist extremism’. Mudde notes that in 2004
only one of the Eastern accession states had an extremist party with a strong
presence, compared to five of the older EU members. While Poland, Slovakia and
Romania all have strong racist civil society organizations including nationalist
groups and conservative Roman Catholic and Orthodox churches, only in
Romania do they have a direct presence in parliament. He also notes that despite
poor data keeping, several CEE states have sustained high rates of racist violence.
Despite the clearly racist elements in civil society the attitude, and violence rates
and success of rightest parties do note correlate very neatly in the CEE states.
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Mudde (2005, 171-182) seems to attribute this to both political structure barriers
and perhaps to the relative absence of out-groups other than Roma. While
Mudde explains that racism is not as bad as is feared in the CEE states, Ram
(2003) finds that the accession process played a very important role in bringing the
Czechs and Romanians to implement policy meant to harmonize their laws,
institutions and societies with that of the core EU states in the area of minority
rights. She finds that the progress in those two countries occurred despite active
opposition of some domestic political actors and the negative example of some
Western European EU member states. EU official pressure combined with
interactions between domestic and foreign NGOs and EU support of human rights
NGO all combined to place minority rights on the public agenda conditioning the
political structures in a way that should provide opportunities for increased
tolerance while stemming the ability of racist actors to gain wide audiences.
Intolerant public attitudes,state capacity, political opportunity for intolerant
organizations and resonant frames seem to come together more in the CEE states
than in the Western and Northern European EU member states.
National identity and European identity reflected in surveys, and in
naturalization laws also influence intolerance. Racist attitudes and violence are not
restricted to the CEE states. In a well-balanced study of racism in Belgium, racist
attitudes towards out-groups are documented in both of the main ethnic
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communities of Belgium (Mielants 2006). He finds that the inability of politicians to
deal with immigrants stems from their unwillingness to realize that immigrants
were no longer simply foreign workers destined to return home. Political action
against the racist right-wing Dutch-speaking Vlaams Blok/Belang and the
Francophone groups are mediated by Belgium’s internal identity struggle.
Perpetrators of racist violence are slow to be punished and racist attitudes are
generally tolerated outside of official circles, also reflecting a lack of concern with
dealing directly with racism problems facing Belgium—the seat of the EU (Mielants
2006, 321-324). Like the studies by Coenders, Lubbers, and Scheepersl, the
anti-immigrant feelings sensitive to assimilation versus multiculturalism framing
were particularly directed at immigrants and citizens from North African or Turkish
ethnic origins instead of former colonial possessions (Coenders, et al. 2008a).
A range of studies have shown an attachment to a European identity with
citizenship based on legal, not ethnic lineage, identifiers, that is particularly strong
among the more well-educated and those who identify more with the European
Union. Another study finds that identification with European Union citizenship has
a positive effect on tolerance attitudes towards immigrants among Belgian youth
(Quintelier and Dejaeghere 2008). Interestingly, they find that intolerance levels are
higher among Dutch speakers, then among French speaking youth. While the
current case among Belgian adults indicates that the Dutch speaking youth will
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have higher levels of educational attainment and economic security. However,
there have been very prominent Flemish political actors who have repeatedly used
political scape-goating against immigrants and French-speakers in order to create
a Flemish separatist movement, so negative images of “othered” groups may be
more frequent in the homes of Flemish youth. The series of studies commissioned
by the European Union Monitoring Center for Racism and Xenophobia, have
traced a correlation between expectations of legal behavior as a qualification for
citizenship with higher levels of education (Coenders, Lubbers and Scheepers
2005e). While Coenders et al associate this requirement to be an indicator of
intolerance among more well-educated Europeans, my own past research found
that there is an inverse relationship with other forms of multi-cultural resistance
and the “legal citizenship” requirement among those who are well-educated. That
finding is consistent with a jus solis and a naturalization conception of nationality
and citizenship over one based on ethnicity or blood lines. Unfortunately, as noted
in the annual reports from the Fundamental Rights Agency and studies such as
Dijkstra et al, there is a big distance between paper rights and the actual
experiences of discrimination on the ground in EU member states (Dijkstra, et al.
2001). Also, the requirements for citizenship to member states determine the
rights of immigrants, some countries are jus sanguine, and others jus solis based
citizenship states. The European Union’s extension of citizenship to minority
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immigrant populations, is therefore, contingent on the state in which immigrants
reside.
European institutions like the European Union and the Council of Europe
and the European Court of Human Rights have all started down a path of
standardizing expectations of how minorities are to be treated. However, Koenig
and others note that there has been an element of a European identity backlash of
the sort anticipated in Ignatieff’s work’s on ethnic nationalism in the face of
economic and identity displacement caused by globalization (Ignatieff 1993).
Koenig (2007, 921-923) finds that as the European institutions have been pushing
Union-wide standards of treatment, the relationship between religious intuitions
and the state have evolved into something with salience to establishing national
identity. He observes that the traditional religions of certain states have become
an important identity marker in an increasingly harmonized Europe, with the effect
of highlighting historical majority religions and pushing minority groups to mobilize
behind a religious identity. Furthermore, the European Institutions have reached
directly to religious organizations as part of civil society in order to reach around
the states, while several of the European states have historically used the power of
governments precisely to supplant religious groups as providers of legitimate
services (Rex 2000).
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Different immigration policies, traditions and political structures in EU
member states have led to a variety of outcomes. Rex explores the forms of
response that European states have adopted in dealing with immigration.
Transnational immigrant populations are problematic for European governments
formed around class compromise. New policies to deal with multi-ethnic inflows
take few main forms. 1st, the exclusion of minorities and repatriation back to
source countries. 2nd is to extend legal citizenship to native-born or naturalized
minority group members but insist on social and cultural integration. 3rd is the
guest-worker strategy or treating immigrants and their families as temporary. 4th is
permitting group-based identity and multiculturalism. Rex (2000, 62-70) argues
that allowing multiculturalism provides structures for services and communitygovernment integration. However right-wing politicians combat multiculturalism
with deterministic arguments that place minorities as a threat to the state because
they have static and incompatible values with the majority population. Entzinger
(2000) sees the kernels of conflict in the treatment of minorities as groups, he
observes that when states emphasize group rights, they also make it easier to
target groups. Without strong state enforcement of individual rights, and the
allocation of services through group organizations, using minority organizations to
help execute policy may be problematic in the long-run as the attachment to the
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state as the legitimate venue for pressing claims is weakened as services are
provided by organizations .
Koopmans(1999) and Norris(2005) each focus on the interaction of public
demand for policy to deal with minorities with the political opportunity structures
that are determined by the state as an explanation for the rise of right-wing
parties. Koopmans and Stratham(2000) note in their study of continental and
British responses to minority problems, The structure of the state and franchise
extended to immigrants (citizen, group rights, or geographic concentration)
informs the types of claims-making options available . The state is still the frame
of reference and the target for claims-making by migrants and minorities, not
transnational organizations. The European Union acts merely a coordinating
committee not the focus of rights claims or for minority groups. German exclusion
of citizenship leads to source country nationality-based claims-making and the
prevalence of home-country based ethnic mutual support organizations, while
British groups are identified by religion or social group or region, not source
nationality as they are identified as British individuals.
The very different strategies states have for dealing with naturalizations,
immigration flows is a product of structural conditions for claims-making and
influences the political participation among immigrant communities (Ireland 2000).
All of the European-Union states demonstrate varying degrees of poor outcomes
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for minorities indicative of stubbornly remaining racism in society. Fennema (2000)
examined a number of the policies in several states and found varied usage of
legal instruments to combat racism. He found that France, Belgium and England
had all rarely used their anti-racist legislation to prosecute discrimination against
individuals, or discrimination by political parties. Germany used its legal
instruments to suppress leftist movements until after a series of deadly attacks on
minorities in the early 1990s. The Dutch, despite having anti-discrimination laws
on the books since 1972, primarily used the law to protect against political
discrimination and left social issues like racial discrimination to be responded to
through the use of a pillar model. They created semi-private social organizations
and tried organize the ethnic community groups to essentially help themselves
access the political system and integrate into Dutch society. The process has,
unintentionally, led to community enclaves that replicate source country divisions,
and separation from Dutch society at large (Ireland 2000)(Thranhardt 2000).
Unlike many other states the Dutch governments, frequently assessed the
success of the integration efforts through ongoing public policy analysis.
The Fundamental Rights Agency of the EU, reports on the recording,
reporting and responding to problems of social integration in a systemic manner,
are not terribly encouraging in light of the different polices, or lack of policies of
member states. The FRA report from 2007 shows that ethnic or religious
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minorities are substantially less likely to be employed or employed at their level of
qualifications compared to their peers (FRA 2007a). They also note that many of
the EU countries, including Bulgaria, Denmark, Greece, France, Italy, Austria,
Portugal, Romania and Finland, did not have any legislation, or institutions to
monitor and prosecute discrimination against individuals pending the
implementation of the Racial Equality Directive of the Amsterdam Treaty (FRA
2007b).
2.3 The Measurement Problem For Intolerance
It would be optimal if there were a dataset that accurately recorded acts of
social intolerance. Consistently recorded and consistently published records
would provide a means of external validation for the variables used to estimate
attitudes of intolerance in this analysis. Unfortunately, such a dataset does not
exist. The structure for addressing the problems of social intolerance and social
exclusion in the European Union is the Open Method of Coordination, a method
that requires the establishment of and comparison of policy progress towards a
set of benchmarks. However, the most basic elements of comparison seem to be
missing in all instruments except the occasional special Eurobarometer survey, the
recent European Social Survey, and neither of those other surveys has maintained
the same questions over several years yet.
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There have been some efforts to assess the state of European Union
assessments of their problems with crimes of discrimination, and member state
performance has been consistently poor. Not only do the EU states generally not
keep standard or consistent records of reported hate crimes that are comparable
between one another, by and large they fail to keep records that are comparable
from year to year at home (Trends and Developments 1997-2005- Combating
Ethnic and Racial Discrimination and Promoting Equality in the European Union
2007). Further complicating this measurement problem is the fact that as
awareness of the problem grows among law enforcement and in the community at
large; the frequency of reporting goes up as a proportion of population. This
phenomenon creates a correlation between pro-active policy and the rate of
reported hate crimes when reported crimes increase as a direct result of policy
responses taking hold! Even in the United States, Congress directed the FBI to
track Hate Crimes in 1990, and by 1995 the FBI only issued uniform reporting
standards for hate crimes reported by only 18% of law enforcement entities
(Uniform Crime Reports 2010).
Table 1.2 is derived from data collected by the Fundamental Rights Agency
and extracted from the World Values Surveys. The table provides an overview of
the changes in reported racist crime over time within countries compared to the

Noordijk

Social Capital and Tolerance

29

changes in attitude over same period for the few countries that have World Values
Survey data over the same range.
For a perfect instrumental variable of racism one would expect some level
of monotonic change between those measures. Racist crime should go up when
racist attitudes go up and vice-versa. However, of the five countries for which
there are overlapping data, four have reversed relationships. Clearly there are
factors contributing mightily to measurement error. We know that the wording and
methodology of the World Values Survey instruments are consistent over the
periods and between countries, although social conditions are not static (such as
large riots in France the month prior to 2007 survey). We also know from the FRA
reports and from national reports that there are problems with police recording of
data within each country as well. Table 2.1 demonstrates why using reported
crime is not going to be a successful measure of comparable progress towards
social tolerance goals. Further detail of the complications of using various data
sources other than the World Values Surveys are explained below.
Table 2.1: Reported Racist Crime Selected Countries and Years

Belgium
Czech
Rep
Denmark

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

757
364

751
452

727
473

848
335

1021
364

1224
253

1359
248

28

116

68

53

37

87

96

2007 Average
Annual %
Growth of
Intolerance
(WVS)
1289
7.60
196
-8.80
35

3.20
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12933

11576

12553
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15914

18142 17607( 8.5(7.5)
.22)
France
903 424(.21)
1317
833
1574
979 923 (.6)
707 -9.9(17)
Ireland
72
42
100
62
84
94
173
224
16.20
Austria
450
528
465
436
322
406
419
752
7.30
Poland
215
103
94
111
113
172
150
238 1.5(-7.5)
Slovakia
35
40
109
119
79
121
188
155
21.30
Finland
495
448
364
522
558
669
748
698
4.90
Sweden
2703
2785 2391
2436
2414
2383
2575 2813 0.5(-8.5)
England 47614
52638 54858 47810 53113 56654 59071 61262 3.6(-1.7)
Source data: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights: Annual Report 2009. Pp24-25
"Reported Racist Crimes". WVS Combined wave 1980-2007, added means of two questions
"Would you have a problem if an (immigrant) or (foreign worker) moved into your
neighborhood?"

Trust in the police and judiciary also dictates whether individuals will be
willing to report crimes, further complicating the value of indicators even in
countries like Great Britain, which have had a fairly consistent reporting standard
over a number of years. According to some reports up to 85% of crimes against
Muslim victims in the European Union member states go unreported . The recent
MIDIS project commissioned by the Fundamental Rights Agency of the EU
provides a broad range of fairly stark findings for the likelihood of reporting hate
crimes .
The figures present data from the MIDIS report. The two tables present
different responses from sub-groups of minorities in the EU, their trust of the
police, and their reasons for not reporting assaults or threats of a discriminatory
nature. What is noteworthy in these tables is the overall trust of police in most
minority communities contrasted with the very high lack of trust among nonreporting victims of hate activities. The MIDIS studies (European Union Minorities
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and Discrimination Survey: Main Results Report 2009; European Union Minorities
and Discrimination Survey. Data in Focus Report: Muslims 2009) also report the
differential levels of trust in the police among different ethnic groups within
countries. You can see from the two charts that the Roma at once trust the police
least, and cite that lack of trust as a reason for non-reporting most consistently of
the surveyed groups.
Trust in Police by Ethnicity
NL- Turkish
DE- Turkish
BE- Turkish
PT- Sub-Saharan African
FR- Sub-Saharan African
RO- Roma
HU- Roma
CZ- Roma
NL- North African
FR- North African
BE- North African

0%
Tend not to trust

25%
50%
Neither trust nor distrust

75%
Tend to trust

100%
DK

Figure 2.1: Trust in Police by Ethnic Identifiers in European States. Data from
European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey (2009)

To further illustrate the confounding effect of trust in the police on reporting
rates, note the different mean scores in the figures below, the first illustrates
differential scores between religious minority populations and majority, the second
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between muslim self-identifiers and majority (or non-religious) self-identifiers. Two
important limitations to this data are that the religious minorities data include
ethnic majority individuals who are of a minority religion such as Roman Catholics
in the Netherlands, and does not capture ethnic minorities of the majority religion,
such as gypsies in Hungary.
What the two tables below illustrate are the complicated nature of the
relationship between minorities and the very people to whom they need for
protection. The first shows the confidence of minority religion self-identifiers and
the police, and the second the confidence of Muslim self-reporters and the police.
In the tables below, the country name has an asterisk if the means difference is
significantly greater than 0.
Minority religious self-reporters and their confidence in the police varies
greatly from state to state. There are a number of conflicting strains to explain this
phenomenon. One is, that as an artifact of the data, the modal group of religious
identifiers is used as the base category for determining majority status. This
means that in several of the countries the “minority” group may actually be part of
the ethnic majority. Non-reporters were also grouped into the majority group,
which may be inappropriate for highly religious societies like Turkey, but it makes
sense for most of the European countries, as many people are only nominally
religious anyway. The imprecise nature of the groupings increases the
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unexplained variance and may mask some of the differences that are addressed
by the Midis study however, these classifications are comparable across countries.
They still capture the differences in attitudes toward the police, if in a less precise
manner. While it is difficult to identify any clear trends, the western wealthier states
(with more recent experience of immigration) do tend to show minorities who hold

3.00

2.25

1.50

0.75

0

Majority
Minority

Austria
Belgium*
Bulgaria*
Cyprus*
Czech Republic
Denmark*
Estonia
Finland
France
Greece
Hungary*
Ireland*
Italy*
Latvia*
Lithuania*
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands*
Poland
Portugal
Romania*
Slovakia*
Slovenia*
Spain*
Sweden
Turkey
Great Britain*
Germany*

1= Great Deal of Confidence 4= No Confidence

the police in less esteem than their majority peers.

* Denotes difference significant from 0 at p<.05.
Notes: Data from combined WVS-EVS waves 1-5,World Values Survey 1981-2008 Official Aggregate.
Question asks "How much confidence to you have in the following…Police? 1=Great Deal, 4=No
Confidence." Minority religious status doesn't include ethnic minorities of majority religion (like
Orthodox Christian Gypsies in Greece) and does include majority ethnicity persons of minority religious
status (Roman Catholics in the Netherlands for example.)

Figure 2.2: Confidence in Police by Majority Religious Status
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The chart, “Confidence in the Police by Muslim Status” further highlights
some of the differences of experience from state to state, and could provide some
insights into the difficulty of measuring racism through crime. It has the added
benefit of selecting a group that is in a distinct minority in most of the European
countries (except Turkey and Cyprus.) The chart reinforces the observation of the
minorities chart above, with some clear exceptions. In France, the Netherlands
and Sweden, people have pretty strong confidence in the police, but Muslims
have even more confidence than do majority religion (or secular) populations. The
rest of the developed western states do not, however, have such a salubrious and
counter-intuitive record.
The instances of high confidence in the police by both minority and majority
status, illustrates an interaction effect that may create the appearance of high
crime in countries of low reported intolerance for countries like Sweden or the
Netherlands in which minorities are more willing to report incidents to police, while
likely experiencing fewer incidents overall because the police are believed effective
by people holding racist attitudes.
National RPE and confidence in the police have a strong relationship with a
correlation of -.13 p<.01 (confidence in the police is scored from 1 to 4 where 1 is
“a great deal”.) This further reinforces the argument that countries, which have a
stronger state presence in society, and are perceived as more capable, will have
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higher levels of reporting of hate crimes and lower attitudes of intolerance
simultaneously.
There is no series of data on intolerance that is uniform between countries
over time other than the WVS scales on neighbors. Reported crime data cannot
be used because of the numerous problems in data collection, and local attitudes
towards the police and local expectations of the treatment of minorities. The lack
of externally valid data other than the World Values Survey leads to the
requirement of constructing a scale of intolerance from the series available in the
World Values Surveys.

4=No Confidence
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4
Non-Muslim

Muslim

2

1

Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria*
Cyprus*
Czech Republic*
Denmark*
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece*
Hungary*
Ireland
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands*
Poland*
Portugal*
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia*
Spain*
Sweden
Turkey*
Great Britain*

1=Great Confidence,

3

* Denotes difference significant from 0 at p<.05.
Notes: Question asks "How much confidence to you have in the following…Police? 1=Great Deal,
4=No Confidence." Data from World Values Survey 1981-2008 Official Aggregate

Figure 2.3: Confidence in Police by Muslim Status

One more item of note for the intolerance scale, especially in the context of
Eastern and Southern Europe, including Italy, is intolerance towards Roma ethnic
identifiers. The World Values Survey has conducted only limited surveys of
attitude towards the Roma, but where it has, the results confirm recent analysis by
the Fundamental Rights Agency. The Roma are one of the least tolerated groups
in Europe. Unfortunately this item was only widely used in the 1999 European
Values wave of the World Values Surveys and cannot be included in the
intolerance variables. However, for the data that both sets exist we can estimate a
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correlation between our current measures and the gypsy variable by finding the
Eta of the means difference between those citing gypsies as undesirable
neighbors versus those who do not. Unsurprisingly, there is a large correlation
present with an eta of .41 with the summed responses to the other five neighbor
questions as a measure of Intolerance.
Table 2.3: Intolerance toward Roma
Neighbors: Gypsies
Correlation Coeﬃcient
Neighbours: People of a diﬀerent

N

.306**

14324

.351**

14324

.336**

14324

.339**

14324

race
Neighbours: People who have
AIDS
Neighbours: Immigrants/foreign
workers
Neighbours: Homosexuals

**Sig. (2-tailed) tau-B. Question asked if respondent would have a problem with listed neighbor.
Countries in the sample: Bulgaria (1999),Finland (2000), France (1999), Italy (1999), Netherlands
(1999), Poland (1999), Romania (1999), Sovenia (1999), Spain (1999), Sweden (1999), Turkey
(2001), Great Britain (1999)
Source:World Values Survey 1981-2008 Official Aggregate

Understanding trends in intolerance is a challenge even using instruments
designed expressly for that purpose. The European Union has only just developed
such instruments, and instead has been forced to rely on non-comparable criminal
justice data, or anecdotes from their national partner groups. The World Values/
European Values Surveys provide one instrument of measure consistent over
several years both in structure and application in measuring a scale of intolerance.
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Establishing an instrument for measuring intolerance allows us to examine the
correlates of intolerance and explore the effects of policies and intent in the
European Union context.
Thus far, efforts to achieve EU goals have been largely left to the different
member states. Only in the past 10 years has an institution existed to track,
compare, evaluate and coordinate social tolerance policies between the states.
Despite the inter-governmental nature of the problem, major institutions of Europe
have encouraged efforts at social inclusion among their member states.
2.4 Civil Society And Social Capital
This section presents the background and state of the literature for different
forms and measurement of social capital and its relationship with civic capacity.
This study explores the role that state capacity plays in creating conditions for the
emergence of bridging social capital instead of more intensely bonded networks.
A strong state provides the conditions for increased bridging capital and stronger
civic capacity in general.
Social capital is an essential component of any well-functioning
government and must be present for democracies to function at all (Bermeo
2003). Social capital has a three-fold relationship with tolerance as a feature of
society. First, as Stepan (2000) notes, tolerance of differences (political and
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otherwise) itself is a lynchpin of democracy. Second, common measures of social
capital feature items such as trust of neighbors and society; intolerant individuals
are expected to not show trust towards out groups. Finally, and most importantly,
social capital is expected to increase the civic capacity of governments that are
part of societies with strong social capital, with both government autonomy and
officials’ embeddedness in social capital networks (Evans 1995). The European
Union members are required to be functioning democratic states, and each of
those states face strains through expansion of the EU. Additionally, their
demographic changes furthermore put explicit emphasis on achieving community
objectives through partnerships between government and civil society. Those
partnerships are expressly meant to both foster increased social capital
infrastructure and embed national or European Union-level government actors in
the societies.
There are a number of definitions of social capital available in sociology,
economics, political science and public administration. While these definitions
have variations in disparate fields, there is some harmonization on the concept
and ways to try and measure it. There is agreement that social capital is
composed of both trust networks, associations, and a set of norms or values
carried by the individuals in society (Van Deth 2003). Social capital is capital in the
sense that these networks provide some instrumentality for individuals in these
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associations or networks. The presence of dense, intersecting networks in society
allows for individuals in a network to access resources in adjoining networks,
whereas networks that reinforce existing relationships offer less opportunity for
utilizing resources, and foster closed trust networks marked by tight social control.
In order for individuals to tap resources beyond their immediate group, intersecting
networks with norms of trust and cooperation must be present. Therefore social
capital must have both dense networks and norms of trust or cooperation (Sobel
2002; Van Deth 2003). Conceptions of social capital have two main addresses
that are not mutually exclusive. Social capital is at once an attribute of individuals
and society (Van Deth 2003).
Putnam (1993, 167) describes social capital as, “ the features of social
organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve efficiency of
society by facilitating coordinated actions.” Light describes social capital as trust
relationships that are part of social networks. His concept of social capital, as
Putnam’s, is instrumental and intentional. Social capital can exist as both
spontaneous and latent networks, but can be made instrumental and is
convertible to tangible benefits (Hutchinson, Vidal, Putnam, Light, de Souza
Briggs, Rohe, Gress and Woolcock 2004). Woolcock(1998) provides a broader
description of social capital that includes some notion of civil government within
the rubric of social capital. Woolcock’s (1998) conception of social capital starts
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at the micro-level of interpersonal relationships within a social subset of
individuals . The trust relationships, shared norms and networks among those
individuals he calls individuals’ micro-level embeddedness. He also notes another
dimension of human capital, which is the link of an individual to other larger social
networks (vertical “autonomous” capital) that extends to the macro level of society
giving an individual access to other sources of social resources. Macro-level
social capital is similar to civic capacity— it is the combination of the ability of the
broader society to get things done (autonomy), and the networks of relationships
that sub-groups have with larger society (embeddedness). The inclusion of the
macro- and micro-levels of social capital integrate the concepts of civic capacity
(the ability of social groups to identify and achieve goals) and civil governments as
institutions that bridge groups, as well as the narrower conceptions of social
capital described above (Woolcock 1998).
Portes (2000) also attributes Putnam with pushing the transition of social
capital conceived as an attribute of individuals to one of society. He argues that a
society has a “stock” of social capital that is generated by bridging associational
memberships and norms of trust and cooperation (Putnam 1994; Putnam 2000).
Newton (2001), however, goes further arguing that social capital is only
conceptually plausible as an attribute of society. It is a measure of the stock or
social trust, associational links, and possibly political trust in a society. While it
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may manifest in the ability of individuals to access resources, the stock of capital
itself is a collective phenomenon. Newton tested his claims about social capital.
He analyzed the correlations between associational memberships and forms of
trust toward society and public institutions and found that the relationships only
emerge systemically at the level of society and not as attributes of individuals. The
associational memberships and social activities of individuals were generally
unrelated to their indicators of social trust. Instead other factors like socioeconomic status, majority status and education had far higher correlations with
elements of trust (Newton 2001). Conceptually there is a logic to social capital
being conceived as an attribute of society as well as of individuals. An individual
with few personal associational memberships, or even low levels of social trust, is
still able to activate more “loose ties”, or access more resources in a society with
many interlocking connections and norms of trust, than the same individual in a
society marked by tight non-intersecting associations and low-levels of trust. As
referenced above, Newton’s (2001) analysis of the linkages between associational
membership and measures of trust found little connection at the individual level .
However, Paxton (2007) operationalized a confirmatory factor analysis of attributes
of social capital including associational memberships at the individual level .
Controlling for national contexts in a multi-level analysis, Paxton found that
organizational types with members who have multiple memberships also have
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increased levels of trust in other individuals more than other types of associations,
while membership in some organizations (religious and unions) may actually
reduce generalized trust (Paxton 2007). Van Deth and Zmarli (2010) also
operationalized an analysis of associational types of individuals’ memberships and
found similar connections to Paxton’s; associational types mattered for the types
of trust (this time political trust) that individuals possessed (Maloney, van Deth and
Rossdeutscher 2008).
Trust networks are described as tightly bonded networks of individuals
such as religious sects that are costly to exit, have tight control over pooled
resources, have very high stakes of exclusion for individual members and may
have a mixture of vertical and horizontal linkages within and between related
organizations (Tilly 2005). Tilly (2005) describes networks that have limited
memberships and tightly connected nodes. His case of study is Eastern
European Jewish immigrants in Johnstown Pennsylvania, but may as well be
Bengali immigrants to England, or Indonesian immigrants to the Netherlands.
These networks are dominated by identity and community focus and access to
resources is achieved through group membership and performance of qualifying
duties. There may be several organizations within this tight network, such as
charitable groups, business associations, and women’s groups. But they are
marked by having high overlapping memberships and few links outside the
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community. These tightly bonded networks can provide resources like financing
for businesses, economic assistance, or social functions, but they also are very
circular and can foster suspicion of outsiders as a means of further enforcing the
social ties (Almond, Appleby and Sivan 2003). Recent research (Iglic 2010) on the
types of social capital associated with different groups has found some
distinctions between types of association networks and their relationship to
general or particularized forms of trust. Finally, the societal nature of social capital
lies in the presumed intersection of the structural (intersecting networks)
characteristics and the cultural aspect in solving collective action problems and
producing public goods (Putnam and Bagnasco 1996; Van Deth 2003).
Social capital can also be seen as residing in individuals to instrumental
purposes and is not necessarily a public good. The individual-centered
conception of social capital relates to, but is distinct from social capital as a
characteristic of a society, a public good, and not just its individual members.
Social capital as an individual’s asset means that the social capital stock of an
individual is identified by their location in and size of their trust networks. That is
their associations of individuals with whom they have sufficient social connections
that they can count on society enforcing agreements (Portes 2000). The notion of
social capital utilized by Putnam in, Making Democracy Work (Putnam, et al.
1993), and Bowling Alone (2000) is an attribute of the community as much as it is

Noordijk

Social Capital and Tolerance

45

of individuals. The earlier notions of social capital offered by Bourdieu and
Coleman put the instrumentality of social capital for individuals at the center of the
concept, social capital was something individuals had, not societies (Portes 2000;
Van Deth 2003). Individuals had trust networks, or weak and strong ties that they
could activate in order to improve their own lot. But the notion of social capital as
an individual’s attribute introduces the possibility of individual social capital shortcircuiting the positive effects of community stocks of social capital. That is, we
cannot merely add the social networks of individuals alone and arrive at an
estimate of civic capacity (Coleman 1988).
While Kwon and Adler (2002, 18) describe social capital as the goodwill
flowing between individuals, they state that social capital is manifest in the
resources that relationships can bring to the individuals. Granovetter’s (1983)
description of social capital places emphasis on the advantages of weak ties, or
the resources available through the broader and weaker social networks that
individuals posses (Granovetter 1985). There are also extrinsic and internalized
aspects to the concept of social capital. The extrinsic descriptions highlight the
utilization of networks by individuals to garner resources or facilitate their personal
objectives, but the intrinsic element of social capital is the set of internalized norms
for cooperation and behavior that membership in groups and iterated relationships
within social networks help to create (Adler and Kwon 2002). Social capital is also

Noordijk

Social Capital and Tolerance

46

described (Portes 1998; Knoke 1999; Burt 2004) as processes through which
individuals create and activate bonding and bridging networks by joining and using
membership in organizations to expand their personal access to resources and
information. Knack’s (2002, 776-778) analysis of social capital’s impact on the
civic capacity of states operationalize two aspects of social capital separately. He
uses both generalized trust, and memberships in associations as his measures of
social capital. Knack also highlights that group membership need not lead to
more trust at all as groups, like religious or ethnic affiliation organizations, garner
bonding capital by burning bridges, which is why he insists on a multi-faceted
measure of social capital.
To further illustrate the importance of social capital as an individual’s
attribute, imagine two people as part of society. One is a member of two
associations, both nested in a sectarian context; a member of a Roman Catholic
business association and part of a charitable association— also part of the Roman
Catholic community (this would be reflective of the sectarian based associations
that dominated the Netherlands until the middle of the twentieth century). The
effect of membership in the bonding-type associations on the individual’s social
capital mean that he has many links to the same group of people but generates
low levels of generalized trust—he does not trust outsiders and doesn’t need to
trust others within the group as he has many avenues of control and reciprocation
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and simply. Along with low-levels of generalized trust, the individual has a limited
network of potential contacts as many of their links are redundant and all are
within the same community. Consider another individual, also with two
memberships: one in a secular social charity organization such as Rotary
International, and another in a local education group (such as a parent teacher
association). There may be some overlap of membership in the two groups, but
the individual essentially spans two groups with different memberships and
different second-order networks. This individual learns more generalized trust
because she has fewer social control links to the individuals in her networks and
instead must trust associates to act fairly. She also has a much broader potential
network of “friends of friends.” The interlinked nature of her memberships
provides greater social capital in the form of both networks and generalized trust.
2.5 Bonding And The Dark Side Of Social Capital
Individual social capital and community-level capital can be at crosspurposes. While it is often the case that social networks can be useful to help
reduce transaction costs (by providing a means of finding qualified job candidates
or connecting individuals to government officials, for example) those relationships
are not necessarily positive. However, individuals with connections may instead
play a market-distorting role by controlling information or selecting members only
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from an “in” group (Portes 2000). This is the case of corruption in “strong society”
countries lacking in a autonomous state apparatus. In this hypothetical, instead of
fostering institutional trust and civic capacity the individuals with high levels of
capital undermine the communities’ stock of social capital. The cases in “Making
Democracy Work” (Putnam and Bagnasco 1996) in Southern Italy, illustrate how
extended family and patronage networks dictated access to resources and
employment and fostered organized crime networks, providing substantial
examples of social capital networks that have a malevolent effect on society .
Although the earliest definitions of social capital are based on observing the
positive externalities achieved by networks of trust and associations, Durlauf and
Fafchamps (2004) in their survey of the evolution of the concept note that not all
versions of social capital are socially beneficial. Several early explorations of the
concept at least mention that not all elements of social capital are necessarily
positive (Granovetter 1983; Coleman 1988; Woolcock 1998), introducing the
concept of social capital alongside examples of its darker forms. Other authors
have explored the potential pitfalls of individuals being too embedded in a tight
associational environment, either socially or between business and public-sector
actors (Evans 1989; Portes 2000). Evans (1989) and Portes (2000) separately
dealt expressly with malevolent forms of social capital networks designed to
undermine fair allocation of resources and information. Portes (1998) argues that
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the dark side of social capital stems from networks that are too dense and stifle
innovation or the ability of individuals to access resources outside their group.
Social capital that is too rich in bonding capital and lacking bridging capital that
can stifle success as much as absent capital. Evans (1995) also argues that civil
societies’ networks and their linkages to the state, or the absence of a strong
autonomous state, can serve as networks of exploitation if the state is subject to
capture by narrow groups. Knack (Knack 2002) also explicitly measures social
capital as associations and generalized trust and volunteerism separately because
some groups are so focused on exclusionary memberships, they undermine
generalized social trust and civic capacity . Indeed, more recent work has also
been dedicated to uncovering aspects of social capital that are less than salutary
for the positive virtues expected.
van Deth and Zmerli(2010) provide a taxonomy of dark social capital in a
recent introduction to an issue of American Behavioral Scientist. They argue that
the conception of bridging versus bonding capital does not really explain why the
anticipated negative consequences would emerge from bonding over
development of bonding capital. They provide three types of organizations or
negative effects that can be described as “dark social capital”. They especially
focus on organizations with negative norms or intent, reproduce negative norms,
and can achieve evil aims more effectively when gaining skills and reducing costs
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of collective action with increased social capital. Especially when it is a tight
network of bonding capital with multiple informal avenues for control of members .
The dense bonding environment of small inward-facing groups isolates
individuals and limits the community’s ability to solve problems. In her study of
democracy and social capital, Paxton (2002) notes that the absence of bridging
mechanisms can lead to intolerance and isolation in inward looking groups and is
inversely related to civic attitudes. Government institutions can provide bridges in
the absence of or in addition to overlapping memberships (Akkerman, Hajer and
Grin 2004a). It is central to the argument in Kemmis’ “Community and the Politics
of Place” (Kemmis 1990) that a strong shared sense of broader identity can bridge
smaller groups and create an environment for interlinking networks.
More recent work by Putnam (Putnam 2007) examining the impact of multiethnic communities on social capital, measures such as social trust finds the
impact of minority presence on social capital is strongly negative. Even controlling
for demographic variables, and census tract level variables, the finding is robust.
In the United States, greater minority presence is associated with lower rates of
social capital. The measurement of social capital is problematic as highlighted by
the concept of trust used in the context of Putnam’s 2007 paper. For a
respondent in a densely populated neighborhoods which are often integrated, and
low-income, and have lower rates of home ownership, the image of a neighbor
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encompasses many hundreds or thousands of people, most of whom they may
not know personally. This does not mean they have low-levels of social capital or
even generalized social trust— it means that they don't know all of their
immediate neighbors, but they may have hundreds of trust network members in
the broader community. Which leads to a second critique. The mentally available
image of neighbor to someone in rural small communities is likely someone the
respondent knows personally, so for them trust equals confidence in the sense
described by Giddens (1990). There is little risk in trusting their neighbor because
they are in a trust network. A more diverse, or high-turnover community or one
with high population density evokes an image of neighbors who are strangers. In
this sense trust in neighbors is a blind trust, it is a question about the nature of
humanity, and in a dense population, or in a poor neighborhood with high crime
rates, there are plenty of examples of risk and betrayal available in the recent
experience of the respondent. But again, in aggregate they may have a more
robust network, or even be more generous or optimistic person— they are simply
required to have more blind trust in their neighbors, than is the respondent in N.
Dakota or even York, PA, two locations in their study.
A response paper testing Putnam’s observations about the U.S. found
stark differences between the U.S. results and regional variation in the European
Union (Gesthuizen, Scheepers and van der Meer 2008). Of course, the national
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level variance in the European Union is much greater than that between states or
cities in the U.S., but it is the reasons for variation that are very interesting. The
primary national level-characteristics that seem to ameliorate the adverse effects
of ethnic diversity on social trust and other indicators of social capital in Europe
are the lower levels of income inequality in Western European states, and the
length of time of democratic experience. Related to the democracy experience,
more research indicated that respondents feelings of political efficacy were
strongly tied to both indicators of social capital and ethnic tolerance (Hooghe,
Reeskens, Stolle and Trappers 2006). Although Gesthuizen and her coauthors
(Gesthuizen, et al. 2008) claim that the levels of social security of the states does
not play a major role in preserving social capital, it seems that social transfers are
one of the major mechanisms for eliminating the income inequalities associated
with the sort of resource competition and with-in group help systems that are
associated with lower bridging-social capital for diverse communities in Putnam’s
study and is an area worth testing because providing a safety net is one of the
main functions, and instruments of control for tightly bonded social communities
(Tilly 2005, 117-124).
The implications for policy from Putnam’s paper certainly resonate both
with the European Union’s goals and observations from work on identities and
authoritarian personality (Altemeyer 1996). Putnam’s more recent work observes
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the possibility of reduced salience of ethnic identifiers through rigorous
enforcement of non-discrimination policies, as in the U.S. military. He finds that
social change in the U.S. incorporates diversity into identity over time, in a way
that can be accelerated by policy emphasizing procedural democracy, and
American membership based on civic identity not ethnic identity (2007).
2.6 Social Trust And Civic Attitudes
Regardless of whether one ascribes to an elites-driven, pluralist, or massmobilization theory of democratic persistence, the connections between culture
and political practice are fairly direct. An active civil society that has many diverse
organizations and networks of connections can facilitate governance and act as a
break on power. If the culture supports trust and tolerance and is politically active,
then the values of the broad base of society will be reflected in the form of
governance and democracy secured from the bottom-up. If the political culture is
such that there is weak or inactive civil society, then the linkages between the
people will be through party structures and political agencies. In an environment
of low social capital and traditional non-democratic civil society institutions,
authority is respected and the fate of democracy lies in the loyalty of the political
elites to democratic competition.
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Despite a rapidly changing world, the persistence of national or regional
political culture cannot be ignored. An interesting study of the persistence of civic
cultural norms and behaviors is provided by Rice and Feldman (1997). Using
World Values Survey and General Social Survey data they analyzed the civic
attitudes and behaviors reported by Americans against those of their countries of
ethnic origin. The authors conducted their study on the premise that a civicminded political culture is foundational to the persistence of democracy. They
were interested in the persistence of civic values as a sort of leading indicator of
democratic decline of success. In defining their measures for civic culture, the
authors (Rice and Feldman 1997) borrow from Putnam’s 1993 analysis of Italian
social capital and presage the observations on civic behavior in the Scandinavian
Midwest from his, “Bowling Alone” (2000) which reflected their thesis. The authors
found powerful durability of civic culture surviving the transition to America with a
nearly unitary relationship between civic culture values in the source country and
those of American descendants. The implications for the persistence of cultural
values, and therefore democratic or authoritarian tendencies rooted in culture are
profound. It seems that the idea that one can take the person out of the home
culture, but cannot take the home culture out of the person is truer then often
suspected. The implication of this for comparative political analysis is that
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measures of political culture may vary widely because of cultural artifact and will
vary widely from state to state.
Particularly in societies that have an acceptance of authoritarian structures,
the role of political and social elites cannot be underestimated. If individuals in
more traditionalist societies are less likely to be politically engaged, then the elites
to whom they are connected will be able to either bolster a functional democracy,
or undermine the legitimacy of a state government that has little outside the
support of elites. Civil society leadership, and the organizations those leaders
head transmit values to their members. Those values can be tolerant of other
groups, or enforce group identity by emphasizing the differences and inferiority or
threat of Others’ groups (Altemeyer, 1996).
Transferring the trust built into private trust networks to government
requires that the link to government be one of contingent consent instead of a
variety of other linkage types that are based on dominance or patronage networks
(Tilly 2005). Only with the effective linkage between networks and public authority
extending to diffuse members of trust networks will democratic governance be
supported. The transfer is predicated on trust networks be linked to government
and to one another (often) through government, and eventually generating norms
of invested interest in the performance of government and the recognition of
government as a legitimate venue for resolving community problems (Tilly 2005).
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This is, again, an expression of the “crowding in” observed by Albana and Barbera
(2010) instead of the “crowding out” of social capital by a strong central state as
described by Fukuyama (1995a, p102). Again, the impact on civic capacity
caused by the interaction of state and society depends on the kind of government
and the type of social capital.
2.7 Measuring Social Capital
The concept of social capital is difficult to measure. However, trust at the
individual and social levels and individual enrollment and activity in civics-oriented
organizations are most frequently used indicators. Social capital has several
components; individual characteristics like trust between individuals, membership
in different associations, and political engagement, as well as community
characteristics marked by enlightened self-interest, bridging social capital and
trust and expectations of institutions.
Some investigations have been able to use specially crafted survey tools
crafted to measure civic behavior among small populations (Williams, Shinn,
Nishishiba and Morgan 2002) or make use of existing population surveys to
measure trust and associations (Paxton 1999). Norris also uses a social capital
index taken from World Values Survey data that analyzes variables of individual
social trust and the participation of individuals in associations (2002). She notes
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that the “big government” countries have higher levels of social capital, and that
social trust is associated with economic development, not associational
memberships. Her observations call into question the importance of associations
to development and provoke questions as to whether latent informal networks and
social trust levels are more important than activated networks. An alternative
explanation is that some forms of association develop “strong society” ties that
create “dense but segregated horizontal networks” that undermine the bridging
capital important for the formation of horizontal networks (Putnam, et al. 1993).
These observations emphasize the importance of both associational membership
and generalized trust dimensions of social capital.
Paxton’s is one of the more sophisticated efforts of measuring latent social
capital in which she develops a three-part confirmatory factor analysis model of
social capital (Paxton 1999). The first latent variable she measures is interpersonal
trust. Then she creates an institutional trust variable that controls for covariance
among indicators. Finally she creates a latent variable that combines personal
associations and formal association to estimate the associational embeddedness
of the individual. Using a factor model for estimating social capital is particularly
beneficial because the technique allows for multiple levels of conceptualization
and can highlight forms of association that undermine the trust features of social
capital and vice-versa as well as control for covariant errors. Unfortunately, neither
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Norris nor Paxton examine their analysis to investigate the impact of particular
associations on other variables of individual social capital to determine if there is a
confounding indicator (Paxton 1999; Norris 2005). However several recent
articles have addressed the importance of type of association and have found
some relationships between associational type and social capital type.
Organizations that focus on the uniqueness of their group members and
reinforce particularistic practices may build a strong small social network, but they
weaken the ability of the broader society to pursue democratic practices. Very
new work by Iglic has traced a relationship between political tolerance and
associational memberships, religion-based organizations in Eastern and Southern
Europe have a negative association with political and social tolerance as did
charitable groups and (Iglic 2010).
Measurement of social capital must include organizational memberships,
some measures of generalized trust and social outlook and ideally, an indicator of
particularistic group composition, such as religiosity.

2.8 Political Opportunity Structures And Tolerance
Political opportunity structures in the various countries can both inform the
types of political parties that are permitted to participate in national politics, as well
as the locus of government civil society interaction. The section below on ethnic
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and racial intolerance introduces more detail about some of the opportunities for
issue framing afforded right-wing parties in the countries studied. However, as a
more general analysis, the stated goal of each of the member states —not
mention their treaty obligation— is to reduce intolerance towards ethnic, religious
or lifestyle minorities. The political opportunity structures afforded will also be
affected by the level of government resources are committed to policy, what sort
of political system is in place, and what parties have been in power during the
period studied.
Although generally applied to political protest movements, the concepts of
political opportunity structures can inform the role that the institutions of the state
can play in structuring the forms of social capital in a community. Kitschelt (1986)
describes political opportunity structures as the combinations of resources,
institutional arrangements and repertoires of contention, or historical precedents,
for pressing claims against authorities. The access of social movements to the
political process, and to policy-makers and the way that such access is
conditioned by institutional rules such as access points, election laws and regime
type, further limits the forms that social movements can take in society. The
coercive capacity of the state and elites’ tolerances for certain types of framing of
issues also provides an element of structural constraint on acceptable social
capital forms.
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Kitschelt’s (2000) argument that the political process conforms or
constrains the kinds of social movements that are available to actors wishing to
press claims depends on a functional state to sustain a constraining environment,
the state must penetrate society, and be relatively autonomous of capture by any
interest group in order to effectively shape the political opportunity structure. His
study finds that a few macro-level characteristics can shed insight on the political
opportunity structures facing civil society actors. The openness of the political
system to claims, centrality of political structures, state participation in the
economy, and capacity to implement policy are all primary features of the political
opportunity structures (Kitschelt 1986; Kitschelt 2000). While some critics of the
concept of political opportunity structures, such as Pippa Norris, consider the
concept too vague to be useful, there are political scientists who still find Tilly’s
notion useful (Norris 2005)(Tilly 2005). Koopmans defends the notion of political
opportunity structures while recognizing that they need to be defined in particular
comparative contexts and cannot be a standard set of characteristics for all
cases, lest they lose any meaning by being too general (Koopmans 1999).
Koopmans identifies cultural factors as additional conditioning structures
facing social movements (Koopmans and Statham 2000)). They argue that
cultural factors have steered the framing of immigration issues in a direction that
fosters right-wing politics in Germany and France. This is similar to Tarrow’s social
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movement notion that concepts must achieve resonant framing of their claims,
and that resonance lies in the familiarity and acceptability to society of the problem
identification and proposed solutions offered by social movement leaders (Tarrow
1998). Tarrow uses Tilly’s conception of political opportunity structures in
identifying conditions when groups may be able to press claims and that
mobilization may be most effective when there is divided government, or
weakened repressive mechanisms. Additionally, outreach to international
organizations can help bring resources to domestic groups or induce the
government into placing the issues of groups onto the domestic agenda (Tarrow
2005).
All of the states examined have reasonably strong states, but their level of
penetration into society varies, as do their political structures such as elections
types, and the distance of policy formation and execution from the community,
and institutional tolerance of extreme-fringe parties In order to capture a proxy for
open opportunity structures, the ratio of how much non-social security
government spending is conducted through regional and local authorities is
included. The notion is that the closer the distance of critical spending decision
makers to the communities, the more open the political structures and access
points to community members. A positive relationship between the ratio of local
spending authority and level of social capital in an open political opportunity
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structure would seem to meet the positive interaction criteria described by
Akkerman, Hajer and Grin (2004b, 82-84). One caveat to this approach is that the
European Union and several of the national governments also work directly with
civil society groups to execute social policy, and this metric may miss that
relationship. Personal communication with staff at the Fundamental Rights
Agency of the European Union, and discussions with Peer Scheepers at The
University of Utrecht informed me that nobody has tracked government spending
on tolerance promotion (Grimheden 2007; Scheepers 2007). Gathering that
information is well beyond the scope of this current study.
2.9 Association Of Religiosity With Tolerance
In light of the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the European Union’s
expansion eastward and southward, the special case of religion as a civil society
institution should be taken into consideration. As Linz and Stepan’s typology of
totalitarian states makes clear, the states of the former Eastern Bloc suffered from
the states’ flattening of civil society (Linz and Stepan 1996b). The only civil society
institution to survive in much of Eastern Europe were the Roman Catholic and
Orthodox churches. Where the church didn’t survive they were one of the first
institutions to return. In Western Europe, while church attendance is low, many of
the countries still maintain official religions or have a long history of state-church
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cooperation in the provision of services as well as the construction of identity. A
number of studies of religiosity and tolerance have been conducted on the effect
of religion on intolerance towards other ethnic and religious groups.
One study tested the effect of religiosity on anti-Semitism to see if antiSemitism in the Netherlands was a product of exclusionary doctrine of Christianity.
The authors found that there was a positive, albeit somewhat weak relationship
between christian religiosity and religious anti-Semitism (Konig, Eisinga and
Scheepers 2000). However, the authors found that Roman Catholic religiosity had
a link to secular anti-Semitism while membership in the Protestant sects did not
differ from average Netherlanders. The authors found a much more powerful nonreligious predictor of effect on anti-Semitism. They found that a variable on
perspective, “narrow perspective,” accounted for fifty-two percent of the
relationship between christian beliefs and religious anti-Semitism, while religious
beliefs accounted for less than fifteen percent. The implication of their analysis
was that the relationship between Christian religiosity and anti-Semitism was
driven by the third factor, narrow perspective. While the authors documented a
positive and significant relationship between Christian beliefs and anti-Semitism,
they established that the relationship was more of narrow perspective mediated
slightly by values of a Christian religiosity. Their analysis notes the relationship
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between fundamentalist religiosity and authoritarian personalities, and narrow
worldview that contribute towards antipathy for out groups.
Yet another study conducted in the Netherlands, hypothesized that
religiosity should have a non-linear negative relationship with intolerance. The
authors theorized that those who, “live” their faith will reject ethnic bias, while only
those who claim an affiliation without being a core believer, or adhere to a
particularistic faith will show positive correlations with intolerance (Scheepers,
Gijsberts and Hello 2002). This difference between “identity” religiosity versus
lived religiosity is analogous to the idea of religiosity versus narrow-perspective
reviewed above. The authors conducted a multi-level regression analysis of types
of religious beliefs and behaviors as well as protestant and Roman Catholic sects
of Christianity. Their conclusions were that Christians tended to show more
prejudice then non-religious people or persons of other faiths (however in the
predominately Christian countries studied, other groups are the outgroups). They
also found that ethnic intolerance was positively associated with religious
attendance, but with the strong caveat that the kind of religiosity practiced
mattered. They found a negative marginal relationship between intolerance and
doctrinal beliefs and the importance of religion in respondents’ lives, but a positive
one between intolerance and religious particularism. The results seem to support a
commonsense notion that those who practice a religion that values tolerance, will

Noordijk

Social Capital and Tolerance

65

be more tolerant, but those who adhere to an exclusionary interpretation of their
faith, will tend to be less tolerant. Their study showed the importance of using a
multi-dimensional factor for religiosity, as the type of religiosity and the manner in
which it is practiced changes the sign of the association with intolerance. The
authors do caution that the non-Christian religious individuals in their study of
European countries are members of outgroups, and therefore unlikely to express
intolerance towards the minority group to which they belong. Finally, and
significantly to this study, the authors found that the religious heterogeneity of the
countries in the study had a strong positive effect on prejudice, as did economic
conditions. Questions about ethnic bias may be more salient to those with outgroups toward whom misanthropic feelings can be directed. The findings of the
multilevel study partially refute and partially support earlier studies on religiosity
and bias in Europe.
A 1990 study of racism and religiosity in Holland found that their was some
association with prejudice among casual church members and those who
attended frequently but that the trend reversed among individuals who
participated in church functions and associations. They also found that the
positive association between nationalism and religious participation almost
completely suppressed the relationship between faith and bias (Eisinga, Felling
and Peters 1990). A 1999 follow-on study that extended the investigation to a
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cross-state comparisons concluded that nationalism had a much more powerful
effect on bias, and that the relationship between religion and bias may be spurious
to that of nationalism and prejudice (Eisinga and Billiet 1999).
The hypothesis that Roman Catholic Eastern European states possess a
cultural propensity toward intolerance and authoritarian behavior, can be
understood in light of the studies reviewed above. Indeed the relatively lower
levels of economic security provided in the post-communist era would signal
intolerance based on Inglehart’s thesis of modernization and tolerance (Inglehart
1997). Also, the observations of Scheepers(Scheepers, Te Grotenhuis and Van
Der Slik 2002) and others that christian beliefs and Roman Catholicism in
particular, are associated with decreased levels of tolerance would also indicate
that a comparison of the United States and Poland, would find Poland less
tolerant. Finally a political culture dominated by years of Communist rule and the
enforced conformity that was imposed, might also be expected to have eroded
any residual culture of tolerance from before the Communist occupation.
Scheepers and others observed that of the Eastern European countries, Poland
was the only one that showed no association between faith and prejudice.
Karpov’s (Karpov 1999) comparison between Poland and the United States
actually revealed that, after controlling for demographic and economic indicators,
Polish sentiment was generally, if less consistently, as tolerant as that of America.

Noordijk

Social Capital and Tolerance

67

The Polish case also indicates a Polish intolerance for anti-system militaristic
behavior, having won their democracy, there seems to be a cultural propensity to
try and keep it.
An effort to analyze the apparent relationship between nationalism and
religious beliefs in the United States, created a survey with a battery of scales
designed to investigate the conflation of religious doctrine with beliefs in the
sacredness of the American symbols (Wimberley, Clelland, Hood and Lipsey
1976). Their study targeted fundamentalist Protestants who were thought most
likely to possess a civil religious value system. Beliefs of presidential authority
stemming from God, the sacredness of the flag, and the religious importance of
the American example all showed correlated but independent loadings from
strictly religious doctrinal beliefs in their latent variable model. Some
fundamentalist Christian Americans were found to hold beliefs toward the country
similar to those held towards God, with an emphasis on particularistic religious
beliefs and civil values indicating a religious-nationalism axis in-line with the work
by Altemeyer (Wimberley, et al. 1976; Altemeyer 1996). The observations by
Eisinga and Billet (1999) that a third dimension of nationalism and narrow
perspective have a stronger relationship to intolerance than religiosity per se seem
consistent with the results of these earlier studies . Religion and religious
organizations can provide motivation and structure for participation in organization
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activities that provide community services. However, religious participation is often
associated with a narrower view of community- focused on co-religionists, and
therefore also associated with intolerance.
2.10 The Interaction Of Government Capacity, Social Capital, And Public Policy
The interaction of government capacity and social capital is not a simple
causal path. Government provides conditions for bridging forms of social capital.
Bridging social capital makes government more accountable and effective by
preventing capture by narrow interest groups, by providing civil society
mechanisms for identifying problems and pressing claims against and monitoring
the performance of government. Social capital offers at least two mechanisms to
support better governance. One in which competent, honest and motivated civil
service exists, a society with high social capital has an engaged civil society which
can articulate social preferences while including a broader segment of the
population. Secondly, an engaged populace performs good monitoring functions
to prevent malgovernance (Evans 1989; Evans 1995).
In Making Democracy Work, (Putnam and Becker 1995) the conclusion is
that the tight networks of associations and the interpersonal and institutional trust
they help foster, create increased civic capacity. Government is able to more
effectively develop and execute policy, leading, in turn, to increased institutional
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trust and participation. Akkerman (2004b) also investigated the role of interacting
states and civil society with an eye both to effectiveness and increased forms of
civil society participation. Their study of the Netherlands’ implementation of
central government directed local initiatives for citizen participation in government
found a strong positive effect of institutionalized participation mechanisms.
Critiques of Putnam’s positive attributions of the role of social capital pivots
on the notions of the political opportunity structures available to members of
society. The relationship between the state and social capital is not a simple oneway causal relationship as implied by Putnam’s work in Italy, but it is a more
interactive relationship (Tarrow 1996). Tarrow argues that the form of government
and the type of interventions in society the government makes has as much to do
with the generation of social capital and thence civic capacity as the other way
around (Tarrow 1996; Knack 2002). As others have observed in the
democratization literature, strong governments may not have an interest in an
active a strong civil society (Linz and Stepan 1996a). They may be intervening to
promote patronage relationships, flatten civil society or create strong bonding
capital within groups, but only do so to keep those groups dependent on the state
(Kitschelt 2000). Conservative social capital theorists argue, that a strong state
serves to interfere with the formation of social capital and undermines the ability of
members of society to organize and solve problems autonomously (Fukuyama
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2001). Their prescription for good policy formation and implementation is to
reduce the strength and resources available to any single part of the state.
However, the observations of other analysts have been that the state does
matter, that an effective state need not simply crowd-out social capital, but that
the forms of the political structures created can strengthen social capital, and
reward cooperative behavior. Work by Pippa Norris (1999) and has documented
an apparent decline in some forms of social capital (institutional trust and
participation in elections) but argue that despite these declines, the western
democracies are still well above a threshold for good governance.
In order for the state to have a moderating effect on civil society, it must
have penetration and integration yet some autonomy from civil society actors and
civil society groups. Migdal’s (Migdal 1988) seminal work on the competition
between the state and traditional society structures in developing countries
provides a very powerful insight on the mutual shaping effect the state and society
can have on policy implementation. Migdal (1988) observes many cases in which
the relationship between policy makers in the central state and the people for
whom they are attempting reforms is moderated by an entrenched social structure
in which powerful individuals, those with the most capital, social and otherwise,
work to undermine or twist reforms in order to reinforce the existing political
economy. Migdal (1988) also notes that previously strong state with functional
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systems can be weakened by sudden changes in the structures of production.
This is similar to the arguments that the existing state connections with certain civil
society actors are altered creating an opportunity for civil society actors to reshape
social relationships and their relationship with the state. It is an opportunity for the
central state to assert itself in addressing the problems associated with transitions,
or to fade from relevance or autonomy in the lives of its citizens (Linz and Stepan
1996b; Linz and Stepan 1996a).
As the prior section on social capital briefly discussed, the relationship
between the state and civil society need not be the zero-sum game that theorists
in the de Tocqueville tradition anticipate. Later studies on civic engagement and
social capital demonstrate that federal requirements for citizen participation led
Portland, Oregon to create neighborhood associations as official adjuncts to city
government. This official status for small civic groups directly linking citizens with
their government appears to have led to citizen engagement in a wide variety of
community organizations (Putnam, Feldstein and Cohen 2003). This is an
example of how access points and government structure, in response to the
subsidiarity requirements of the European Union treaties, can lead to improved
civic capacity at the local level, where policy is implemented. Also discussed in
section 2.4, not all studies of government-civil society interactions find a positive
relationship between social capital and government policy; even in cases where
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the policy is explicitly meant to integrate civil society organizations into policymaking (Togeby 2004). With cautions that governments and civil society groups
need “horizontal” interactions instead of hierarchical or patronage connections,
several examples of a mutually beneficial relationship between government,
society and civic capacity (Wallis and Dollery 2002; Akkerman, et al. 2004b). Their
observations are slightly mixed but they share common observations that there
needs to be a balance between access points for civil society members to press
their interests, but also sufficient government autonomy to constrain capture by
groups with narrow memberships and bonding capital which isolates other
citizens.
A recent analysis provides even more support to the observations made by
other work on social capital in Europe, that the “crowding out” hypothesis
postulated by Fukuyama (1995b) and others (Gesthuizen, et al. 2008) is not only
incorrect, but reverse (Albano and Barbera 2010). Albano and Barbera (2010) test
directly the speculation that the establishment of a strong-state, particular of a
social safety net, has a positive relationship with volunteerism and the bridging
capital of individuals engaged in associational activities. This result provides
encouragement to my thesis about the importance of state capacity in generating
a positive spiral with social capital, particularly with bridging forms of social capital.
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There are a broad range of studies that have shown trends that counter the
general assumptions of the main body of earlier social capital work. One is that
social capital does not always have a positive effect on civic capacity- when
groups work against each other either directly or through the state. Another,
discussed previously, is that smaller is not always better. The novel element
added to the literature by this paper is an effort to test and quantify the
relationship between government capacity and social capital. This will rectify the
different observations of diversity and social capital. It also will test the occasional
proposition that negative or at best neutral effect government has on social
capital- the presence of government at the macro level is associated with higher
levels of social capital and numerous observations at the micro-level have
recorded that government mediated interactions have improved both social capital
and civic capacity.

2.11 Relative Political Capacity
To conduct the analysis of state success in moving toward a more tolerant
society, measures of political capacity at the state level are used to try and
account for Evans’s theory. As all the EU states should have fairly high levels of
government penetration in society, an interaction effect between state autonomy
and social capital that will lead to more successful outcomes is expected. States
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with an ability to broadly extract resources from society must have a certain
degree of penetration of their society. With that penetration of society comes the
ability to suppress or co-opt organizations working at cross-purposes to the state,
and cooperate with civil society organizations working in support of the state’s
goals. With the European Union’s subsidiarity principle, as well as the recent
focus on fostering civil society, states will locate their efforts closer to the
communities affected.
Relative political capacity in the European Union for the period of this
analysis can be taken from work performed by Arbetmann and Kugler (1997) and
others to compare tax extraction and therefore bureaucratic reach among
countries at similar levels of development . The model is an effort to estimate how
deeply into society governments can reach. It should be a proxy for Evans’
autonomous state, functionally combining autonomy and embeddedness. As a
final note, the lack of state strength and state capacity is often cited as a threat to
the establishment of democracy. However a study by Jose Cheibub (1998) found
that democracies, especially immediately after transitions, are more effective at
extracting taxes from civil society than authoritarian forms of government. An
implication of this finding may be that the post-transitional phase of
democratization provides a unique opportunity to establish the state and its
functions as citizens are less reluctant to submit to the functions of the state . If
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that opportunity is realized by implementing parties, directed by their elites, then
regardless of regime structure, democracy can be consolidated and strengthen
the legitimacy of the state and the process.
The theoretical foundations of Arbetman and Kugler’s (Arbetman 1997)
model of relative political capacity lie in observations of the seeming invariance of
extractive capability with regime type. The observation follows earlier work by
Lipset (1959) and others who observed that contrary to the modernization theory
assumption that a strong authoritarian state would have a better ability for stateled accumulation, democracies have performed the strong state role of taxation
just as effectively as non-democracies, often even more efficiently (Diamond, Linz
and Lipset 1990; Przeworski and Limongi Neto 1997). The construct of relative
political capacity is meant to measure bureaucratic effectiveness in reaching into
society, this is combined with the effectiveness of political parties in mobilizing
system consensus and reducing the costs of political reach (Organski 1997). As
noted by Dahl (1971) and refined by subsequent research, if the costs of
oppression surpass the effectiveness of the oppressive mechanism, then elites
may turn to democracy in order to reduce costs of resource extraction, or to
mobilize their populations (Przeworski, Stokes and Manin 1999).
The theoretical foundation of measuring political capacity speaks directly to
the creation of institutions that allow the state to penetrate and mobilize society or
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its resources. Organski (1997) describes the cycle as one in which political
development leads to increased political capacity, that capacity is then turned to
collecting resources and addressing social concerns, which also improves
government capacity and reach. Implicit in this description is innovation in the
interface of government and society—part of the model that would encompass
national governments’ efforts to incorporate civil society elements, and to foster
social capital in addressing EU policy concerns such as intolerance and the
attendant discrimination.
Although a precise estimation of government effectiveness is an ongoing
effort (Kugler and Tammen 2012), there have been several attempts at improving
the measurement. Measures of relative political capacity (RPC) as described in
Arbetman and Kugler (1997) are derived from two components, relative political
extraction (RPE) and relative political reach (RPR). As the names imply, these
measures are comparative in nature, they measure the behavior of states against
the expected behavior of their peer states. The relative political extraction
component is a measure of the tax revenue/GDP of a particular country divided by
the predicted tax/income ratio calculated from the regressing the tax ratio of other
states controlled for level of development and a series of economic structure
variables such as agricultural production, exports, and minerals exports. Relative
political extraction is the ratio of reported government revenues over revenues
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expected by the model. RPE is the residual of the model (Arbetman and Kugler
1997).
The relative political reach element is calculated in a similar fashion to that
of extraction, the difference being that relative political reach uses the ratio of labor
market activity of a country over the activity level predicted by a regression
equation derived from all countries in the sample; controlling for a variety of factors
such as development level, economic structure, and unemployment rate
(Arbetman and Kugler 1997).
The regression equations for the RPC measure are described below in
Figure 2.5. Unfortunately, the data required to complete the full formula for RPR is
incomplete for many of the Eastern and Southern European countries over the
period of this study. Therefore the political capacity measure to be used in this
analysis will be relative political extraction without including relative political reach.
Relative political extraction is calculated using the methodology described by
Arbetman and Kugler (1997) with latest relevant data from Eurostat, OECD and
the World Bank.
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Unstandardized Predictor i (Tax Revenue 1988...2009) = α
β1=Year
β2=(agriculture/GDP)
β3 = (Per Cap GDP)
β4= exports/GDP
β5= mining/GDP
β6= oil production in ‘000 BBL/day

Where RPRi=
+xβ1...6+ε

Unstandardized Predictor i (Labor Force1988...2007) = α
β1= Per capita GDP
β2= Government expenditure on wages/GDP
β2= Unemployment rate
β3= Urbanization
β4= Population older than sixteen/ total population
β5= Mean educational attainment
β6= Social Security taxes/total revenue

RPCi≈RPEi + RPRi

Figure 2.5: Regression Equations for Relative Political Capacity from Arbetman and
Kugler (1997)

Even in the European Union members to be included in this analysis, there
will be some variation in capacity observed, as different member states have
different levels of social safety net, different rates of economic growth, different
policies to connect with at-risk populations, and different abilities to make credible
threats to sanction free-riding by double-dippers who collect social benefits, but
also work on the side. Particularly in states with high-unemployment or high
migrant populations, the ability or desire of the state to monitor, assist or sanction
should be less than in states without large fractions of marginalized workers.
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Because the employment data in many of the eastern European accession
states is volatile or unavailable for much of the period 1991-2001, RPE is used to
estimate political capacity instead of the combined term.
2.12 Conclusion Of Literature Review And Discussion Of The Problem
This section has introduced the state of the conditions of the problem of
social intolerance in the European Union in several dimensions. The state of the
literature about the relationships of intolerance with a variety of personal and
societal characteristics was introduced revealing some expected and counterintuitive relationships. The literature, including a quick overview of existent
quantification of intolerance was also introduced, demonstrating the importance
and difficulty in measuring intolerance, either as a concept, or as activities such as
hate crimes or acts of discrimination.
The state of theoretical literature on the other important concepts in this
study was also presented. The review covered the different conceptions and
measures of social capital available including both theoretical and instrumental
examples. Social capital has a number of distinct dimensions, it is a characteristic
of individuals, and societies. It can be in-group focused, creating tight-knight
saturated networks; it can also be more diffuse with multiple relationships bridging
several kinds of groups. The importance and role of government capacity was
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also introduced, as well a discussion in how the relative capacity of governments
might be measured.
While the literature contains discussions of a direct path that social capital
plays in promoting social inclusion and tolerance, the link between social capital
(particularly the bridging form of social capital) and the capability of government is
not as thoroughly explored and rarely in a comparative context. The next chapter
introduces the variables and models that will be used to test the questions
introduced in chapter one. Putting the different threads of the literature together,
the relationships between state capacity and intolerance as transmitted through a
direct effect an indirect path through the forms of social capital that emerge under
a more capable state will be tested. The expectation is that the bonding forms of
social capital will be weakened and the bridging forms enhanced, resulting in
improved intolerance outcomes for the community.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY, MODELS, AND DATA
This study will attempt to measure the impact that state political capacity
has on shaping social capital in a direction that sustains bridging capital and
supports the policy goal of increased tolerance. Bridging social capital is the form
that is marked by numerous weak ties and generalized social trust and is
associated with an inclusive outlook towards other groups. Civil society
institutions generate social capital, they create either in-group bonding or intergroup bridging relationships. The review of the literature provided a foundation for
anticipating that bridging capital creates more effective communities with a more
effective political and civil society policy nexus. The political capacity of
governments, combined with an interest in tolerance promotion, should condition
the type of social capital civil society groups (such as religious groups) generate.
The combination of strong political capacity, and government interest in promotion
of tolerance is expected to be associated with more bridging capital. Societies
with strong governments and strong social capital are expected to be associated
with more successful tolerance outcomes than those with other combinations of
government capacity and social capital.
The model will take as its independent variable a measure that reflects the
goals of the Pillar III harmonization agenda. Absent surveys such as the European
Social Survey, and the World Values/ European Values Survey, there is no
consistent measure of intolerance that is comparable between European
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countries. Therefore a scale derived from questions regarding the suitability of
members of possible out-groups as neighbors will be used as a measurement of
intolerance for individual respondents.
A hierarchical linear model, comprising important indicators of the concepts
above, will be used to test the effects of individual and state-level characteristics
on tolerance of diversity. The model will also test the relationships between and
interactions of, social capital, state political capacity, religiosity and identity on
attitudes towards others. These items will be measured for interactions and
change over five waves of the World Values Survey, using factor analysis and
hierarchical models to test changes within societies and the relationship with
indicators. World Values Survey data from 1990-2009 will be used for individual
level information on age, income, education level, political ideology, left-right
political self-placement, dimensions of social capital and tolerance. National-level
data for aggregate income, tax effort, right-wing government participation and
social security expenditures are drawn from the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators, the European Commission’s data agency, Eurostat, the OECD and
from national statistical agencies.
In order to examine the specific hypothesized relationships between state
political capacity, social capital and the policy objectives of tolerance, a series of
models that control for relationships between demographic characteristics of
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individuals as well as the relationships observed in others’ work to test
components of the hypotheses will be used. In the discussion of variables below,
the direct correlation between the main variables of social capital, religiosity, and
RPE are examined. The relationships between social capital and relative political
extraction as well as intolerance using a path analysis of ordinary least squares
regression models is also tested. Finally, the relationships with hierarchical linear
models that include variables at the individual level like demographic
characteristics and the forms of social capital, with group-level variables that are
measured within national milieus is explored.
The path model provides insight into the relationships between the different
variables. It allows the partition of variance to gauge both direct and indirect
effects of independent variables on the phenomenon of interest. This model allows
an assessment of the effect that political capacity may have on the creation of
different forms of social capital on education, and finally on intolerance itself.
The hierarchical models are used specifically, to account for the effect that
state level characteristics, such as wealth, mean education level, religious makeup, recent experience with immigration, and social spending may have on the
pressures of ethnic and economic competition that individual’s experience.
However, beyond those characteristics, the interaction between social capital, civil
society institutions and a capable state are expected to have a greater effect on
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achieving the goal of tolerance beyond high-levels of social capital, or political
capacity alone. As a mediator to the expected relationship between state
capacity and social capital, the intensity and form of religiosity (personal versus
institutional) as an element of social capital and identity is expected to have a
relationship with tolerance that is also mediated by state capacity.
3.1 Path And Hierarchical Models To Test The Relationships Between
Intolerance, State Capacity And Social Capital
The hypothesized relationships between intolerance, government capacity
and social capital are characterized by multiple paths of effects between variables
and by nesting in national contexts. The relationship between government
capacity and intolerance is proposed as including an indirect path through social
capital. Public policy execution in the European Union is an expressly context
dependent process. The European Union follows a policy of subsidiarity which
gives considerable latitude to the member states in determining how to achieve
Union objectives, particularly on domestic policy issues like integration. Beyond
the formally context driven nature of problem analyzed, the very characteristics
and social phenomenon that are of interest, have unique national experiences that
will modify the way phenomenon interact. The distinct national social and political
contexts indicate that any analysis that does not explicitly recognize the nested
nature of the problem of policy implementation in different national and social
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contexts, is going to suffer from unnecessarily large unexplained variance and lose
a great deal of explanatory power. Because of these characteristics, the
relationship is explored using the two main techniques of a path model and multilevel regression.
Figure 3.1 contains a diagram of the path between government capacity
and intolerance including the indirect path through social capital. The diagram
illustrates the proposed relationship between government capacity and social
capital, where government capacity supports the emergence of bridging social
capital. The path from bridging social capital and the direct path from government
capacity to are expected to reduce intolerance.
In addition to the theoretical basis for an analytical model that incorporates
context, the method of data collection and cases available are drawn from national
samples rather than a simple random sample of the entire population of the
European Union and candidate states. Therefore, the use of an analytical method
that fails to incorporate the nested structure of both the phenomenon and the
data would suffer validity problems (Snijders and Bosker 1999).
The primary hypotheses of this study, that the political capacity of
government matters for the execution of policy and the presence and type of
social capital matters for tolerance, and that the interaction of government
presence and social capital (government constraining malignant versions of social
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capital and supporting bridging capital), require the ability to analyze cross-level
interactions between context-conditioning national level characteristics like
government capacity and individual-level characteristics such as social capital.
The multi-level nature of the phenomenon highlights the limited utility of other
analytical techniques like multiple regression with dummy variables as a proxy for
national contexts (Bickel 2007).

Bridging
Social Capital

Poltical
Capacity

Intolerance
Bonding
Social Capital

Figure 3.1: Conceptual Paths of Political Capacity to Intolerance (author’s diagram)

The multi-level model itself is written below with lowercase variable names
denoting individual level variables, and capitalized names denoting state-level
variables. The terms individual-level, micro-level, and level one are all used
interchangeably; macro-level, group-level, level-two and state-level are used to
describe level-two variables.
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Level one

Yintolerance= Random Intercept + Income + Education + Age + Political Self-Position +
Religiosity + Bridging Social Capital + Bonding Social Capital + Minority+error
Level Two- within each random intercept
RPE + GDP+ RIGHT_WING + Error
Cross-level interaction
RPEx Bridging Social Capital

Figure 3.2: Example of Hierarchical Model

Appendix D contains more detailed description of the strengths and
limitations of the types of analytical methods to be used in the analysis including
the need for dealing with missing data and distributional requirements of the
maximum likelihood estimators used in hierarchical regression.
3.2 Identifying And Testing Variables For The Models
Several of the concepts included in the model have multiple indicators and
capture slightly different concepts. In order retain a fairly parsimonious model
while preserving the information available and capturing important dimensions of
the concepts that may be in the data, compound variables or scales were created
to derive some of the variables for use in the model. There will be a three-stage
test for each compound variable. The first test is whether it makes sense
theoretically to use more than one indicator for the variable. If the indicator is
unidimensional and captured by one question, then only one measured indicator
will be used. However, in many cases it is useful to combine the different
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measures of a single concept together in order to have a more complete measure
of the item. Second, if the concept is theoretically multi-dimensional, the
hypothesized dimensions of the concept are present in the data with a factor
analysis and hierarchical cluster analysis to establish the appropriate combinations
for variables. If there is a compelling theoretical reason to combine dimensions
under the first test, then that will override considerations of confirmatory
techniques.
The sections below describe each of the variables in detail, the derivation of
compound variables and factors, as well as information on means and distribution
of other components of the independent and dependent variables.

3.4 Intolerance
Fitting a model with an estimator for intolerance using questions about
intolerance attitudes available in the European and World Values Surveys is
somewhat difficult as there are few variables that persist in the core questionnaire
from wave-to-wave. Also difficult is tracking how well the estimates of intolerance
generated by the variables in the survey correlate to acts of intolerance on the
ground in each of the member countries. As reported by the Fundamental Rights
Agency, for the period of this research, there is no consistent reporting system for
intolerant behavior or crimes, and even less cross-nationally comparable data
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available (FRA 2007a). Therefore, the general intolerance indicators available to
test in our study will be a scale composed of related questions about undesirable
neighbors from the World Values Surveys.
The European and World Values Surveys contain a series of questions that
ask the respondents to state if they “would have a problem” with each of a set of
hypothetical neighbors. The characteristics of the “neighbors” in the survey vary
from country to country except for a small group of potential neighbors that are
carried through most countries most years. This subset of neighbors includes the
potential out-groups of immigrants, foreign workers, homosexuals, AIDS sufferers,
heavy drinkers and drug users. Other questions about religious and ethnic
minorities are inconsistently available.
I conducted a number of analyses in order to identify patterns of
intolerance in the scale of questions. First the scale of neighbors was analyzed
using hierarchical cluster analyses with nearest neighbor estimators. The result
shown in figure 3.3 illustrates the approximate distances of covariation each item
has for individual respondents.
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Figure 3.3: Cluster Analysis of Intolerance Indicators (WVS-EVS)

Intolerance toward neighbors who are immigrants or of a different race
occur frequently in the same respondents. The are only two steps between the
two indicators this cluster. Next, respondents appear to cluster AIDS sufferers
and homosexuals together, then with the foreign worker/different race cluster at
step twelve. The indication from the cluster analysis is that intolerance toward
foreign workers and toward homosexuals/AIDS sufferers is closely related. Less
tightly clustered are the two indicators of substance abuse behavior.
Based on the results of the cluster analysis several estimates of intolerance
were calculated. One is an estimate of intolerance was calculated using factor
analysis. One variable derived from the factor analysis is used for analysis.
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Details of the process to calculate Intolerance that is focused only on attributes are
discussed in Appendix A
The identification of separate factors underlying intolerance in the European
Union may have implications for policy as they can help policy-makers direct
prescriptions at addressing the components of intolerance instead of the general
concept of social intolerance. Some groups, such as recent immigrants or
religious people, might well group drug or alcohol addiction in with homosexuality
as undesirable behaviors to be avoided in neighbors, while there are others who
may be perfectly tolerant of sexual orientation, or even of alcoholics, while being
strongly racist or anti-immigrant- supporters of Pim Fortuyn or Geert Wilders in the
Netherlands would well fall into this group.
In order to develop a single easy to interpret scale of intolerance in Europe,
that captures intolerance as a more general phenomenon and consistent with the
European Union’s stated goals of social tolerance especially of race and lifestyle a
simple summative index was created.
The 0-4 summative variable was created using the four questions that were
most highly correlated in the polychoric correlations table and cluster analysis. For
each neighbor from the list that was mentioned: “Immigrant”, “Different Race”,
“AIDS”, “Homosexual”, a point was added to that individual’s score. The
frequency distribution of the resulting variable is shown below.
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As shown by figure 3.4, the resulting scale has a single-tailed distribution
with a slightly high skewness. For the hierarchical regressions, the variable is
transformed to further reduce skewness. The distribution below is a gamma
distribution, but although a gamma-link hierarchical general linear model may
provide greater statistical power and better estimates, the mean (1.03) and
median (1) are close enough in this distribution that the loss of power is made up
for by the ease of interpretation.
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Figure 3.4 :Summative Intolerance Scale Distribution (WVS-EVS 1990-2008)

The separation of general intolerance and a measure that emphasizes the
attributive aspects of intolerance allows investigation of intolerance that is specific
to particular sub-groups apart from persons who have generally intolerant
personalities. It may enable understanding of different kinds of intolerance that
emerge at different economic or social development.
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3.5 Social Capital
Borrowing from analysis of social capital discussed in the literature review
section about the concepts and measurement of social capital, a set of three
social capital variables is crafted, composed of scales of variables linked to
different dimensions of the concept; bridging social capital; containing metrics of
generalized trust, friendships and memberships in organizations; bonding social
capital is trust that is in-group focused, and not associated with active civic
engagement or trust in government institutions. Finally, the model will also include
a measure of religiosity because religion and religious association are major civil
society actors and have a strong tie to other forms of associational memberships
and intolerance.
3.5.1. Bridging and Bonding Social Capital.
The membership component of the bridging social capital is derived from
a sum of membership questions available in the World Value sand European
Values Survey. The items for memberships included are church or religious
organization, sports or recreation organization, arts, music or education
organization, labour union, political party, environmental organization, professional
organization, and charitable organization. I created a summed scale of these
items using the process described below.
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Unfortunately, the World Values Survey and European Values Survey use
slightly different wording to ask respondents’ memberships and activity in various
organizations. As described in the literature review and introduction to this
section, membership in organizations is thought to be a cornerstone of the
conceptualization of social capital. The different wording used in the two waves
makes it impossible to simply use the responses from each of the surveys in direct
comparisons between states and the different versions of the survey. 1 Appendix
C contains details on recoding the surveys to amend the two versions and
preserve the information contained in the surveys. I will review the relationships
between the different aspects of social capital and the two different measures of
associational activity.
In order to check how the membership items relate to one another I tested
them using both cluster analysis. Examination of the dendrograms produced by
hierarchical cluster analysis shows the different membership questions tending to
cluster together except the variables for religious organization membership and
union membership which lay outside the cluster of other organizations. It is
inaccurate to describe union membership as voluntary for many countries— if you
are a worker in certain industries you are also a union member by law. However,

1

A table with the different wordings is in appendix 2
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that very fact of obligatory membership, may also mean that unions can be
generators of relationships that are not self-selected.
Further inquiry into the nature of the relationships between the membership
indicators using exploratory factor analysis reveals that the business associations
cut across various groups such as unions and religious organizations. A
subsequent factor analysis of memberships including items of abstract social
trust, religion indicators, and the importance of family and friends showed no clear
pattern other than that religious membership loads tightly on other religion
indicators, and that the importance of family and friends measure slightly different
constructs.
3.5.2. Combined Social Capital Factors
The memberships indicator was combined with three separate variables
that measure trust in individuals and the importance of friends and family to
establish factors for social capital. The questions query respondents on the
importance of family in their lives, the importance of friends in their lives, their state
of happiness, and whether or not they think most people can be trusted. The
question on generalized trust, “Do you think most people try and take advantage
of you, or that most people can be trusted” is a binary variable. The importance of
family and importance of friends is a four-point ranked ordinal question.
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Table 3.1 presents the loadings of a factor analysis for four indicators of
social capital that have been used in the literature and discussed in the preceding
pages. The table below reports the factor loadings (factor matrix), the unique
loadings (pattern matrix), correlations, and coefficients of two factors identifying
different aspects of social capital.The factor that emerged are labelled bridging
and bonding capital.
Table 3.1: Social Capital Loadings
Factor Loadings
Most people can be trusted
Important in life: Friends
Importance of Family1
Memberships
Correlation

0.081

Unique loadings

Coefficients

Bridging Bonding Bridging Bonding Bridging Bonding
0.484
-0.05
0.396
0.010
0.467 -0.121
0.288
0.103
0.257
0.146
0.181
0.051
0.192
0.815
0
0.838
0.000
0.830
-0.407

0.056

-0.41

-0.005

-0.312

-0.007

Variance explained 79%

1 Transformed using (ki^(1/ki)
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring of covariance matrix. Promax rotation. a. 2 factors
extracted. 16 iterations required. Source: WORLD VALUES SURVEY 1981-2008 OFFICIAL
AGGREGATE v.20090901, 2009. (2009).

The unique loadings indicate a definite pattern in the trust forms of social
capital. They show that for many of the respondents their responses for Trust, the
Importance of Friends, and Membership in Organizations, move together. Other
respondents are focused on the importance of their friends and families, but have
unrelated movement in their responses to the trust variable and memberships.
Figure 3.5 shows the value of these social capital factors across European
countries over the available years of the study. While the factor analysis identifies
two related but distinct forms of social capital the variance explained is too low to
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be used as latent variables in the analytical models. I will use these factors to
analyze the path of the relationship between relative political extraction, forms of
social capital and intolerance. The maps below show that the Northern European
countries have high levels of both bridging and bonding capital, that is people can
find friends and family important, while also having a generalized sense of trust
and participate in groups. The other countries exhibit a more zero-sum
relationship between trust. memberships and the importance of family.
Average Bridging Social Capital

Less Bridging

More Bridging

Average Bonding Social Capital

Less Bonding

More Bonding

Figure 3.5: Social Capital Factor Maps (WVS-EVS)

The variance explained by the factors and the ability to quantify the different
factors for a regression model using either OLS or ML estimators means that the
full model can effectively include the factors for bridging and bonding social capital
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to help distinguish between these forms of trust and a relationship with
Intolerance.
3.6 Trust In Institutions
In keeping with other analysis of social capital, a measure of trust in
government using the scale of confidence variables included in both the World
Values Survey and the European Values Survey. There are four salient questions
asked across all the waves and all the countries included in this analysis. The
questions seek the confidence level of respondents in a number of government
institutions: the armed forces, police, parliament, and the civil service.
While a summed scale would be the most direct way of measuring
confidence in government, there is a complex relationship between the confidence
in the armed forces and the other confidence variables. It seems there are people
with different kinds of confidence in government. As discussed in the literature,
some with confidence in government have confidence in authority structures,
while others may have confidence based on performance or perceived
effectiveness.
Two confidence in government variables were extracted using Bartlett’s
method which retains the correlations between factors, but also weights the
unique variances of the different dimensions (DiStefano, Zhu and Diana 2009).

Noordijk

Bridging Intolerance

100

Details of the factor analysis are presented in Appendix C. The separation of
official trust into its component factors provides potentially useful insight into the
qualitative element of confidence in government and reveal some drivers of
intolerance among individuals who otherwise might score highly on elements of
social capital. Table 3.2 offers a comparison of different measures of official
confidence correlated with the summed measure of intolerance.
Table 3.2: Public Institutions Confidence Correlations
Civil Service/
Parliament
Confidence
Factor
Civil Service Parliament
Confidence Factor 1
Police and Armed Forces
Confidence 2

Police/Armed Summed
Forces
Official
Confidence
Confidence
Factor

Intolerance
Scale

1

77713

77713

68115

.415**

1

77713

68115

Summed Official Confidence 4

.942**

.654**

1

69427

Summed Intolerance Scale 3

.011**

-.096**

-0.003

1

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
1,2,4: Lower scores indicate “Great Confidence”, higher indicate “No Confidence”
4 Summed scores from Confidence in Police, Civil Service and Parliament.
3 Higher scores indicate increased intolerance of neighbors
N reported on off diagonal.
WORLD VALUES SURVEY 1981-2008 OFFICIAL AGGREGATE v.20090901, 2009.
(2009).

As illustrated, the different dimensions of official confidence, although highly
correlated, suppress the relationship between each other and intolerance. This
observation is consistent with the literature on authoritarian personality and
intolerance discussed in the literature review. The civil services confidence factor
has a weak but direct relationship with intolerance indicating that confidence in the
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non-authority structures is aligned with improved tolerance. The armed forcescentered factor has a stronger and reversed correlation with intolerance than the
civil services/ parliament factor. This reversed relationship with intolerance exists
despite the two factors being correlated with one another at a level of .69. The
official confidence measure that is simply the sum of the four confidence indicators
shows a nearly completely suppressed relationship to intolerance. The differences
in slopes between the summed confidence scale and the each of the other
confidence factors is significant at p<.05. By separating the factors explanatory
power and some understanding of the different forms of social capital and official
trust and the relationship to intolerance.
3.7 Religiosity
In order to include the unique effects that a social institution like religion
might have on the personal attitudes of individuals, as well as their being
embedded in community networks centered around the church, I include an
indicator of religiosity.
There are several variables that prompt responses about religion that span
all waves and most countries in the World Values and European Values Surveys.
Table 3.3 shows the mean scores for the range of religiosity questions asked most
consistently across the waves.
Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics for Religion Measures.
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Standardized Variables

N

Mean

Std. Deviation Min

Max

Important in life: Religion 1-4,
1=Very, 4=Not at all.

74822

2.43

1.073

-1.33322

1.46383

Confidence: Churches(1-4;
1=Great Deal, 4=None)

82621

2.43

0.982

-1.45612

1.59793

How often do you attend religious 84328
services (1-8; 1=more than
weekly, 8=never)

5.09

2.500

-1.63555

1.16454

How important is God in your life 82851
(1=Not at all, 9=extremely)

6.04

3.307

-1.52458

1.19693

World Values Survey 1981-2008 Official Aggregate v.20090901, 2009. (2009).

The most straightforward method of capturing a measure of religiosity is to
simply standardize the variables and sum them into a scale of religiosity. Detailed
discussion of estimating religiosity is presented in Appendix D. Analysis of
religiosity questions indicated strong inter-item correlations that would likely form a
reliable single scale. The Cronbach’s alpha for a scale based on these four item
is .86. The resulting variable was adjusted to account for a multi-peaked
distribution. The final calculated scale for religiosity retains the high Chronbach’s
alpha meaning that the information has been retained while reducing distortions
caused by non-normality of the data.
The literature has shown that there are several dimensions to religiosity. I
used factor analysis to test four indicators of religiosity to examine for multidimensionality. The analysis of the available measures indicates loading primarily
on only one latent concept. If more of the questions on religiosity were available
through the different waves and across countries, a nuanced measure of religiosity
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that parses out personal versus institutional religiosity might be possible.
However, the eigenvalues for the potential factors indicate that only one factor
accounts for a great deal of the variance in the latent factors, as reflected in the .
86 correlation between the two factors. Only one religion variable is justifiable with
the indicators at hand.

WORLD VALUES SURVEY 1981-2008 OFFICIAL AGGREGATE v.
20090901, 2009. Madrid, World Values Survey Association .

Figure 3.12: Average Level of Religiosity by Country (WVS-EVS)

The level of religiosity reflected in this variable does appear to be in
harmony with other research on religiosity in Europe. The map below shows that
religiosity is fairly low in Northern and Western Europe, while high in Ireland,
Poland, and Turkey, with the other Roman Catholic States filling in the middle.
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3.8 Minority Ethnic And Religious Group Status
I calculated the modal ethnic and religious affiliations of the country from
the dataset. For Northern European countries I only identify individuals outside the
three main groups, non-affiliated, protestant and Roman Catholic, as minority
respondents. I also created a second identifier if the respondent is muslim.
However, the infrequency of the religious identifiers make this variable difficult to
use in the full multi-level analysis. In single level analysis it provides an important
control to explain why someone may be sympathetic towards minorities in
defiance of expectations drawn from other characteristics.
3.9 Education
Education has been observed to correlate positively with tolerance in
almost all studies. However, variation can occur within national systems as the
goals of education can be either instrumental-technical or include socialization
curricula as well. The Educational Attainment variable in the World Values Survey
provides a cross-nationally comparable scale of 1-9 levels of attainment starting at
1= no formal education, to 9=completed education. Forms of socialization in past
education systems will likely have a persistent effect on older citizens, so individual
educational attainment and national average educational attainment. Therefore,
mean national educational attainment may also tested as a context variable. The
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education question asked on the different waves of the survey varied from the first
wave of the European Values Survey to the rest of the waves of the survey. In
order to include the data for the countries that presented missing data in the years
of the question change, I imputed the data using the waves for which data was
presented using both questions. There is more detail in Appendix F on missing
data techniques that were used to preserve this data for the analysis.
3.10 Individual Political Position
Political position on the right-left scale has been demonstrated to be
strongly associated with intolerance; any model of intolerance attitudes must
include some element of political self-identification. The World Values, and
European Values Surveys ask each respondent to place themselves on a 1-10
scale of political alignment where 1= left wing and 10= right wing.
3.11 Relative Political Extraction
As described in the literature review, relative political extraction helps to
measure the penetration of the state into society at a certain level of development.
I calculated RPE for the sample of European countries for the years covered by
the relevant waves of the World Values Survey. In keeping with the description of
relative political extraction derived from the work led by Kugler and Arbetman, RPE
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was calculated using the total tax revenue, minus tariffs, of each country to create
a variable of expected versus actual tax receipts for each country over the period .
Arbetman and Kugler (1997) updated in Kugler and Tammen (2012) the
measurement of government capacity describe a linear relationship between the
indicators and the dependent variables in their regression equations to estimate
the expected tax ratio and the expected ratio economically active population over
population . In developing equations to derive expected ratios for the smaller
sample and range of years analyzed in this project there is improved fit with nonlinear relationships for important independent variables in the equations. Because
the non-linear model deviates from the reference literature, and the model
improvement is quite small (less than 2% of variance explained), retained the linear
model.
The calculation of RPE uses the level of development and a vector of
sectoral composition variables to predict the tax effort of countries. The model
used for this analysis predicts .52% (R2) of variance in tax effort. The residual
unexplained variance is considered the Relative Political extraction. Detailed
explanation of the model, including the regression results are presented in
Appendix E.
The maps illustrate the relative political extraction of a range of the
European countries over the period of this study. As might be expected, Sweden
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has the highest RPE overall and as one of the wealthiest countries, the highest
level of absolute political capability. The figure also illustrates how the measure of
relative capacity varies over time as governments are able to extract resources
from their societies, or choose not to. 2 Again the concept of RPE does not
provide total available resources, but instead presents the tax effort in excess of
that predicted for peer countries. In figure 3.13 Bulgaria appears to have higher
capacity than the Netherlands some years. This indicates that Bulgaria’s tax
revenues were unexpectedly high for its level of development not that it has more
total resources compared to the Netherlands or the United Kingdom.

1988

-.26

2

1998

.065

-.045

.098

Cyprus data after 2004 is S. Cyprus officially reported data combined with data reported by the
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus weighted 70% and 30% respectively. .
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-.05
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2007

.072

-.27

.115

Sources: Gross Domestic Product by sector from OECD members SourceOECD, nonOECD members data from EUROSTAT tables using similar accounting methodology.
Per Capita GDP from World Bank World Development Indicators database, using PPP at
USD terms at year 2005 values. Revenue data is from SourceOECD database for
OECD members, others from EUROSTAT. Oil production data is from the International
Energy Agency, http://www.iea.org/stats/index.asp.

Figure 3.13: Relative Political Extraction of Selected Countries 1988-2007

3.12 Moving Average of Participation of Right-wing Groups in Government.
This context variable is in recognition of the fact that an effective
government is unlikely to effectively execute policy with which it either disagrees,
or which does not rise to the ruling coalitions’ agendas. In an effort to estimate
the institutional intentions of governing parties, I use the political party placement
data and cabinet composition data from the Comparative Political Data Set
1960-2008, from the University of Bern (Armingeon, Engler, Potolidis, Gerber and
Leimgruber 2010). I compiled a 5-year moving average of the right-wing
composition of government scores to serve as a proxy for government intent. For
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post-communist states I use a moving average of the post-transition years, until a
five year history was achieved, then the 5-year moving average was used. The
Armingeon et al dataset did not include political party data for Turkey so values
were calculated approximately comparable values for use in the analysis.3
3.13 Ratio of Local to National Discretionary Spending
The models test the proximity of governance hypothesis that is implicit in
Evans’ work about the interaction between the state and civil society (Evans
1995). The literature on social capital also seems to indicate that the closer to
local civil society that government policy is executed, the more effective the policy,
and more sustaining of social capital it is likely to be (Putnam, et al. 2003;
Akkerman, et al. 2004b). The data for budgetary allocation was collected from the
OECD and Eurostat for non-OECD European states. The allocation variable uses
percentage of non-social insurance spending by local and regional governments
divided by total spending minus social insurance. For small countries with no subregions, the figure was set to one. Data for spending ratio in Turkey was acquired

3

Weighted government political placement values were calculated using a simplified version of
Armingeon et al’s method of weighted cabinet participation. For cases without a designation of
right-left political values for political parties, each of the parties were coded based on
supporters’ self-placement in the right-left spectrum on the 1990-2007 waves of the World
Values Survey. The leftmost values were subtracted from the of the major parties and divided
by the range to gain a scale comparable to that used by Armingeon et al. It is a Left=0,
Right=100 scale. As in Armingeon et al, the period of Prime Ministry was then weighted by time
in office for each year.
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from the EDDS database at the Central Bank of the Turkish Republic (TurkStat
1990-2011; CBRT 2010).
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CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS
4.1 Intolerance In Europe Over Time

Figure 4.1 below shows the mean scores for intolerance in the European
countries being studied between the different waves of the World Values Survey.
Because not all countries have participated in the surveys for each wave the data
in the figures show a general comparison over time. The data in the left frame is
from wave 2, the earliest available, while the lower right frame is from the latest
available data in 2008. The figure 4.1 illustrates the intolerance scores for each of
the country-waves for the European Union and accession states available through
the surveys. The table shows a general trend toward improved tolerance,
especially the return to a normal level for France in 2008-2009 after the 2005
wave reflected uncertainty due to nation-wide riots that had occurred weeks
before the survey. However, the news is not all good, as a number of states,
notably the Netherlands and the Czech Republic each had substantial increases in
intolerance for the 2008-2009 wave of the European Values Survey over the levels
reported in the prior wave of the World Values Survey. A detailed table of
intolerance by wave and year is reported in Appendix B.
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Wave 4: 1999-2004

Wave 2: 1989-1993

.46

2.4

Wave 5: 2005-2007

.12

112

.18

2.4

Wave 6: 2008-2009

2.3

.16

2.7

Source: (World Values Survey 1981-2008 Official Aggregate V.
20090901, 2009 2009; EVS 2011)

Figure 4.1: Summed 4-Item Intolerance in Europe 1989-2009

The data reflect the observation that overall in Europe, and in all of Western
Europe except France, there was improvement of social tolerance over the 15
years covered by these surveys until the 2008-2009 wave. The France anomaly is
explained by the fact that data collection began 30 days after major race riots
spread throughout the French suburbs. The data from the 2008-2009 wave of
the European Values Survey indicate that France has returned to levels lower than
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before the riots. Some countries in Eastern Europe such as Hungary and Slovak
Republic have made tremendous improvement in tolerance over the period, while
other countries, such as Slovenia, Latvia and Turkey have notched increases in
intolerance along with their Northern European neighbors the Netherlands and
Sweden.

4.2 Demographic Correlates Of Intolerance
Chapter three provided an explanation of different measures of intolerance
that will be used to gauge EU progress towards tolerance goals, and explore
correlates of intolerance and that can provide insight to guide policy.
Table 4.1: Correlates of Intolerance: Demographics, National Characteristics
Summed 4-item Behavior and race
Intolerance scale dimension
Religiosity (-1 Irreligious, 1 Religious)

.178**

-.026**

Bridging social capital (friends diffuse trust,
memberships)
Self Position in Political Scale (1=Left, 9=Right)

-.216**
.113**

-.014**
-.016**

Gender (0=Female, 1=Male)

-.028**

-.037**

Age

.108**

-0.004

Educational Attainment

-.190**

-.049**

Scale of Incomes

-.165**

-.030**

Is respondent of a minority religion

-.040**

-.038**

Size of town

-.119**

-.050**

GDP per Capita (2005 PPP USD)

-0.77**

0.24*

Growth Rate of Migration
Relative Political Extraction

-0.2**
-0.127**

0.29**
-0.303**

Right-wing Governments (lagged moving average)

0.383**

-0.282**

Country-Wave Level Correlations
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* p<.05, ** p<.01. Country-Wave level correlations are correlations between aggregated
intolerance levels and the country-level indicators.
(World Values Survey 1981-2008 Official Aggregate V.20090901, 2009 2009)

Table 4.1 shows strong correlations in the expected directions between
Intolerance and bridging social capital (-.216), religiosity (.178) and educational
attainment (-.19) on the individual level. GDP (-.77), RPE (-.127), and Right-wing
governments (.383) are all significant for the aggregated country-wave level data.
The correlational relationship between RPE and intolerance is significant and in the
hypothesized direction.
For the dimensional factor of race versus behavior the connection with RPE
is even stronger than with the combined scale for intolerance. Correlation
coefficients indicate that countries with higher RPE experience intolerance toward
behavior more than racial attributes. Those states with recent experience with inmigration correlate with a significant uptick of intolerance against other races and
foreign workers more than against drug users or alcoholics (.29). Keep in mind
that in those states in-migration is correlated with decreased overall intolerance
against immigrants or homosexuals (-.24). Finally, there is a direct relationship
between per capita GDP and intolerance focused on foreign workers or minority
races (.24), indicating that the specific form of intolerance targeting only
immigrants is specific to the wealthier states. A sort of post-materialist
intolerance.
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4.4 Examining the hypotheses
The series of hypotheses lead to the development of a path model that
permits analysis of the relationship between relative political capacity and
intolerance. It is taken as an assumption that European Union member states are
not totalitarian states and accede to the goal of social tolerance.
The hypothesized mechanism is that relative political capacity will reduce
intolerance through two primary paths. First, the presence and effectiveness of the
state in society will foster the development of between-group focused bridging
forms of social capital; second that there is a direct effect of relative political
capacity in terms of the resources, both repressive and services that the state can
deliver to individuals that reduce inter-group competition. The main hypothesis are
examined in this section using several techniques, including a path model of the
proposed mechanisms and hierarchical models that examine the proposed
relationships. The path analysis is developed using ordinary least squares
regression because it is robust to violations of normality in the dependent variable,
but the nested nature of the data requires special techniques to address intraclass
correlation4 . Then, because of the clustered nature of the societies surveyed, a
series of hierarchical linear models are used to examine the full model with the
express inclusion of group-level considerations.
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The several sub-hypothesis are also tested and several of the relationships
between intolerance, social capital, governance, and state-level characteristics are
explored.
4.5 Path Model Examining Relationships Between RPE, Social Capital And
Intolerance
The hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between the bridging
forms of social capital and state capacity is tested with a single-level regression
model controlling for other correlates of social capital. In addition, if the notion of
state capacity controlling the forms of social capital that will emerge is correct,
RPE should be inversely related, or unrelated to bonding capital. This test also
provides the bridging social capital path to construct an overall path model using
ordinary least squares regression to illustrate the relationships between relative
political extraction, social capital and intolerance.
Modeling the path of relationships between RPE and the forms of social
capital examines the mechanism proposed in hypothesis two; that stronger
government capacity will constrain the formation of bonding social capital and
foster bridging capacity. The regression of bridging social capital on relative
political extraction, controlling for Education, Per Capita GDP and Religiosity,
results in relationships that confirm the hypothesis. Table 4.4 presents the mean
standardized parameters and R-squared for the 5 imputed datasets.
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Table 4.2: Relative Political Extraction on Bridging Social Capital for Path Model
Model OLS

RPE on Bridging Social Capital
β (t)

Intercept

0.21

Study (1=EVS,2=WVS)

0.11(.9)

Education

0.24* (6.8)

Religiosity

.08* (2.9)

Is Minority Religion
(0=majority, 1=Minority)

0.056 (1.65)

RPE

0.181* (4.8)

LN GDP per cap

0.375* (8.8)

R2,

0.178

N= 79735. Design Effect = 112.5, Adjusted N=708
Bridging Social Capital is on a scale of 1=intense<->-1= weak.
t-scores for group-level variables estimated using N for degrees of freedom at each
level.
*significant at p<.05
Source: (World Values Survey 1981-2008 Official Aggregate V.20090901, 2009 2009;
European Values Study 1981-2008, Longitudinal Data File 2011)

The table illustrates strong support for the hypothesis that there is a
strengthening relationship between RPE and bridging social capital. The
standardized parameters show that for each standard deviation increase in RPE
there is a .181 intensification of bridging social capital. Education and per capita
GDP also have strong associations with bridging social capital. Religiosity, also
has an intensifying effect on bridging capital. This observation is likely because
one of the components of the bridging capital factor is membership in a religious
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organization and religious individuals are also engaged in other service oriented
organizations as discussed in the literature review.
A second regression model, in table 4.8 below, to test the path between
RPE and the bonding form of social capital does not confirm the expectation of
hypothesis 2.3; the relationship between RPE and bonding capital is in the same
direction as with bridging capital. However, the relationship is very weak, .075
standardized coefficient. The model accounts for roughly 3% of the variance in
bonding capital. The bonding social capital model has a conditional intraclass
correlation of only .04, indicating that it the characteristics of bonding social capital
are driven by individual level characteristics that are not included in this path. The
item that correlates most with bonding capital is religiosity. The relationship
indicates that more religious people, other factors being equal, tend have a more
in-group orientation. It is also worthwhile to remember that although bonding and
bridging capital are factors drawn from the same measured indicators, they are,
largely independent of each other so there are states, like Sweden, that score
intensely on both bridging and bonding capital.
The models that were tested in this section indicate that the expected
relationship between bridging forms of social capital and RPE exists which
indicates a confirmation of hypothesis 2.2. The expected negative relationship
between bonding, or inward focused forms of social capital, and relative political
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extraction was not present however rejecting the relationship expected in
hypothesis 2.3.
In order to examine the direct effect of bridging social capital on intolerance
the path analysis model is populated with other indicator variables. This model
also specifies the paths between Intolerance and bridging social capital and the
relationships between and among RPE, GDP, education, political self-position plus
the institutional trust and religiosity forms of social capital as well.
Path analysis requires that the entire web of effects be examined on order
to identify the paths of relationships among the variables in the model. To
examine the path of bridging social capital in the single-level model it must be
populated with all the relevant relationships, otherwise there may be unidentified
suppression or moderation effects that will confound interpretation.
The table illustrates the first part of the path which passes through
education and has a -.09 correlation with Intolerance in the final model. The path
model illustrates that only a very small part of the relationship between RPE and
Intolerance stems from the relationship of RPE and GDP per capita through
education. The path diagram shows the relationships as modeled by the path
analysis, and manifest in the single-level regression model of the relationships
between intolerance and the individual level variables, and the national-wave level
variables of GDP and RPE.
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Table 4.2: Intolerance Single-level Regression for the Path Analysis
Ordinary Least Squares

Random Intercepts Regression

β (t)

B (t)

Intercept

-0.05

-0.07

Study (EVS,WVS)

0.004 (1.6)

.086 (1.3)

Political Self-Placement

0.08 (3.1)

.08 (19.6)

Age

0.063 (2.21)

.0133 (27.8)

Religiosity

.084 (2.9)

.03 (9.8)

Educational Attainment

-0.10 (-3.4)

-.10 (-26.2)

Bridging Capital

-.11 (-3.8)

-.308 (-21.5)

Bonding Capital

-0.012 (-.6)

.005 (.5)

Ln (per Cap GDP)

-0.315 (-2.8)

-1.14 (-8)

RPE

.006 (.07)

.096 (.06)

R2

0.205

Dependent Variable= Intolerance summed with sqrt transformation.
N= 79128, Design effect= 66, Adjusted N=1192,
All Standardized Regression Coefficients
*significant at p<.05.
Source: World Values Survey 1980-2005 combined dataset. World Values Association.

The table provides the path model of the single-level OLS regression next
to a random intercept hierarchical model. The singe-level regression has an Rsquared of .20. What both models provide is confirmation of that bridging social
capital is associated with improved tolerance; the single-level regression with a
single fixed intercept at the mean income and political capacity level, shows a -.11
standardized correlation between bridging social capital and Intolerance, the
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hierarchical linear model indicates that even if the intercept for the individual-level
model is allowed to vary by country-year, the relationship holds.

Bridging
Social
Capital

Relative
Political
Capacity
.25
.2

-.122
.2

.10
.15

.09
-.317

.144
-.11

.00
.08

.006
.24

-.214

Per Capita
GDP

Study
EVS=0,
WVS=1

.043

Educational
Attainment

Intolerance

-.315
-.2

.02
-.02

-.10
-.09
-.084
.028

Religiosity

Political SelfPlacement

.08.094

.07
.06

Age

Path model estimated using OLS regression for the total model (direct paths) and
for the two indirect paths estimated.
Source: World Values Survey 1980-2005 combined dataset. World Values
Association.

Figure 4.2: Path Analysis of RPE to Intolerance, Single-level Regression

4.5.1 Path model test of hypothesis 1: Political capacity will have a direct effect
on intolerance.
Figure 4.2 illustrates that the direct path between relative political extraction
and transformed intolerance in the model is a very weak and not significant .006.
This is the opposite direction of the hypothesis and means the null hypothesis of
no effect cannot be rejected by this model. However, the discussion of the
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relationship of RPE and intolerance illustrated by the path model, indicates that the
effect of RPE on intolerance is mediated both through education and social
capital. As a note the random intercept multi-level models in section 4.6 also
show a non-significant relationship of RPE and intolerance in the opposite of the
hypothesized direction.
4.5.2 Path model tests of hypotheses 2, 2.1, 2.2: Political capacity of the
government will reduce intolerance through bridging social capital.
These hypotheses are confirmed in the path model. The unexpected direct
relationship of RPE and intolerance in the direct path is moderated by the indirect
paths through educational attainment, bridging social capital, and GDP. The path
analysis in figure 4.2 illustrates the relationship of RPE to intolerance through
bridging capital and education.
Hypothesis 2.1, that bridging social capital (Trust-based) is associated with
reduced Intolerance, is supported in the path model. The path between bridging
social capital and intolerance is statistically significant with a coefficient of -.11 (p<.
05). Remember that the bridging social capital variable is constructed so that
negative numbers indicate denser networks and greater social trust. The -.11
correlation indicates that as individuals participate in fewer organizations and have
less trust, they are more likely to exhibit intolerance.
Hypothesis 2.2, that increased government capacity will improve the level
of bridging social capital, is also supported by the OLS regression used to
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populate the path model. The RPE to bridging social capital path, has a -.18
correlation, consistent with the hypothesis. The path between bridging social
capital and the intolerance variable has a correlation of -.11. Therefore, eighteen
percent of the path that is between bridging social capital and the intolerance
variable is a product of relative political extraction.
Additionally, RPE is associated with ten percent of educational attainment
scores, which have a .24 coefficient associated with bridging capital. The product
of the path, .10 by .24, is the .02 that is contributed indirectly to bridging capital
by RPE through educational attainment. The net indirect contribution of RPE to
Intolerance through bridging social capital is .02 plus .01 through education for a
total indirect path of .03. The relationship between Intolerance and RPE is still a
very weak effect, requiring an examination using the more powerful tool of a multilevel linear regression.
4.5.2: Path model test of hypothesis 2.3, Intense bonding social capital is
associated with summed intolerance
Hypothesis 2.3 is not supported by the results of the path model presented
in table 4.1. The standardized regression coefficient of -.012 is not close to
significant. Even the parallel random intercept multi-level model with improved
sensitivity, presented alongside the OLS path model in table 4.1 does not support
the hypothesis that bonding capital is directly related to intolerance. Table 4.1 and
the discussion of its results indicate that there was no significant relationship
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between RPE and bonding forms of social capital. This rejects the hypothesized
mechanism of constrained bonding social capital. Indeed, the maps of social
capital in Europe (figure 3.9) show that some high bridging capital states like
Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands, also have high levels of bonding social
capital.
The path model is useful for illustrating the mechanisms of the relationship
between government capacity and intolerance. Relative political capacity is
associated with improved educational results, and a strengthened relationship of
GDP per capita and intolerance. Without the path model, the simple correlation
between RPE and intolerance would lead to a conclusion that increased capacity
suppresses intolerance, however the mechanism is more complicated, and has
implications for focusing limited public resources.
The OLS model does not permit varying intercepts and really dealing with
the context-dependent nature of the surveys and the environment of the
relationships between intolerance and its correlates requires the use of multi-level
techniques which permit varying intercepts.
4.6: Testing Hypotheses With Multi-level Models.
The statistical power of multi-level models is determined by the number of
groups, more than the number of individual cases (Hox 2002). The constraints
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caused by the small number of group-level (country wave) indicators, the multilevel model is limited in the number of country-level variables or cross-level
interactions that can be tested in the multi-level model without losing power.
Following the direction of a number of texts reviewed in the literature discussion,
the focus will be on the interaction of social capital and relative political extraction
with few context-level variables such as RPE and GDP per cap in each analysis.
The subsequent models examine the role of RPE and bridging social
capital in multi-level models that include the contextual effects of GDP/Capita and
RPE, as well as the cross-level interaction of RPE and bridging capital. The
interaction term allows the slope of bridging capital to vary by country. The
observation of the single model, that the impact of RPE on bridging social capital,
and on Intolerance is affected by the right-left nature of the government, indicates
that the slope of social capital varies by country-wave.
Several models are presented in the table in Appendix J that lead to the
specification of the model in table 4.3. The first is the null model containing
random intercepts to provide a baseline for comparison and derivation of the
psuedo-R2.
The relationships of interest for this study are the relationships of
intolerance, RPE and bridging social capital with each other and interacted on
intolerance. The model below allows the inspection of the relationships of the
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country-level variables on the individual-level intercepts, and the relationship
between bridging social capital and RPE as nested in the context of each country
in each wave of the survey. In multi-level regression models the observations of
the single-level models carry forward to the multi-level model in the slopes of the
individual-level and group level variables. The fixed effect coefficients of the
group-level variables act on the intercept for individual’s regression equations.
4.6.1: Analysis
The results of the hierarchical model for the 1986-2007 data looks similar
to the final OLS regression for the path model. The relationships of education, as
well as political self-assignment, age, income and gender all retain significant
individual-level slopes with intolerance in the expected direction.
The addition of GDP per capita reduces the between country error term
(random intercept) by more than half, and doubling the explained variance
between the null model from the appendix and populated model below. While
none of the other context variables had statistically significant fixed effects.
The unstandardized slope of bridging social capital on intolerance is
between -.28 to -.33 in all the models and still significant at the .00. This result
provides consistent support to hypothesis 2.1, that intensified bridging social
capital is associated with lower intolerance.
Table 4.3: Hierarchical Model 1986-2007 Data
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Fixed Effects

Coefficients

Intercept γ00

-0.21

Religiosity (centered)

.04**

Gender (male)

.27**

Education (centered)

-.09**

Right-Left Political (centered)

.08**

Income (centered)

-.017**

Bridging Social Capital (centered)

-.33**

Age (centered)

.013**

Town Size

-.04**

Relative Political Extraction

1.90

ln GDP/Capita (centered)

-1.03**

Migration. rate

-2.24

Soc. Security Spending/GDP

-2.9

Local expenditure /total expenditure

-0.036

RPE x Bridging Capital

-1.39*

Ln GDP x Bridging

-.15**

Local Exp x Bridging

0.12

Random Effects
Residual

3.13

Random Intercept

.22*

Random Slope Bridging

.025**

Slopes by Intercepts Bridging

0.006

Model Fit (smaller is better)
AIC

226570.00

BIC

226606.00

Pseudo

R2

0.19

Individual N= 77,015, Group-level N = 72 . Mixed Regression, Unstructured Random
Effects (variance components). Right-wing parties in percentage of total cabinet posts,
weighted by days. Source: own calculations for Turkey based on Schmidt and Beyer
(1992); 1991 onwards: Political Data Yearbook(s), EJPR.
Source: World Values Survey 1980-2005 combined dataset. World Values Association.

While the direct path between RPE and intolerance does not have a
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statistically significant coefficient, it is positive which is the opposite direction
proposed for hypothesis one (1.9). However, the cross-level interaction term RPE
x bridging also highlights the relationship between RPE and bridging social capital
in the model. The coefficient of the cross-level interaction term is -1.39 and is
significant even though the coefficient for RPE alone is not. The -1.39 coefficient
of the interaction term indicates that at higher levels of RPE, the relationship
between bridging social capital and intolerance is slightly, but significantly
intensified. Review of the hierarchical models in Appendix J provide more support
for the idea that some change in RPE accounts for an element of the random
slope of bridging social capital.This is because there a reduction of the random
slope for the bridging social capital (from .04 to .03), meaning that some of the
random variation in slope for bridging social capital, is accounted for by RPE.
The error term for the random slope of bridging social capital (.025)
indicates that there is slight, but statistically significant variation in the slope
between intolerance and bridging social capital at the country-wave level. The
slope by intercept error term of ,006 for bridging social capital means that the
variation in slopes is not a product of the intolerance.
The variation is accounted for without further explaining the model fit,
which still has a psuedo-r-squared of .18 to .19 for both models. The existence of
an inconsistent relationship in the interaction effect explains why there is no
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increase in the slope of bridging capital for an increase in relative political
extraction.
This observation is also confirmed by the relative lack of slope variance for
bridging social capital. If the slope of bridging capital on Intolerance is almost
always the same, the slope of the interaction of RPE and bridging social capital
cannot have a consistent effect on Intolerance because RPE changes from group
to group. While the slope RPE x bridging capital is significant, indicating that the
variance of slope from context to context accounts for a non-trivial amount of the
error in the model, however there is a large standard error of the estimate and
small degrees of freedom ( 31) means the relationship has little power.
The hierarchical model also includes the interaction of country-wave level
per capita GDP with bridging social capital. The coefficient of -.15 is significant.
For higher levels of GDP the slope of the relationship between bridging capital and
intolerance will also change slightly. Illustrating that the relationship between per
capita GDP and intolerance is also partially mediated by bridging social capital.
First the level of recent influx of immigrants has a reversed relationship with
intolerance, that is intolerance is inversely related with the immigration rate.
Second, the level of unemployment in the country has a significant relationship
with intolerance but the weak relationship indicated is the reverse of common
assumptions (model 3 in Appendix J). This is in contrast with results of some
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other studies, however other authors have observed that unemployment at the
individual level does have a direct relationship with intolerance (Coenders and
Scheepers 2003). Possible explanations might be that migrants seek strong
economies and countries with capable governments as destination countries.
Contact theories of intolerance also are supported by the strong reversed
relationship of town size and intolerance as most migrants and their heirs settle in
urban settings.
Finally, a separate term for social security spending over GDP is included to
explore the idea that a strong social safety net reduces the dependence on tightly
bonded organizations for social welfare support and reduces the costs of
defections by potential partners in organizations or enterprises that lie on the edge
of an individual’s network of social controls. Social security spending is not
significant in the fully specified model in table 4.3.
The model rejects a direct effect of RPE on social intolerance. Hypothesis
one is rejected. However, hypothesis two; that RPE will foster bridging social
capital is supported. As is hypothesis 2.1, the expectation that intensified bridging
social capital is associated with lower intolerance.
4.6.2: Testing the relationships of relative political extraction, local expenditure
and bridging social capital
Hypothesis three postulates that, a smaller locus of public spending control
will contribute to greater social capital and reduced intolerance, controlling for
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other factors. This is following arguments in the literature that local organizations
will be engaged if they have input into spending decisions, and that local civilsociety groups will be supported local expenditures. In these results, the locus of
expenditure has no significant direct relationship with intolerance (-.04), nor one
that is mediated through bridging social capital illustrated by the interaction term
between bridging social capital and ratio of local control (.12). Hypothesis three
cannot be sustained based on these results. The policy or environmental
conditions for tolerance and policy decisions on how to address issues of
intolerance are not linked simply to local expenditure. How the resources are used
appears to matter more than what level of government reports spending.
Hypothesis four is tested in the model where neither local expenditure, or
the interaction of local expenditure with social capital are significant in the setting
of the 72 country-years included in the sample.
4.6.3: Multi-level models With 2008 and 2009 cases testing interaction with
right-wing government and the EU effect
Table 4.4 presents several models (seven through ten) largely testing the
same issues discussed above but with additional country-year cases drawn from
the 2008-2009 wave of the World Values and European Values Surveys. The
most important additions to the models are the interaction of right-wing
government participation and the inclusion of Time EU; a measure of years the
country has been in the EU since the SIngle European Act of 1986. The models
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also differ from prior models because all variables have been grand-mean
centered and standardized on their standard deviation. Because the data from
the new wave of the surveys has only recently been released and is not entirely
recoded to match the prior waves, the models below omit a number of the
interesting variables covered in the previous sections such as individual income
and town size. However, the overall outcome of the new models is that the
relationships evident between intolerance, bridging social capital and relative
political extraction persist even with a larger range of countries and cases.
4.6.4: Testing hypothesis four; Right-wing participation in government will
mediate the relationship between political extraction and Intolerance.
Model A, in table 4.4, includes both an independent variable of the trailing
moving average for right-wing party participation in government and an interaction
effect with relative political extraction. This model includes these variable to test
the hypothesized relationship between right-wing governments and political
extraction. Hypothesis four from the introduction postulated that right-wing
governments will be less likely than other governments to use political capacity in
an effort to directly constrain intolerance. The expectation is that there would be a
direct relationship between right-wing government participation and intolerance.
The model also tests for the interaction between RPE and right-wing participation
in government to examine mediation effect. The fixed effect coefficient for rightwing government is .04 with a t-value of 1.74, below the significance threshold of
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1.96. The interaction effect in model A fails to reject the null hypothesis that rightwing participation in governments has no effect on the relationship between
relative political capacity and intolerance. The coefficient of the interaction term is
-.02 with a t-value of .97.
The coefficient for the direct relationship between intolerance and rightwing party composition of government in the models with the newer cases
confirms the result of the multi-level models with the smaller dataset. There is a
weak relationship between right-wing government participation and intolerance (.
04 in models A and B, and even weaker .03 in model C) indicating that as
governments have greater participation of right-wing parties, the reported
intolerance level increases slightly. This is in addition to the relationship of
individuals’ right-left political disposition and intolerance (.05 and p <.01). The
interaction term for right-wing party participation in governments with RPE is also
below significance, with a t-score of -.72 the interaction effect does not approach
significance at p.05. The coefficient is -.02 indicating that as RPE increases the
marginal effect of right-wing participation declines.
Hypothesis four asserts that the participation of right-wing parties in the
Parliament will effect how political capacity is applied by governments. The weak
relationship indicated by the coefficient for the interaction term does not support
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the hypothesis. There appears to be a direct effect, but it is only very weakly
related to RPE.
Table 4.4: Models with 2008-2009 Cases Added, Models A through C
Fixed Effects of Standardized

Mod t
el A

Intercept

0.61 26.47

0.61

26.55

0.68

31.31

Male

0.08 20.15

0.08

20.16

0.08

20.17

Bridging Social Capital

-0.07 -11.85 -0.07

-11.52

-0.07

-12.45

Religiosity

0.03 15.31

0.03

15.30

0.03

15.44

Political Self-Placement

0.05 26.89

0.05

26.90

0.05

26.86

Age

0.07 35.48

0.07

35.48

0.07

35.50

Education

-0.08 -38.24 -0.08

-38.23

-0.08

-38.17

Ln GDP/cap

-0.23 -10.22 -0.24

-10.38

-0.09

-2.96

RPE

-0.01 -0.57

-0.02

-0.81

-0.06

-2.97

Bridging * GDP

-0.01 -2.36

-0.01

-2.52

-0.01

-2.24

Gov-right 5 year MA

0.04 1.74

0.04

1.86

0.03

1.50

Bridging * RPE

-0.01 -0.97

RPE by Gov right

-0.02 -0.72
0.04

1.14

-0.01

-1.57
-0.22

-6.51

Bridging Group
Bridging Group * Bridging Ind.

Model
B

t

Model
C

Time EU

t

Random Effects

Est. Wald ZEst.

Residual

0.376 231.4280.376 231.428

0.376

231.400

Random Intercept

0.042 6.198

0.042

6.237

0.028

6.157

Bridging by Intercept

0.001 0.944

0.002

1.241

0.001

1.358

Bridging Random Slope

0.002 4.518

0.002

4.517

0.002

4.570

Wald Z

Est.

Model Fit
Psuedo R2

0.19

0.19

0.20

AIC Fit

200286

200293

200251

Wald Z
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Dependent variable= Transformed and centered intolerance
Individual N=98279, Group-level N = 85.
Mixed Regression, unstructured random effects.
Right-wing parties in percentage of total cabinet posts, weighted by days.
Source: own calculations for Turkey based on Schmidt and Beyer (1992); 1991
onwards: Political Data Yearbook(s), EJPR.
(World Values Survey 1981-2008 Official Aggregate V.20090901, 2009 2009;
European Values Study 1981-2008, Longitudinal Data File 2011)

4.6.5: Effect of the duration of European Union membership on intolerance and
RPE
Model C includes a new term in the independent variables, duration of
membership in the European Union since 1986. This variable is calculated simply
by subtracting the year of survey from the year the country joined the European
Union, or since the ratification of the Single European Act in 1986.
With the term for duration in the European Union included, several shifts of
values in the model are revealed. The coefficient of the direct effect on intolerance
is substantial and significant -.22 (p<.01), indicating that longer term membership
is associated with improved social tolerance. Additionally, duration in the EU has
suppression effect on GDP/capita, accounting for more than half the relationship
between national wealth and intolerance. The direct term for RPE shifts from the
very weak positive relationship in models one through five, to a significant and
negative relationship in model ten. The coefficient -.06 is significant at p<.01.
Although still not a strong effect compared to bridging social capital or education.
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It is significant and in the direction expected in hypothesis one. In the presence of
whatever factors are captured in the indicator Time EU, RPE behaves as expected
in the hypotheses from chapter one. The more recent accession and candidate
countries have much higher intolerance levels than the older EU members.
4.6.8 Effect of group-level bridging social capital on individual bridging social
capital and intolerance.
Model B, illustrated in table 4.4, indicates that the group-level reservoir of
social capital does not have as strong a relationship with intolerance as does an
individual’s level of social capital. This result was indicated by other models that
illustrated relative indifference in the slope of bridging social capital to the levels of
intolerance, however, model B specifically tests for this relationship. A group-level
variable was created by taking the country-wave average social capital for each
country in the sample. The variable was centered on the grand mean and
standardized. The direct effect of the group-level variable for bridging social
capital indicates that the .04 shift in the intercept of intolerance is the opposite of
the direct effect. That is, the greater the average intensity of bridging social
capital, the intercept of intolerance for that country-wave actually increases,
although the relationship is weak and not significant as an indicator in a random
sample of countries. However, the interaction term does indicate that with higher
levels of social capital the impact of an individual’s level of bridging social capital is
slightly intensified-- again, the relationship is weak, and not significant. The
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random slope for bridging social capital in model nine is also unaffected by the
inclusion of the group-level and interaction terms, indicating that there are other
sources for the slight differences in slope of bridging social capital from countrywave to country-wave.
4.7: Multi-level Examination Of Bridging Social Capital
The path model in section 4.5 presented a ordinary least squares model
that investigated the causal paths between GDP, political extraction, education
and social capital on intolerance. As bridging social capital is a lynchpin of the link
between of political extraction and intolerance, it warrants more investigation.
Also, table 4.4 from the path model to bridging social capital indicate that while
religiosity is associated with increased intolerance, it is also associated with more
intense bridging social capital. This section uses hierarchical techniques to revisit
the relationship of bridging social capital the other independent variables. All the
variables are standardized by the standard deviation and centered on the grand
means.
The use of a single-level regression model to measure the paths of
relationships between the hypothesized variables allows for an understanding of
effects in the aggregate, but is not as sensitive to changes of group-level variables.
Comparing the multi-level model below to the path regression on bridging social
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capital and new model allows for including the impact of group-level variables on
the individual-level intercepts and inspection of the relationship between religiosity
and bridging social capital. The model below differs from the single-level
regression above in two important ways. First, the intercepts are allowed to vary
by country-year, secondly it includes indicators for how the group-level variables
effect the intercepts in each country. That means that relationships observed
moving in one direction in the aggregated ordinary least squares regression may
flip for the individual level as the impact of different intercepts and the changes on
intercepts caused by context variables is accounted inside the model.
Table 4.5: Hierarchical Random-Intercept Regression on Bridging Social Capital
Model Bridging 1,2

Random Intercept

Random Slope Religiosity

Fixed Effects- Standardized Z-scores
Intercept

Coefficients Sig.
0.02
0.72

Coefficients
0.02

Sig.
0.70

Study (WVS=1,EVS=0)

0.00

-0.03

Gender (1=Female, 0=Male)

0.04

0.00

Religiosity

0.11

0.00

Minority (0=minority, 1=majority)

0.08

0.00

Education

0.20

0.00

Income

0.09

0.00

Political Self-position

0.04

0.00

Age
GDP per Cap

0.010
0.30

0.04
0.00

Relative Political Extraction

0.18

0.00

Government Right Participation

0.08

0.08

Local expenditure ratio

0.21

0.00

-0.004
0.04
0.114
0.07
0.20
0.09
0.04
0.010
0.31
0.21
0.04
0.15

0.890
0.00
0.000
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.04
0.00
0.00
0.38
0.00

Random Eﬀects

Residual
Variance

Sig.

Residual
Variance

Sig.

Residual (within group variance)
Random Intercept (variance between
groups)
Religiosity Random Slope

0.74
0.08

0.00
0.00

0.74
0.08

0.00
0.00

0.002

0.001
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0.007

AIC 166865

0.002

AIC 166839

Dependent is grand mean-centered bridging social capital. Source: World Values Survey
1980-2010 combined dataset. World Values Association. Mixed model using variance
components structured random effects and random coefficients models.

Even with the improved sensitivity and possibility that relationships will shift
with the introduction of the random or group-level intercepts, the results are
consistent with the path model. Table 4.5 illustrates that the relationships noted in
the single-level path model still hold even with the reduced degrees of freedom
while random slopes by context are allowed.
4.7.1. Revisiting hypothesis 3; Local expenditure ratio and bridging social
capital.
There are several results of interest in these models. One is that an
increased ratio of local expenditure will improve bridging social capital is borne out
in this model, that is in conflict with the result of the interaction term of bridging
social capital and local expenditure from the hierarchical model. The result
supports the mechanism of improved tolerance proposed in hypothesis three. A
standard deviation increase in the local expenditure ratio is associated with a .21
intensification of bridging social capital (the scale of bridging social capital is
reversed). This effect can be compared to the other effects in the model as they
are all standardized. The .21 coefficient reduces to a .15 effect when a random
error for religiosity is included, indicating some interaction effect between personal
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religiosity and local expenditure. Both the .21 and .15 coefficients are among the
strongest correlates of bridging social capital in the model.
4.7.2 Religiosity and bridging social capital: a closer look.
Religiosity and bridging social capital are investigated in the hierarchical
regression that includes random slopes and intercepts for religiosity, shown in
table 4.5. The results indicate that religiosity intensifies memberships and social
trust-- bridging social capital. The coefficient is -.11 (p<.01), indicating that it is
one of the more powerfully correlated independent variables included in the model
(remember these are standardized coefficients). The effect of religiosity on
bridging social capital weakens only slightly at higher levels of social capital with a
random coefficient for slopes by intercepts of .007. There is some statistically
significant variability in the slope of religiosity on the formation of bridging social
capital as indicated by the .002 (p<.01) coefficient for random slopes.
The model indicates that while the effect of religiosity on bridging social
capital is strong and increased religiosity intensifies the stock of an individual’s
social capital, the relationship is variable and weakens at higher levels of social
capital.
4.7.3 Minority status and bridging social capital
According to the models in figure 4.5, minority religion status is associated
with a .07 standard deviation decline in the intensity of their bridging social capital
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reserves. This is a clear indication that social capital efforts should target minority
communities, of course for social capital to be bridging it must bridge outside
identity communities meaning spreading to majority communities as well. Until the
last ten years, little of the policy effort in the Netherlands case studies included the
majority population, these results seem to indicate that is not a rational policy
choice. There has been a recent shift in the past several years among some
Dutch cities with a neighborhood focus that includes majority participation. As the
majority population is also more likely to express intolerance, efforts to address
intolerance should be focused on majority population as well as increasing
minority social capital.
4.8 Summary and Conclusion of Analysis
The path model and hierarchical models were used to test the
hypothesized relationships between and among social intolerance, relative political
extraction and social capital.
Hypothesis 1: Increased relative political capacity will be associated with
lower levels of Intolerance in the European Union and accession states. The
hypothesized direct path between relative political extraction and intolerance was
not supported in any of the models, save model ten. In fact, in most of the
models, including the OLS path model the direct relationship between RPE and
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intolerance was not significant and was positively correlated with intolerance. In
model ten, the independent variable for time in the European Union was added as
a measure of government intent. When that variable was included in the model,
the suppression effect on RPE potentially caused by per capita GDP was reduced
and the direct path was both statistically significant and negative.
Hypothesis 2: Relative political capacity will reduce intolerance by
encouraging bridging forms of social capital. Relative political capacity will reduce
intolerance by constraining bonding forms of social capital. The path model, the
several multi-level hierarchical models and especially the final hierarchical model in
table 4.5, which analyzed the contributing factors to bridging social capital, all
support the thesis that relative political capacity fosters the formation of bridging
social capital. However, the second part of this hypothesis, that relative political
capacity will constrain the emergence of bonding capital is not supported in the
path model.
Hypothesis 2.1: Bridging social capital (Trust-based) is associated with
reduced intolerance. This hypothesis is supported in every investigation. All the
models show a very strong relationship between bridging social capital and
intolerance, often, with education, the independent variable with the highest
correlation with improved tolerance.
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Hypothesis 3: Local allocation of state resources will foster stronger
bridging social capital. The models provided slightly contradictory outcomes. In
the hierarchical model testing effects on intolerance, the interaction term between
bridging social capital and local ratio of spending was not statistically significant.
The lack of significance for the interaction indicates that the relationship between
bridging social capital and intolerance did not differ with levels of local spending.
However, further inspection of the relationship with a model regressed on bridging
capital in section 4.7 indicates support for the hypothesis with a strongly
significant (p<.05) standardized coefficient of .21. The direct analysis of the
relationship is a better gauge of the relationship than the interaction effect, so the
hypothesis should be accepted.
Hypothesis 4: Government intention (measured by right-wing participation)
interacted with relative political capacity should have a stronger effect on
intolerance than relative political capacity measured alone. This hypothesis was
directly tested in the hierarchical models. The results showed a very weak and not
significant relationship for the direct effect of right-wing participation in
government.
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CHAPTER 5: TWO DUTCH CASES.
Investigating the efforts of public officials to tackle the challenges of
intolerance in a single national context. The examples illustrate that the tasks of
integrating different cultural groups falls largely to local governments, and that
those governments use their resources to actively promote programs to foster
bridging social capital, both for the community and individuals. Furthermore, the
case of these cities in the Netherlands shows the usefulness of policy diffusion
through public administration networks. The local implementation of policy and
the use of networks echoes both the subsidiarity structure of the European Union
and the open method of coordination for non-coercive pursuit of policy goals that
remain under the national-level competency.
Governance of integration and immigrant policy in the European Union falls
under national competency since the Maastricht Treaty. This means that there is
no “European” policy on integration of minorities into society. The policy
environment is one of parallel governance in which treaty goals have been
articulated, but policy is established and implemented in a manner idiosyncratic to
national political conditions (Zielonka 2007). Under the principle of subsidiarity, the
national governments retain control of policy implementation. In the case of the
Netherlands, policy implementation is further devolved to municipal authorites,
who are connected to each other through policy networks, and to other European
cities through the Committee of the Regions.
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The international treaty obligations of the Netherlands have informed the
development of policy among technocrats since the first major review in 1979, the
international obligations are mentioned in at least three major reports over the
years (Pennix 1979; WRR 1990; WRR 2001a). However, while policy in the
Netherlands has been informed by international obligations, the national and local
context of policy and implementation is paramount. Also, the Netherlands has
rarely been in danger of violating the vague strictures of EU and Council of Europe
treaties covering intolerance and migration.
As one of the major migration destination countries and founding European
Union members, the Netherlands has led the way in developing immigration and
integration policy for ethnic minorities (Borket, Bosswick, Heckmann and LükenKlaßen 2007, 10-22; Scholten and Timmermans 2010, 532-535). The
Netherlands has had some form of articulated minorities policy since the late
1970s after a national report noted the need to formally accept the permanence of
immigrant groups (Pennix 1979; WRR 1990). In addition to the Minorities Policy,
the Dutch legal environment has enfranchised minorities by extending the right to
vote in local elections in 1988; Dutch officials engaged with consultative bodies
composed of local minority leaders; and the Netherlands emphasized protection
against discrimination as embodied in the 1994 Equal Treatment Act which
intensified tracking of discrimination by governments and employers (Borket, et al.
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2007, 21-22). However, despite not ever articulating policies that extended
political franchise to immigrants as “multiculturalism,” the majority Dutch culture
hosted a political backlash against accommodation in the new millennium.
The policy structure of the Netherlands is similar to that of the European
Union in the larger context. Local governments in cities and towns have chief
administrative responsibility for managing policy set at the national level for
achieving integration and combatting intolerance (WRR 1990, 86-88). However,
that administrative responsibility is directed by national-level policy directions and
framed in the policy conversations of the day. Local administrators rely on national
directives, funding and data collection to manage their efforts. However, they also
participate in policy networks that are at least partly supported by the central
government. The local administrators access national research and data
networks managed by the central government, as well as policy networks
composed of other Dutch city administrators, non-governmental organizations
and academics (Entzinger 2006, 127).
The national policy conversation throughout the 1970s to the assimilationist
trend of the 2000s has been focused primarily on the responsibility of ethnic
minorities to engage in broader society, with much less conversation about ethnic
Dutch society engaging with and incorporating minorities into social activities.
Interestingly, apart from a few programs promoting intercultural, and
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intergenerational dialogue, the emphasis in the Netherlands, including Utrecht and
Rotterdam has largely been focused on the participation of minority and immigrant
residents in organizations outside of the home with recognition of majority
responsibility for inclusion mentioned but not emphasized.
Integration policy was given added impetus by a 1979 analysis of the
situation of ethnic minorities and existing policy conducted by the Netherlands
government’s research institute, the WRR. The 1979 analysis examined the
situation of several minority groups then extant in the Netherlands including
Moluccan, Surinamese, Caribbean, and Mediterranean immigrants. The report
found that there was little coherence in Dutch nationality policy because, prior to
the 1970s, the government policy behaved as though immigrants were transitory
(Pennix 1979, 160). This conclusion was surprising because in 1973 half a million
immigrants were former colonial subjects; they were officially citizens but still
treated as temporary communities. The other major community of immigrants was
the Mediterranean labor recruitment group composed largely of Greek, Spanish,
and Turkish labor migrants. More recently, a combination of economic and
political refugees from Arab states and Africa have also settled in the Netherlands
(WRR 2001a, 46).
Highlighting the immediacy of acknowledging a multi-ethnic society,
Amsterdam has a population of immigrants and non-ethnic Dutch exceeding fifty
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percent, while Rotterdam and some mid-sized cities like Utrecht have non-ethnic
Dutch (allochtonen) populations exceeding twenty percent (Entzinger 2006, 123;
Scholten and Holzhacker 2009, 81-82). Even more starkly, the youth populations
of ethnic minorities currently exceeds the ethnic Dutch (autochtonen) youth
population in Utrecht (Manders 2011). Dutch policy on immigration and
integration since 1979 has been marked by comparatively intensive research and
evaluation, but shifts in methodology, political environment, and unit of
implementation have caused apparent shifts of focus in policy but not necessarily
changes in implementation at the street-level (Entzinger 2000; Scholten and
Holzhacker 2009).
Scholten (2008) writes that the local implementation of integration policy
continues to reflect the community identity models of multiculturalism and
integration of the 1980s and 1990s. However, in my conversations with
bureaucrats in both Utrecht and Rotterdam (two major allochtonen population
centers), they stressed the focus on people as individuals and not as part of
communities. The newer term for policy directed at integration or assimilation is
the struggle against social exclusion (Manders 2011; Jagmohansingh 2012).
5.1 Three periods of Dutch policy related to social capital and multicultural
society: the national context.
Most of the period of integration policy since the 1970s, when social capital
is mentioned at all, it is almost exclusively focused on the importance of
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immigrants being engaged in economic activity and organizations. It is not until
more recently that greater emphasis has been put on community cohesion and
bridging capital activities of the majority community. Programs like “Welcome to
Rotterdam”, neighborhood interventions in Rotterdam and Amsterdam and
community projects in Utrecht, have an intentional element of drawing ethnic
Dutch into shared activities (WRR 2001b; Engbersen, Snel and Weltfvede 2005;
Lub 2005, 32-35; Scholten 2009).
The first of these periods of Dutch policies (1979-1990) emphasized
pillarization and bonding within groups connection to officials through formal
public consultation organizations. The initial national policy report in 1979
contained several policy recommendations, foremost among them were
coordinating national efforts at meeting the basic needs of immigrants and
fostering their participation in society. Activity was focused within pillars of
organizations and outreach. The effect of policies meant to assist minority
communities to manage their own affairs was bonding minorities to one another
and then linking them municipal governments. However, this policy experienced
difficulty because the representation organizations occasionally did not reflect the
community they were assigned to represent, for example having Sunni (Grey
Wolves) immigrants on a board to organize a Turkish immigrant population
consisting of Alevi Kurds and ethnic Turks (WRR 1990, 89) (Entzinger 2006,
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125-126). In the first period of policy local officials allowed for some public
instruction in the language of their home country and extended the electoral
franchise for local elections.
During the second period of minorities policy (1991-2001) there was more
of a focus on integration; with a shift towards the engagement of individuals in
formal labor and an increased focus on social participation especially in the labor
force (Scholten and Holzhacker 2009). There was a strong emphasis directed at
improved education and language skills as the gateway to accessing employment
and social integration. The focus of policy was also less “group” based and more
focused on improving individual human capital, although social capital in the form
of participation by groups and in organizations within the communities was still
referenced in the reports structuring this period of national policy (WRR 1990,
50-52). Improved Dutch language and culture skills were emphasized in this
period and were considered the responsibility of the state.
The inburgering (citizen creation) process established as national policy in
this period focused on mandatory Dutch language classes (free at the time) with
600 hours of language lessons and training for participation in the labor markets
as a means of empowering individuals to access labor and social networks
outside the home. The 1989-90 report on integration policy that provided this
policy outline also reflected that there was fairly little public instruction happening
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in the native tongue of immigrants, despite the public outcry against this “policy”
that emerged at the end of the decade (WRR 1990, 77-83). Indeed, the report
noted that the lack of education and discrimination by natives were equally causes
of the high unemployment and social isolation experienced by ethnic minorities.
Nonetheless, national policy direction was shifted away from addressing
integration through communal identity group memberships and addressing issues
through community-based multicultural organizations or consultation committees.
Despite the shift in focus from identity community-based participation, there was
an increasingly strong focus on developing human and social capital for
individuals, including participation in ethnic group-based organizations but also in
participation in the broader economic society (WRR 2001b, 50-52).
The third period in Dutch integration policy, beginning roughly with the rise
of Pim Fortuyn’s Liveable Rotterdam party and his subsequent murder in 2002,
has been described as “the assimilationist turn,” reflecting the political backlash
against what had been described as the multiculturalist model pushed by scholars
and the major political parties in the Netherlands (Scholten 2009; Scholten 2011a,
189). According to Scholten, the assimilationist backlash already had roots in the
publications of the Social Cultural Research office, and political movements that
redefined tolerance as limited to tolerating only those who shared majority cultural
practices. Ironically, among the complaints of Fortuyn’s supporters was that
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immigrants and asylum seekers did not share the Dutch value of social tolerance
of different lifestyles (Scholten 2011b, 197). As a note, the 2008 World Values
Survey wave from the Netherlands shows that the few respondents with a parent
born abroad (n=133) have significantly lower intolerance rates towards
homosexuals or different race neighbors than the native population (p<.05, p<.05)
(World Values Survey 1981-2008 Official Aggregate V.20090901, 2009 2009). The
data also show intolerance rates for ”Homosexual“ or “Different Race” neighbors
among immigrants that are much lower than in presumptive home countries such
as Turkey (.04 in the Netherlands vs .9 in Turkey and .045 vs .43).
The assumption of the politicians pushing back against the multiculturalist
policies of the prior two periods was that the immigrants were not adopting Dutch
values and that the policies were abject failures. This assumption persisted even
against the conclusions of a special parliamentary report that was commissioned
by the anti-immigrant Socialist Party in 2004 (Scholten 2011b, 192-194). The
Temporary Committee on Integration (TCOI) found that many of the measures of
policy had been more successful than expected, particularly in the areas of
educational attainment and housing, while goals of employment and social
participation were still below targets (Blok 2004, 534, 540-541). Furthermore, the
report noted that allochtonen success was greater where there were consistent
programs that targeted populations for language training, work programs, and
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education. The results of the report were challenged by the anti-immigrant
parliamentarians who had commissioned the report, and the political coalitions of
the new millennium pushed assimilation as the policy goal while pushing the
burden of assimilation onto immigrants and asylum seekers.
A series of assimilationist laws were promoted by the new minister of
Immigration and Integration, Rita Verdonk (Scholten 2011b, 188). Further
examples of the new laws included the two Wet Inburgering laws in 2005 and
2006. The 2005 laws, “Wet inburgering in het buitenland” (the Integration Abroad
Act), requires that individuals seeking immigration to the Netherlands, including for
family reunification, must pass a language and citizenship test administered in their
home country before they can apply from immigration (The Netherlands:
Discrimination in the Name of Integration Migrants’ Rights under the Integration
Abroad Act 2008). The exams and language training are at the expense of
individuals. The 2006 law applies similar requirements on individuals already in the
Netherlands who seek to remain in the country or to gain naturalization. In
addition, the laws passed in this period tightened restrictions on dual citizenship
(van Oers, de Hart and Groenendijk 2010, 19-23).
The language of assimilation and individual-level focus was echoed in
several of the conversations with local level bureaucrats and researchers from
Rotterdam and Utrecht (Brouwer 2011; Manders 2011; Jagmohansingh 2012).
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This echoes the observation of researchers, that direction of the national turn in
integration and immigration policy turned away from multicultural integration and
towards individualistic assimilation. However, in practice the local level policy has
pursued pragmatic efforts at improving civic capacity through building social
capital and utilizing a number of public, business and civil society partners,
including groups organized by ethnic identity (Poppelaars 2007, 250-251;
Jagmohansingh 2012).
5.2 Social Capital and Civic Capacity Efforts at the Local Level
The analysis of the dataset in the analysis section demonstrates that the
level of revenues directed locally had a significant effect on the development of
both bridging social capital and reducing intolerance. The conversation in the
introduction of the Dutch case may give an indicator of both why the level of
allocation may matter and why the national level right-left political orientation may
matter less than other factors in success with social tolerance goals. When
comparing the Netherlands ratio of local expenditure to some of its European
peers the Netherlands is in the middle of the pack. However, the political structure
dictates that most of the efforts at integration and social cohesion are devolved to
the local level.
Below, examples from two Dutch cities are included to examine how they
targeted social capital issues as a mechanism for achieving greater social
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tolerance. These cities are part of both Dutch policy networks and increasingly
linked to Europe-wide policy networks and epistemic communities.
5.2.1 The Participatie-Ladder: monitoring success in developing social capital of
individuals at risk of social exclusion.
One recommendation consistent across the government research institute
reports through all three periods of policy, as well as the Parliamentary
Commission on Integration in 2004, was the need for better measurement of
program effectiveness (Pennix 1979; WRR 1990; WRR 2001a). Local versions of
the inburgering process and efforts at combatting social exclusion that include
emphasis on bridging social capital required a means of evaluating the base rate
of participation in order to gauge the success of efforts. One instrument gaining
widespread usage in the Netherlands is the Participatie Ladder. The Participatie
Ladder is a program that embodies a number of the different conceptual strands
discussed in this section. One, it is a tracking tool for cities to asses their efforts
at improving individuals’ social and human capital. Two, it was developed with the
think tank RegioPlan, a consortium of twelve Dutch municipalities, and The
Association of Netherlands Cities (Verenigde Nederlandse Gemeente) that work
together to share the costs of developing new social science tools and reinforcing
an existing policy network (Participatie Ladder 2012). Finally, it is an example of
public policy network coordination that could easily extend beyond national
borders.
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The Participatie Ladder is essentially a panel survey instrument that
provides an indicator of individual social participation. Although the tool could
provide a baseline for the general population’s social engagement, it was
developed primarily to asses the resources of unemployed individuals. Participants
(recipients of state assistance, regardless of ethnicity) are assessed for their
position on the “Participatie Ladder” that includes the frequency of contacts
outside their families. Part of the program then makes assistance contingent on
engaging in language courses (if required) before assigning placement in either
paid or voluntary employment to increase the recipient’s social network and skill
set (Rezai and Barendrecht 2010, 34-35; Jagmohansingh 2012). Rotterdam and
Utrecht have used the Participatie Ladder instrument since 2008 (Participatie
Ladder 2012).
The Participatie Ladder is currently used to track the social capital reserves
of social assistance recipients by 100 of the 430 Dutch cities. The ladder is a
survey that evaluates respondents on six levels of social participation. The levels
of participation rank from social isolation at one, to paid employment at six. The
emphasis is on paid work, so it is not a perfect measure of social capital, however
levels two through five emphasize the importance of engaging friends, joining
organizations, and performing voluntary work respectively (Participatieladderhelpt
Gemeenten Bij Het Maken Van De Juiste Keuzen 2011). The survey instrument

Noordijk

Bridging Intolerance

157

contains 21 questions about the participant’s social activities such as shopping or
volunteering outside the home. The tool is meant to be used as a panel survey
interviewing the same participants over time to track the effectiveness of policy
efforts. Unfortunately the survey has not been conducted among the general
population of any Dutch cities, so no base rate has been properly established
against which at risk populations could be compared (Brouwer 2011). The closest
similar metrics may be unemployment rates and rates of volunteerism found in
surveys by the Dutch Centraal Bureau voor Statistiek or the European Values
Surveys. The absence of a base case also highlights the emphasis of social
capital development efforts and integration policy in general on minority
populations, with less concern for employers. The City of Utrecht was a pilot
member of the intercity consortium in the Participatie Ladder’s development and
has used the tool to assess the success of individuals and programmatic efforts to
decrease social exclusion and improve social capital (Brouwer 2011).
Both Utrecht and Rotterdam use the Participatie Ladder as a tool for
encouraging or requiring participation in activities outside the home. In
Rotterdam, receipt of social assistance, is contingent on performing twenty hours
of volunteer or paid work as a way of ensuring that individuals are learning new
skills and creating a network that can lead to employment in some cases.
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5.3 Rotterdam: Mensen Maken de Stad
Rotterdam is an immigration city. According to recent data held by the city
there is a majority allochtonen population among minors, like Utrecht. Rotterdam
itself has only a 57 percent native Dutch population, a number that includes
second and third generation ethnic minorities (Rotterdam Facts and Figures 2009,
12). In keeping with recent political changes in the Netherlands, where
multiculturalism has been described as the cause of, not the solution to
intolerance, Rotterdam has shifted its official policy focus away from identitygroup-based efforts and towards addressing individuals’ needs (Jagmohansingh
2012). However, in practice, the policies remain engaged in reaching out to
minorities, building social capital in mixed ethnicity communities and even
subsidizing art and sports programs for poor and minority youth (Deelgemeente
Begroting 2012 Charlois 2012; Jagmohansingh 2012).
The policy effort in Rotterdam and Utrecht is to incorporate citizens, nonprofit organizations and local employers in co-production of policies to improve
both the human and social capital of individuals on social assistance (Engbersen,
et al. 2005). In Rotterdam, conversations with social policy makers indicated that
there remains a focus on social tolerance, with developing social capital seen as
instrumental to achieving tolerance in a very diverse setting. The policy experience
of Rotterdam also reflects the different phases of national policy, with the present
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political-policy environment emphasizing the experiences and needs of individuals
over group identity (Scholten and Poppelaars 2008; Jagmohansingh 2012).
However, in practice, civil society groups that are connected to different ethnic
communities remain important partners. (Bijlage 2.: Stand Van Zaken Mensen
Maken De Stad 2007 2012; Jagmohansingh 2012).
Rotterdam has an ongoing initiative to improve social cohesion and reduce
intolerance between migrant and minority communities and older ethnic dutch
residents of Rotterdam’s neighborhoods. The Mensen Maken de Stad (MMS), or
People Make the City, is an initiative to increase active citizenship and social
capital and foster a co-production model of public policy with roots extending
back to a citizen-led efforts at connecting new and old Rotterdammers in a city
that has experienced very high in-migration over the past 30 years. The MMS is a
merger of two different programs a civil society initiative called Opzoomeren and
an official pilot program called StadsEtiquette. The two programs each work to
foster bridging social capital by coordinating local efforts and intensive support
from public sector, civil society and business actors at the neighborhood scale.
The civil society effort was led by organizations in several Rotterdam
neighborhoods in the early 1990s and called Opzoomeren after the first street that
enacted the effort (Lub 2005, 13-14). The Opzoomeren initiative was an effort to
increase interactions among neighbors, engage community members in local
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leadership, and reduce mistrust and intolerance in a street by street,
neighborhood-by-neighborhood model. The initiative was triggered deterioration
of conditions in Rotterdam’s neighborhoods, where residents did not feel safe on
the streets and the physical character of the neighborhoods were substantially
deteriorated. The Opzoomeren project worked by activating neighbors into
participating an open discussion about the conditions of the neighborhood, and
inviting participation in planning activities in response. Official help for the first
initiatives came in the form of small grants for resources such as brooms, cleaning
supplies, and occasionally funds for youth activities like sports leagues (Lub 2005,
13; Bijlage 2.: Stand Van Zaken Mensen Maken De Stad 2007 2012, 3). The
Opzoomeren project grew to cover many streets and refined its methodology in
the decade between the initial efforts and institutionalization as Mensen Maken de
Stad in 2004. The methodology includes training for volunteers in identifying
neighborhood leaders, assessing needs, and attaining the early participation of
business and government stakeholders in the process of changing quality of life in
the neighborhood (Lub 2005; Hengeveld and Janssens 2010). The program is
supported financially and administratively by the city, with social services, police
and even city maintenance workers coordinating their efforts in each focus
neighborhood (Hengeveld and Janssens 2010). The program expressly supports
the establishment of bridging social capital through place-focused efforts to get
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neighbors to work together solving problems, and view one another as part of a
single community (Mensen Maken De Stad: 'Het Vervolg' 2006, 5). In addition to
local financial support, programs are funded with pass-through money from the
national government and grants to non-profit sector partners (Deelgemeente
Begroting 2012 Charlois 2012, 123)
The Mensen Maken de Stad effort as supported by the City of Rotterdam
also contains elements of a separate effort meant to train new residents in Dutch
urban etiquette in response to rising public perception of a safety threat caused by
immigrants (Lub 2005). The pilot effort of the Urban Etiquette program launched
in Rotterdam from 2000 to 2001 was a city-directed effort to bring residents of
some neighborhoods together to assess the problems in their neighborhood, and
to teach, especially to the young, the expectations of public behavior in Dutch
society. In addition to teaching behavior, the StadsEtiquette program helped
neighbors conduct an assessment of problems including the capabilities and level
of engagement of the community members. Like the Opzoomeren project, the
StadsEtiquette program was focused on creating social capital, but with a
somewhat tighter focus on livability issues and resolving conflict with immigrants
(Rotterdam 2002, 13-16).
The StadsEtiquette project was successfully piloted in 2001-2002 just
before the election of the Livable Rotterdam coalition led by the anti-immigrant
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politician Pim Fortuyn in 2002 (Hengeveld and Janssens 2010, 10-11). In spite of
the fall of the Labor Party in Rotterdam and the election of an expressly antimulticuturalism, anti-muslim coalition to city government, Mensen Maken de Stad
was launched as the StadsEtiquette program was combined with the successful
civic capacity and tolerance model developed by Opzoomeren in the prior
decade. The policy emphasis of the new coalition was less focused on the
expansion of inter-communal trust, than cultural assimilation by immigrants to a
notional standard of “Dutch” behavior, but the Mensen Maken de Stad program
initiated in 2002 is precisely focused on social capital and increasing tolerance and
trust in the community (Mensen Maken De Stad: 'Het Vervolg' 2006, 7-8). The
emergence of a distinctly social capital centered, social tolerance model with
support of public resources, indicates that street-level bureaucrats and active
members of the public already understand the importance and effectiveness of
social capital as a means to achieving improved tolerance and understanding.
This experience underscores the observation of Scholten and Poppelaars on the
divergence between national-level and local politicians and practical application of
knowledge by bureaucrats and the civil society actors (Scholten and Poppelaars
2008).
Rotterdam funds sports and arts activities for that are organized different
ethnic identifying civil society groups. In the new political climate, the model of

Noordijk

Bridging Intolerance

163

pillarization by ethnic groups is rejected and replaced with a formal focus on
individuals, the reality is that civil society organizations often emerge along ethnic
or cultural lines. It is the role of the state to manage linking those organizations
and using the existing groups to promote broader networks among their
members. As has been illustrated in the case of Rotterdam’s implementation of
the Mensen Maken de Stad program, despite having a city council actively hostile
to the idea of multiculturalism and integration, if not immigrants outright, the City
of Rotterdam’s professional staff implemented programs expressly meant to
nurture bridging social capital with the intent of improving civic capacity and
reducing intolerance. Also significant in this effort is the importance of public
financial and professional support to grow this effort to over 2000 neighborhood
streets. Only the government has the resources to coordinate and support these
efforts, and the example of Mensen Maken de Stad and other social capital
support programs provides a concrete illustration of how government resource
can actively enhance tolerance through supporting the development of bridging
social capital and improved civic capacity.
5.4 Utrecht: Enhancing Social Capital Through Interventions, and Fostering
National and European Policy Networks to Apply Research
As mentioned before, the City of Utrecht is a multicultural city. It is a
research and transportation hub with several universities, major think-tanks and
government research institutes in the community. Some thirty percent of its
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population is non-white Dutch and there is a majority ethnic minority population
among the young generation (Manders 2011). Like Rotterdam, Utrecht has
focused efforts on supporting local organizations that work on improving social
capital and intergroup understanding. The city provides funding for sports groups,
arts, groups and cultural events in public spaces. Additionally, the city
government has also faced the challenges of improving and replacing the housing
stock with a target of reducing neighborhood homogeneity, and it has used the
need for redevelopment as an opportunity to create civic capacity in order to
improve participation in the process of redevelopment. Finally, the City of Utrecht,
is a member of DIVOSA (the association of municipal managers, a public policy
incubator) and pilot case for developing the ParticipatieLadder with other
members of the association of Dutch municipalities (Verenigede Nederalandse
Gemeenten). Utrecht is also a pioneering member of the European Union
Fundamental Rights Agency and the Committee of the Region’s efforts to
establish a network of best practices in the Joined-up Governance project to
disseminate best practices across the European Union (Sakkers 2012).
Examples of continued efforts to enhance public engagement and
coproduction of policy in Utrecht can be found in the reports of activities from
Overvecht, an area of the city that has been a focus for lower-income in-migration
and perceived social cohesion problems for the city (Doe Mee in Overvecht:
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Wijkactieprogramma 2012-2013 2012) (van Kempen 2008). The reports show a
continued focus on programs such as “street coaches” who work with social
workers to direct at-risk youth to community programs and volunteer activities.
The Overvecht neighborhood is also interesting because the Utrecht government
has focused on redevelopment to change the housing mix to decrease rental unit
concentration and avoid ethnic homogeneity (van Kempen 2008). Part of the
effort of relocating and restructuring the neighborhood has been to incorporate
minority voices in planning the neighborhood, an effort made difficult by the
absence of civic participation among minority population in the district (Koster
2012). In response to the need to invest in the community and increase
participation so community voices could be heard, as well as to increase civic
capacity, the Doe Mee in Overvecht (Do It Together in Overvecht) initiative was
created in 2008 (Doe Mee Overvecht). The initiative contains many programs
directed at increasing social capital and civic capacity in this changing and
challenged community. Including street mentors, a participation guideline on the
website, and directions for coordinating efforts between city planners, city
maintenance, social workers, and citizens. It is similar in many ways to the efforts
of Mensen Maken de Stad.
Despite the national imperative to attack intolerance with identity-free
policies, park activities and programs and promoted by the City of Utrecht do

Noordijk

Bridging Intolerance

166

precisely focus on minority youth with sports, arts, and education programs
(Peters 2011). The programs that target particular areas or needs such as
education for Roma girls, or parenting coaches for Moroccan-Dutch parents
(Manders 2011; Doe Mee in Overvecht: Wijkactieprogramma 2012-2013 2012).
A recent analysis by Karin Peters (2012), of the role public parks play in
promoting integration and inter-ethnic understanding found that two different
types of parks in Utrecht contributed differently to the experiences that ethnic
Dutch and ethnic minority families had vis-a-vis one another. The researcher
found that while individuals from different groups rarely interacted directly, in
general, sharing the same public space reduced threat perception of “Others.”
She also reviewed city grant-funded cultural activities at the a community center
and found that the efforts to directly produce conversations between groups were
effective in reducing potential conflict. Interestingly, her qualitative research
revealed a fairly stark divided between active younger people, and older ethnic
dutch residents with the older residents (generally) harboring greater suspicions of
immigrants and ethnic minorities because of social isolation (Peters 2012). She
also finds that local level interactions of individuals influences social cohesion and
forms of social capital (trust, organization participation) in contrast to a national
political narrative that highlights differences and the imperative of assimilation
placed on immigrants.
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Finally, the Utrecht case is important as an illustration of how a medium
sized municipality can leverage its resources through the sharing of its experiences
in fostering social capital and confronting intolerance within a policy network.
5.5 Bridging Capital for Cities: National and European Policy Networks to
Increase Municipal Civic Capacity
The Dutch cities studied are part of several interacting networks to share
policy, research and expectations. The networks are both nested in the national
context and the European contexts. Participation of the cities with the European
UNion Agency for Fundamental Rights and the Committee of the Regions also
indicates that the municipal managers are also aware of European Union
objectives.
Utrecht was a founding member of the consortium (DIVOSA) that
developed the ParticipatieLadder measurement tool. They continue to share best
practices in how to apply that tool to improve individuals’ levels of social and
human capital as part of DIVOSA. Utrecht is an active part of the Verenigde
Gemeenter der Nederlanden, the network of associated Dutch cities. That
association pools resources to exchange information and research policy issues
that are common challenges facing Dutch cities. The city government also works
with the Central Statistics Agency to collect data for monitoring and evaluation of
public policy.
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The city of Utrecht is also one of several pilot cities working with the
Fundamental Rights Agency and the Committee of the Regions in the European
Union to develop tools that share best-practices in combatting social intolerance
and fostering inclusion (Joined-up Governance: Connecting Fundamental Rights
2012). The Joined-Up Governance efforts seeks to amplify the diffusion of best
practices element of the Open Method of Coordination, in lieu of relying on the
naming and shaming function of the monitoring performance and publishing
results. Leveraging their own human rights experiences with those of other cities
facing similar challenges is a major goal of Utrecht’s efforts to be considered a
“human rights” city (Sakkers 2012). In addition to being a pilot member of the
FRA’s network, Utrecht is active with other policy networks, such as, the Eurocities
initiative, a partnership of 140 major European cities founded by in 1986 by six
major cities; Barcelona, Birmingham, Frankfurt, Lyon, Milan and Rotterdam .
The active policy networks both within the Netherlands and in the wider
European area have been developed precisely to enhance epistemic communities
of policy makers and diffuse policy innovation. In the absence of the European
Union shifting social tolerance policy into the Union’s area of competence or joint
competence where there could be some element of coercion to laggards, the best
that can be hoped for under the Open Method of Coordination is that bureaucrats
are able to share best practices. Institutionalizing expectations and practices is
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precisely what the Dutch cities have done domestically and are extending to the
European Union-wide networks of regional and local administrators. The effective
practice of promoting social tolerance through increasing bridging social capital
can be disseminated and practiced by regional and municipal leaders, even in the
face of political opposition at the national level in their countries.
5.6 Conclusion of Netherlands Policy Cases
The investigation of policy practice in the two Dutch cities illustrate several
of the mechanisms behind relationships that emerged from the path and
hierarchical linear models. Education and social capital were primary drivers of
successful efforts to reduce intolerance. The role of political capacity as an
indicator of improved social capital is illustrated by the resources Dutch cities
poured specifically into improving bridging forms of social capital. Finally the
Dutch cases illustrated that Dutch municipal policy-makers are aware of, and
participate in, European Union institutions that pursue European Union policy
objectives.
The apparent success of policy networks and shared resources for in the
Dutch cities has strong implications for the potential of Europe-wide or even
transcontinental policy networks. Also, at least one mystery from the models, the
irrelevance of right-wing participation in government, was explained by the fairly
consistent practices of street-level bureaucrats faced with pragmatic choices
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about how to address social policy issues in the face of shifting national-level
politics.
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
By analyzing the interaction of government capacity and the emergence of
intensified bridging forms of social capital, this study contributes to our
understanding of the mechanisms by which bridging social capital emerges.
Combining techniques of comparative political economy and public administration
to investigate the relationships and mechanisms of government capacity helps
explain why and when government presence improves bridging social capital. It
also helps fill the gap in knowledge left by Putnam’s (2007) more recent
observation that diversity undermines social capital. This study offers an important
improvement by incorporating the role of existing government capacity in
facilitating the rise of bridging forms of social capital, even in diverse settings.
Over the past three years the European Union has been rocked by the
global financial crisis. The challenge of combatting intolerance has gotten even
more daunting in the face of continued economic and politically motivated
migration and persistent high unemployment in European Union states.
Additionally, under the leadership of Germany and the United Kingdom, austerity
has been the prescription for all ails. The policy environment facing public
administrators is one of increased stressors on the public and a more competition
for policy resources on the government side. Assessments of effectiveness are
even more critical for policy now than the period for which the bulk of the data for
this project was collected.
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The tests in the analysis show a consistent relationship between relative
political extraction and bridging forms of social capital. The direct relationship
between relative extraction and intolerance was much weaker and inconsistent.
More intense bridging social capital is associated with reduced intolerance, relative
political extraction is associated with improved bridging social capital, and the
multi-level test of the interaction between bridging social capital and relative
political extraction confirmed that the relationship of political capacity with
Intolerance is mediated by its relationship to bridging social capital and education.
The relationship confirms the main hypothesis offered that relative political capacity
shapes the forms of social capital emerging in societies and that the rise of
bridging social capital will be associated with improved social tolerance.
Although a direct relationship was proposed for relative political capacity on
intolerance by constraining the impact of bonding forms of social capital, the data
indicate that the role of the bonding form of social capital, as measured in this
model, has little relationship with intolerance once other variables are included in
the model. The fact that the Netherlands, Sweden and Norway among others,
had more intense social capital, both bridging and bonding, than most other
countries presents some clues as to why the relationship is not clear across all
countries. The important observation is not that relative political extraction
constrains the nasty effects of bonding social capital; it is that bridging social
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capital is the more important of the two for addressing social intolerance. The
country-level maps of social capital in figure 3.9 show that individuals can
simultaneously have elements of bonding capital like strong family ties and have
active links to broader relationships. Those people strong in both are not
dependent on their in-group identity for their support networks and not as subject
to social control. Bridging capital appears to be key as it is associated with more
diversity of contacts.
Two other powerful drivers of intolerance in these models were educational
attainment and age. There is an interaction and context effect present in these
items, as older cohorts are often not as well educated as younger individuals who
are in a cohort that is more educated. As important as educational attainment is,
the younger cohorts of the new accession states have also experienced some
recent qualitative changes in the type of education. While the education systems
of the EU 15 have long included some normative content promoting social
tolerance and inclusion, this is a relatively recent phenomenon for many of the new
EU member states and Turkey (Coenders and Scheepers 2003). A policy
implication is that an emphasis needs to be made on school curriculum and
outreach to maximize the qualitative impact of education especially for states at
lower levels of economic development.
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The exploration of the Dutch case studies provided insight into the reality of
the interaction between government resources, social capital and tolerance policy
at the level of implementation in the European Union context of subsidiarity. The
cases showed the emphasis of local policy implementors had on supporting
bridging social capital and several policies meant to foster social capital resources
in minority communities. The cases contributed insight explaining why the
national right-left political context may not have mattered in the determining policy
effectiveness as local leaders pursued pragmatic policies, that were coordinated
between cities and with E.U. institutional actors.
National government policy documents emphasized the importance of
social capital for immigrant integration in economic and civic life. The policy
documents of the 1980s and 1990s encouraged the creation of better metrics for
social capital and minority integration. The national and municipal contexts even
called for the enhancement of minority civic capacity, both as groups and
individuals. The national documents also acknowledged the European policy
imperative for protecting human rights, including non-discrimination, although
European Union pressure was never central to the policies proposed. By the
2000s the national policy context had shifted towards more focus on assimilation
for minorities and less on integration with differences tolerated.
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The investigation of the municipal level activities was also quite instructive.
Both to illustrate the types of policies that might be used to enhance government
capacity (policy networks) and in the kinds of policies created to enhance personal
and community social capital stocks. Some of the unexpected results from the
quantitative analyses were also addressed. One phenomenon was the
insensitivity of intolerance to changes in right-left distribution of government
power at the national level. This was because the hard work of social tolerance
programs is executed at the street-level, and municipal bureaucrats and social
workers are more pragmatic than ideological. Also, the cases illustrated that local
government focus is on improving bridging forms of social capital, and may also
render bonding capital less necessary but did not actively suppress the
persistence of identity-based trust networks.
Also, in the municipal cases reviewed, local governments worked together
to develop methods to asses either personal social capital stocks (Participation
Ladder) or community-wide bridging social capital (Mensen maken de Stad). Both
projects have the intention of reducing social intolerance and social isolation as
stated goals, and in the case of the Participation Ladder, as the phenomenon it is
meant to measure.
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6.1: Implications of Results for Policy
The results of the analysis in this document also support the emphasis on
the role of bridging social capital in improving governance. The obverse is more
directly supported in this analysis however, as governance seems to be linked to
more intense bridging forms of social capital. If bridging social capital leads to
better governance, and relative political extraction is associated with improved
bridging social capital, the expectation should be that there is a feedback process
between governance and civil society that improves civic capacity. An improved
ability to identify and find effective remedies to community is not surprising.
Associated with the ability to identify and address problems is the locus of policy
creation and implementation. The analysis and cases indicate support for the
hypothesis that more local control of expenditures results in greater bridging social
capital. Local groups and actors may find their activities more relevant if they
expect to be able to participate in the creation and execution of policy.
The relationship between bridging social capital and intolerance is fairly
insensitive to changes in per capita GDP, meaning that the policies directly
focused on fostering social capital are relevant to all European Union member
states, not simply the rich ones.
There are two broader implications for policy in the EU at large. The
current focus of the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) in enhancing cooperation
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and networks in civil society seems to be an effective strategy for improving both
oversight and social capital. The European Union is already expending effort
focused on fostering networks between non-governmental organizations and
officials between countries to exchange best practices and experiences. In many
of the European Union member countries, the efforts at facilitating integration and
managing multiculturalism falls to local officials. Facilitating the spread of best
practices should fall heavily to the supporting network of relevant urban officials.
However, the effort should also be directed at linking individuals and organizations
within each of the member states and encouraging national governments to put
resources into community organizations that are focused on tasks or activities as
opposed to identity. It appears that general efforts focused on improving
memberships in social, business, sport, or activism can have positive effects on
achieving social tolerance goals in conjunction with other efforts.
The second element is related to harnessing the effects of political capacity
more directly. The current arrangement for improving social tolerance in the
European Union is modeled on the Open Method of Coordination. However, the
FRA does not have the means to compel reporting that Eurostat and other
agencies have to harmonize measurement. The EU also needs stronger “naming
and shaming” procedures to stimulate efforts in dawdling countries or other
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means of putting social tolerance on the agenda of states with indifferent
governments.
Additionally, the efforts at improving social tolerance in new accession
states should certainly involve facilitated policy-diffusion by sharing best practices
among functional agencies of street-level bureaucrats like social workers and law
enforcement. This is an argument for supporting efforts like the “Joined-up”
governance network created by the Committee of the Regions and the
Fundamental Rights Agency of the European Union (Joined-up Governance:
Connecting Fundamental Rights 2012). Finally, encouraging links between well
established civil society organizations may help bridge the gap to older Europeans
who are outside the education system but still connected to labor or social
groups.
6.2: Next Steps for Research and Practice
Further avenues for research and model improvement, fall into four groups;
Measurement improvement, model specification, improved estimation of policy
effectiveness to help target resources effectively, extension of the model beyond
Europe.
First, improving the measure of intolerance could certainly help track
progress and policy effectiveness. As noted in the literature review, intolerance is
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difficult to accurately measure. It would be fruitful if more comprehensive
questions for assessing intolerant attitudes were included in social surveys.
Questions that are structured on a Likert scale would improve analysis and permit
for more accurate modeling of effects.
Secondly, relative political capacity, as it is conceptualized in this paper
includes taxes paid to social insurance in the comparisons between societies
because of the poor fit in calculating relative political extraction with a term for
social insurance omitted. Even in Europe there is non-uniformity in what services
are paid for by other taxes, taxes at different levels of government or through
regulatory requirements that do not show up on the government balance sheet. If
this model were extended beyond the European Union setting to countries with
even wider divergence in whether revenue was paying for social insurance or other
expenses. The model should adopt a more complete conception of government
performance.
Improved estimates of treatment effectiveness to establish a sort of costbenefit model for social capital improving policies like those explored in the next
section. There has been yet another wave of data collected for the years
2010-2011, this new data will permit the use of a growth model. Growth models
add some complexity, but better control for within country variations. With
improved model fit from better specification and a growth curve model, it might be

Noordijk

Bridging Intolerance

180

possible to locate inflection points in the relationship between social capital and
intolerance to determine countries or municipalities that might gain the most from
dedicated social capital programs.
Finally, although the European Union has a very specific policy goal in
reducing intolerance, it is certainly not unique in recognizing intolerance as a public
bad. The models can be extended beyond Europe. As can the recommendations
for policy. For example, in the process of researching this project it became
apparent that there is no reason that the networks of public agencies and the
promulgation of best practices in the Open Method of Coordination in tackling
intolerance need stop at the borders of Europe.
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APPENDIX A: CALCULATING INTOLERANCE MEASURES
In order to more clearly identify is Inspecting the polychoric correlations of
the responses to the questions can identify the relationships between each of the
above elements of the “neighbors” scale5 . The table below shows the polychoric
correlations between the different questions, with the standard error shown in the
diagonal. The creation of a polychoric correlations table allows for the factor
analysis of relationships between the binary variables by generating an estimate of
correlations from presumed scalar variables. Using a polychoric correlations
matrix allows the use of factor analysis in order to identify underlying latent
variables that can contribute to a better understanding of the phenomenon being
measured.
Table A.1: Intolerance Component Correlations
Different
Race

Heavy
Drinker

Immigrant

AIDS

Drug
Addict

Homosexual

Dif. Race

1

0.01

0.00

0.00

0.01

0.01

Heavy Drink

0.27

1

0.01

0.00

0.00

0.0

Immigrant

0.77

0.31

1

0.00

0.01

0.0

AIDS

0.57

0.46

0.55

1

0.00

0.00

Drug Addict

0.23

0.63

0.28

0.62

1

0.00

Homosexual

0.51

0.5

0.49

0.79

0.64

1

N= 96520. Random subsample drawn to meet memory constraints of software.
Bold numbers show correlations, normal font above diagonal provides significance level.

5

Polychoric correlation is a maximum-likelihood estimator of the correlations between ordinal or binary
observed variables developed on the assumption that those variables represent a normally distributed
latent scalar concept.
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The polychoric correlations illustrate the connections between two
apparent groupings of the variables, one concentrated on the race or immigrant
status of an individual, another on Homosexuality and AIDS status, and to a lesser
extent on drug addiction. Analysis of the correlation table using the factor analysis
function in SPSS provides an estimate of how the different elements of this scale
relate to one another.
Because of its robustness in dealing with minor violations of bivariate
normality, Principal Component Analysis was chosen to analyze the correlations
matrix and extract two components of intolerance found in the “neighbors” scale
(Kline 2005; Garson 2010). The promax rotation allows for the correlation of
extracted factors— in keeping with a conception of intolerance that incorporates
racial and status components. Table A.2, shows the variance loadings of the
different variables on two components of the intolerance scale.
The matrix of pattern loadings is of particular interest as it is the unique
variance contributed to the factors by each of the observed variables. The
structure and pattern matrices are very close to one another for these two factors
because they have a small correlation and the contributions to variance shown in
the structure matrix are largely unique to each of the two factors.
Table A.2: Intolerance Loadings Matrices
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Structure Matrix

Pattern Matrix (unique
variance)

Component Score

Behavior to
Race

General

Behavior to
Race
Dimension

General

Behavior to
Race
Dimension

General

Different
Race

0.97

-0.10

0.97

0.00

0.28

-0.00

Immigrant

0.96

-0.18

0.95

-0.09

0.27

-0.04

Homosexuals

-0.22

0.92

-0.13

0.91

-0.04

0.47

AIDS Sufferer

0.02

0.94

0.11

0.95

-0.03

0.49

Heavy
Drinker

-0.87

-0.27

-0.90

-0.35

-0.26

-0.19

Drug Addicts

-0.90

0.36

-0.88

0.27

-0.25

0.14

Correlation between factors= -.098
Promax rotation with Kaiser Normalization using Principal Component Analysis
Data: World Values Survey Combined Dataset. 2009.

I have named the two factors identified by the different loadings that
contribute variance to the two factors “Behavior<>Race” and “General”. As can
be seen from the pattern matrix, the loadings for the “Behavior<>Race” factor
load very strongly and positively with respondents who claimed an objection to
neighbors of either a different race or immigrant status. The sexual orientation or
AIDS status of individuals only contributes slightly or negatively to the factor. On
the other hand, undesirable behaviors of drinking or drug addiction are inversely
loaded on this factor. The combination of negative loadings on undesirable
behavior with positive loadings for race and immigrants highlights one of the
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strengths of using factor analysis to understand the relationships in the data. This
identifies a unique axis of intolerance for people who have specific objections to
potential neighbors by race or immigrant status.
Those intolerant of behaviors like drug abuse or to a lesser extent
homosexuality are on the left (negative) end of the axis, those who are intolerant of
everyone, or no one, fall in the middle, and those with a special intolerance
centered on race or immigrant status fall on the right. The loadings indicate the
presence of respondents who, instead of having a generalized intolerance for all
potential ‘undesirables’ have a special dislike for different races and immigrants
versus the behaviors of people. Imagine how the loadings would work for a
particular individual who mentions a problem with both a racial minority and an
immigrant but not that of an addict or a heavy drinker; that person would score a
maximum score on the Behavior<>Race factor, more than an individual who had
expressed uniform intolerance towards everyone.
In order to capture the different components of intolerance in a way that
can be used in the models, the Bartlett-regression extraction method available in
SPSS. That method turns the pattern matrix into regression coefficients (pattern
matrix scores are standardized variance scores) for each factor. It is a less
efficient way of conserving information than a structural equation model, but
structural equation models are beyond the scope of this project and the loss of
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some explanatory power is compensated by the utility of identifying the underlying
factors.
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APPENDIX B: MEMBERSHIP QUESTIONS AND RECODING
Examples of Diﬀerent Wording for Memberships Questions between EVS and WVS.
Country Year Survey

Question

Question Translated

United Kingdom 2006
WVS

Now I am going to read oﬀ a list of voluntary
organizations. For each one, could you tell
me whether you are an active member, an
inactive member or not a member of that
type of organization?

United Kingdom 2000
EVS

Please look carefully at the following list of
voluntary organizations and say...
a) to which if any you belong?
b) which, if any, you are currently doing
voluntary work for?

Netherlands 2006 WVS

Nu lees ik een lijst voor van organisaties/
verenigingen. Kunt u voor elke organisatie
aangeven of u een actief lid bent, een
inactief lid of geen lid van dat type
organisatie?

Now I am reading a list of
organizations/associations.
For each one, could you tell
me whether you are an
active member, an inactive
member or not a member of
that type of organization?

Netherlands 1999 EVS

Op KAART 5 staat een lijst met organisaties
en activitien.
a) Wilt u voor elk daarvan aangeven of u er
lid bent of er aan mee doet?
b) Doet u voor een van deze organisaties of
activiteiten onbetaald vrijwilligerswerk?
Voor welke?

On card 5 there is a list of
organizations and activities.
a) For each, will you
indicate whether you are
a member or engage in
the activity?
b) Do you do unpaid
voluntary work for any of
these organizations or
activities? For which?
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Examples of Diﬀerent Wording for Memberships Questions between EVS and WVS.
Country Year Survey

Question

Question Translated

Turkey 2001 EVS

Siz dernek, vakıf, sendika siyasi parti veya
bunun gibi herhangi bir gönülü kuruluşa üye
misiniz?
İf yes then...
Şimdi size çeşitli alanlarda bazı gönüllü
kuruluşlar sayacağım.
a. Bu alanlarda çalışan bir kuruluşlar,
derneğe vakfa vs. üye olup olmadığınızı
b. Eğer üye iseniz bu kuruluş için para
almadan, gönüllü olarak bazı faaliyetler,
çalışmalar yapıp yapmadığınızı söyleyinizi

Are you a member of a club,
faith-based charity, labor
union, political party, or any
similar voluntary
organization?
Now I will say my list of
some voluntary
organizations of various
kinds to you.
a. For each of the various
activities, organizations
and foundations working
in this field of activities,
are you a member or not?
b. If a member, could you
say whether or not you
worked in this
organization without
receiving pay or did some
volunteer activities?

Turkey 2000 WVS

Şimdi size çeşitli gönüllü kuruluşlardan
oluşan bir liste okuyacağım. Bu listede
değişik türde gönüllü kuruluşlar (örneğin
dernek, vakıf ve benzeri) var. Okuduğum her
gönüllü kuruluş için, üye olup olmadığınızı
belirtiniz. Eğer bu tür bir gönüllü kuruluşa
üye iseniz, aktif yani faal bir üye misiniz,
yoksa pasif yani faaliyetlere pek katılmayan
bir üye mi?

Now I am going to read a list
of a variety of voluntary
organizations to you. There
are a variety of diﬀerent
organizations on the list
(groups like, associations,
foundations, religious
organizations for example).
For each voluntary
organization I read, tell me if
you are a member or not. If
you are a member of such
an organization, whether you
are an active member, or a
passive member who does
not participate in many
activities?

Noordijk

Appendix C

200

APPENDIX C: SOCIAL CAPITAL
Memberships Responses Compared.
The World Values Surveys and European Values Studies use slightly
different wording in the questions used to explore participation in social
organizations. This section explains how both studies were rectified to include
data from all available countries and years.
A look at the dendrograms in figures 3.6 and 3.7 below, show the similarity
of relationships between the groups for both survey instruments, with both
reflecting the same clusters of organizations appearing among respondents. The
political party memberships, environmental group membership, professional
organization and human right organization memberships cluster together within
five steps while the education and arts connect at 11 steps. The dendrograms
indicate that membership in voluntary organizations tend cluster together, except
for union membership and religious organization membership. The graph for
waves using the EVS wording is first, and WVS wording is below it.
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WORLD VALUES SURVEY 1981-2008 OFFICIAL AGGREGATE v.20090901, 2009.
(2009).

Figure C.1 :Cluster Diagram for Membership Question from European Values Survey:
Waves 2 and 4
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WORLD VALUES SURVEY 1981-2008 OFFICIAL AGGREGATE v.20090901, 2009. (2009).

Figure C.2: Cluster Diagram for Membership Question from World Values Survey:
Waves 1,3 and 5

In order to make the responses from the different survey instruments
available ın the EVS and WVS comparable, the membership variables for the WVS
were recoded to reflect the binary coding of the EVS questionnaires. The wording
of the WVS instruments offers the respondents the choice of claiming “active” or
“inactive” membership versus simply being asked to self-identify as a member, or
not, is the EVS questionnaire. Given the choice of being an inactive member, the
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WVS instruments consistently return a much higher level of membership than the
EVS, even in the few cases where a clear trend is visible in the EVS surveys. In
order to bring the scales to a similar range and level, if a respondent was coded
as an active or inactive member, the answer was recoded to member. This is
closer to the wording of the questions about membership in the EVS survey
instruments and it also creates a binary variable, instead of the 0-2 three point
scale in the WVS questionnaires. With the two variables adjusted to the same
scale and similar wording it is possible to compare the relationships between
membership types and other elements of social capital within countries for
individuals. as well as other parts of the proposed model for individuals within
countries, and between countries for the two different waves, but not between
countries for all the waves. Each analysis of the models includes a dummy for the
wave of the survey instrument, the multi-level models returned non-significant
effects of instrument
Testing the External Validity of Membership Questions
Because of the challenges associated with the slightly different wording of
the two questionnaires used in the surveys, I tested both the external validity of
the self-reporting membership variables, and compared the effects of the two
different survey instruments. To do this, I ran a regression of the self-reporting of
labor union membership contained in the WVS/EVS instruments against union
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membership data for seventeen European countries as reported in a 2006
Monthly Labor Review article (Visser 2006). Visser describes union density as the
number of union members divided by all wage and salary earners collected from
government administrative data or labor surveys (2006, 40-41).
Table B.1 : Analyzing Effect of Changes in Wording for Union Membership Questions
Model

B

Std. Error

β

Sig.

1
Adj. R2 =.65

(Constant)

0.179

0.035

0

Combined WVS and
EVS Reported

1.246

0.14

2
Adj. R2 =.73

(Constant)

0.2

0.032

Combined WVS and
EVS Reported

1.39

0.129

0.906

0

Survey dummy WVS = 1

-0.166

0.046

-0.304

0.001

0.812

0
0

a. Dependent Variable:Reported Union Density
N=42, Source: WORLD VALUES SURVEY 1981-2008 OFFICIAL AGGREGATE v.20090901, 2009.
(2009).. Visser, J. (2006). Union Membership Statistics in 24 Countries. Monthly Labor
Review, 38-49.

Table B.1 above contains the results of the analysis. The results illustrate
how well each of the survey instruments match up to labor union statistics
produced by European governments. The model adjusted R2 of .73 indicates that
even for the low number of cases, the variation in combined WVS and EVS
questions predicts seventy-three percent of the variance in recorded union density
for each country each year that both data sets were available. The intercept of .
197 illustrates that the EVS data appears to slightly overestimate the union
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membership rates. The slope for the combined questionnaire is greater than one,
indicating that the combined variable tends to overestimate membership.

Figure C.1: Survey Measure of Union Membership Compared to Union Reported
Membership

Figure C.1 contains the mean union membership reported for each country
year sorted by survey instrument and charted against the union density for each
country, each year, reported in Visser (2006). The top solid line is the mean slope
for the European Values Survey questionnaire and the dotted line is the slope for
the World Values Survey questions. Both are parallel to the unit relationship line,
but at different levels. The WVS questions (including both active inactive member
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options) is closer to the recorded union membership density. Figure C.2 illustrates
the unstandardized predictors from the model with unified membership coding
and the inclusion of the dummy term for the survey instrument. The second
model shifts the slope very close to a unit relationship. As illustrated, when
adjusted for the survey type and the predicted slope line is almost exactly overlain
on the unit relationship predictor line for union membership (unit slope).

FIgure C.2: Fit Line of Union Membership Reported in WVS Survey
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Importance Of Family And Friends
The importance of family and friends questions, plus the generalized trust
question comprise the indicators for forms of social participation and trust-elements of social capital. All the indicators in table C.2, except the importance
of family variable, exhibited normal distributions. The importance of family variable
had heavy kurtosis (kurtosis score of 10). Eighty-five percent of respondents
reported family as being very important, with another ten percent responding that
family is somewhat important. An inverse power transformation using (ki^(1/ki),
reduced the reported kurtosis to less than 3 (2.10), while preserving the
distribution and standard error.
Table C.2: Importance of Family and Friends, and Trust
Important in
life: Friends
Important in life: Friends
(1=Very,4=Not at All)
Most People can be trusted
(1=Yes, 2=No)
Important in life: Family
(transformed)

Most People
can be trusted

Important in life:
Family (transformed)

1

.121**

.146**

.119**

1

-.012**

.146**

-.010**

1

** . Correlation is significant at p < .01.
Pearson correlation except Most People Can be Trusted (Spearman for nonparametric correlation.)
N=71170 < > 83212

WORLD VALUES SURVEY 1981-2008 OFFICIAL AGGREGATE v.20090901, 2009. (2009).

The table reports the correlations of each indicator with one another and
The correlations between the variables are fairly low and attempts to identify
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factors showed no clear pattern, indicating that each variable is measuring a
unique phenomenon or that they are interacting in a way that prohibits easy
interpretation. The slight and negative correlation between the Trust question and
the Importance of Family variable is noteworthy as it illustrates the conceptual
difference between within group trust and more diffuse forms of trust. The diffuse
forms of trust are those more generally associated with benevolent forms of social
capital.
Confidence in Government
The cluster analysis results are illustrated by the dendrogram below (figure
C.4). The dendrogram reinforces the patterns evident in the correlations table.
Confidence in parliament and confidence in the civil services clustered together
immediately. The police and armed forces clusters were merged much later.

Figure C.4: Official Confidence Clusters
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Factor analysis following up on the initial reviews of the data revealed
groupings of the variables similar to that of the cluster analysis. The table below
provides the factor loadings in the structure matrix, unique variance accounted for
by each of the factors is displayed by the pattern matrix, and finally the factor
coefficients used to derive the two factor variables are in the last columns. For
principal axis factoring using an oblique rotation (allowing correlation between
factors), the pattern matrix provides the best information for identifying the
underlaying latent structure. In the pattern matrix for the official trust scale of
questions two clear patterns emerge. The first confidence factor explains much of
the unique variance for confidence in the parliament and the civil service, with a
slight reverse relationship with confidence in the armed forces. The second factor
is slightly less well defined but still distinct. The loadings in the pattern matrix
center on the confidence in the armed forces and confidence in the police and
almost no cross-loading on the other two indicators. Correlation between the two
factors is .69, which indicates that respondents with confidence in government
institutions generally extend that confidence to the different branches. The table
below contains the Pearson correlations between the different questions.
Table C.3: Public Institutions Confidence Correlations
Armed Forces
Armed Forces
The Police
Parliament

1
.383**
.260**

The Police
n=81311
1
.430**

Parliament
79767
80950
1

Civil Services
79251
80381
79622

Noordijk
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.274**

.414**

210
.551**

1

Pearson Correlation.
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Number of cases in the off diagonal (weighted).
WORLD VALUES SURVEY 1981-2008 OFFICIAL AGGREGATE v.20090901, 2009. (2009).

In order to tease out the different types of relationships among the
confidence indicators I conducted two analyses; first, a hierarchical cluster
analysis followed by factor analysis to further understand the relationships
between the variables and derive factors that capture the different dimensions of
confidence in government. The coefficients derived and used to calculate the two
factors are provided in the table. They show that the first factor weights
confidence in the parliament the most (.78) , and gives lesser but positive weight
to confidence in the civil service responses (.5) and the police respectively (.11).
However, individuals’ responses to confidence in the armed forces are reverse
weighted and weak (-.08). This means that people with low confidence in
parliament and the civil service but higher confidence in the armed forces will
score higher in this factor than someone with equally low regard for all branches.
Conversely, the second factor weights heavily on both the armed forces and
police confidence variables, and reverse weights parliament confidence and all but
ignores the civil service responses. The first factor is more of a general confidence
factor, while the second highlights confidence in authority institutions than
governance institutions.
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Table C.4: Official Confidence Factor Dimensions
Structure Matrix
(loadings)

Pattern Matrix
(unique variance)

Factor Coefficients

Civil Parl Police
Army

Civil Parl

Civil Parl

Police
Army

Police
Army

Confidence: Armed Forces

0.353

0.572

-0.074

0.623

-0.070

0.815

Confidence: The Police

0.562

0.672

0.190

0.542

0.109

0.885

Confidence: Parliament
Confidence: The Civil
Services

0.776
0.698

0.503
0.508

0.812
0.660

-0.054
0.055

0.796
0.496

-0.179
0.057

Factor Correlation

0.415

Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring. Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization.
Factor Scores Method: Bartlett.
Questions are coded: 1=Great Deal of Confidence ,4=None
Source: WORLD VALUES SURVEY 1981-2008 OFFICIAL AGGREGATE v.20090901, 2009. (2009).
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APPENDIX D: ESTIMATING RELIGIOSITY
Because the literature indicates that there are at least two dimensions of
religiosity that may have bearing on intolerance, factor analysis was conducted to
extract them. Those two dimensions, a personal religiosity and institutionaldoctrinal dimension did not emerge from the data as explaining a great deal of
independent variation.
Table D.1: Unique Loadings for Factor Analysis of Religion Variables
Pattern Matrixa

Personal Religiosity

Institutional Religiosity

How often do you attend religious
services?

0.219

0.548

Important in life: Religion

0.703

0.167

Confidence: Churches

0.222

0.544

How important is God in your life
(reversed and rescaled.)

0.696

0.178

Eigenvalues

2.9

0.45

Responses coded with lower values indicating more intense religiosity.
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring; Rotation Method: Promax with Kaiser Normalization;
Rotation converged in 3 iterations. World Values Survey 1981-2008 Official Aggregate v.20090901,
2009. (2009).

A scale of the religiosity items was created using the four religiosity
indicators and reversing them. Unfortunately, a straightforward sum of the
religiosity variables is problematic as the “Importance of God” measure has a
multi-peaked distribution at the ends and in the middle that makes it somewhat
platykurtotic (-1.32). Those extreme values carried over into the summed scale
and flattened the distribution. To calculate the measure of religiosity I created an
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additive scale using standardized indicators of top three items in table 3.13 above.
Then I multiplied the three item scale by the absolute value of the standardized
“Importance of God in your life” indicator, effectively using the “Importance of God”
measure to weight the intensity and reverse the scale of the other indicators. The
resulting distribution is illustrated in figure D.1 below. It still retains some of the
peakedness of the summed scale, but has a much more normal distribution with a
skewness of -.33, and kurtosis -.23, well within the normal range for social
science statistics.

Unreligious
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Figure D.1: Frequency Distribution of Religiosity Indicator
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APPENDIX E: CALCULATING RPE
The table below illustrates the results of the regression equations described
in the literature review above for relative political extraction. The table shows the
unstandardized coefficients for component of relative political extraction.
Table E.1: Regression Model of Relative Political Extraction
RPE 1986-2008

RPE-soc security
Standardized β

Standardized β
0.378

Intercept
Mining/GDP

0.03

-0.237

Export/GDP

-0.046

0.210

Oil Prod. 1000 bbl/d

-0.180

0.211

Agriculture/GDP

-0.574

-0.366

0.220

-0.12

GDP/Capita
N=470

Adjusted R2=.515

Adjusted R2=.232

Dependent Variable is Total Revenues - Tariffs. Total revenues-soc sec - tariffs.

Sources: Gross Domestic Product by sector from OECD members SourceOECD, non-OECD members
data from EUROSTAT tables using similar accounting methodology. Per Capita GDP from World
Bank World Development Indicators database, using PPP at USD terms at year 2005 values. Revenue
data is from SourceOECD database for OECD members, others from EUROSTAT. Oil production
data is from the International Energy Agency, http://www.iea.org/stats/index.asp.

In table E.2 below the mean political extraction for each of the countries
over the available years of the studies is reported. Again the values are derived
controlling for level of economic development, so the RPE of .026 for Romania
does not mean that Romania has the same political capacity as Finland’s .029 in
absolute terms. Rather it means that for its level of development, Romania has a
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higher than average political capacity, but not nearly the resources for policy that
are available to the Dutch.
Table E.2: Mean Relative Political Extraction, By Country.
RPE Total Tax Revenue Minus Tariffs
Country
Mean
N
Country

Mean

N

Austria

0.029

22

Italy

0.015

22

Belgium

0.059

22

Latvia

-0.043

13

Bulgaria

0.044

13

Lithuania

-0.040

11

Cyprus
Czech
Republic

-0.055

13

Netherlands

0.029

22

0.008

12

Poland

-0.003

17

Denmark

0.085

22

Portugal

-0.057

22

Estonia

-0.027

10

Romania

0.026

13

Finland

0.052

22

Slovenia

0.035

15

France

0.036

22

Spain

-0.045

22

Germany

-0.035

22

Sweden

0.092

22

Greece

-0.031

22

-0.038

22

Hungary

0.057

17

Turkey
United
Kingdom

-0.013

22

-0.036
Ireland
22
Sources: Gross Domestic Product by sector from OECD members SourceOECD, non-OECD
members data from EUROSTAT tables using similar accounting methodology. Per Capita
GDP from World Bank World Development Indicators database, using PPP at USD terms at
year 2005 values. Revenue data is from SourceOECD database for OECD members, others
from EUROSTAT. Oil production data is from the International Energy Agency, http://
www.iea.org/stats/index.asp.
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APPENDIX F: MISSING DATA IN THE MODEL
The data were examined for missing values on the concept of intolerance
and the components of social capital. Dummy variables of the each of the
relevant indicators were created with the value of 0 indicating a valid response,
and 1 indicating a missing response. The missing values dummy variable for the
intolerance scale were then correlated with demographic variables and other
indicators to identify significant deviations from a random distribution of missing
values (McKnight, McKnight, Sidani and Figueredo 2007). The dataset was
divided by each country and each wave of the survey in order to control for data
missing from entire sub-samples, that would then manifest as a significant
relationship between demographics and intolerance despite not being present in
the model.
The results of the first test for influence of missing data on the intolerance
scale are included in table F.1. The table reveals that the relationship between
missing variables and Intolerance does show some associations, that is, the value
of Intolerance is not associated with missing values at random.
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Table F.1: Test for Completely at Random Distribution Missing Data
Intolerance

Bridging
Trust

Confidence in
Civil
Government

Overall proportion
missing

Gender missing

0.00

-.009**

0.00

0.00

Age missing

0.00

-0.01

-0.01

0.00

Income missing

-.053**

.010**

-.012**

0.18

Self-identified political
position

.064**

.132**

.068**

0.20

Religiosity missing

-.008*

.023**

.023**

0.06

Bridge trust missing

-.011**

Confidence in Civ. Gov.
(Missing)

0.00

0.07
.065**

0.06

Kendall’s tau-b for non-parametric correlations. The row variables in the left column are all dummy
coded 1= missing, 0= recorded.
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
a. Listwise N = 74230

In order to ensure that the relationships noted above are not simply artifacts of the
data, the tau-b correlations were examined by country-year as well. While some
of the correlations between missing data and the dependent variables, are
artifacts of complete waves of missing data for a few countries, the two variables
with the strongest relationship, are not. The relationships indicate that some steps
to rectify the potential, albeit minor, distortion of parameters caused by missing
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data. As a further tests of missingness on components of social capital are also
included as columns in the table. Finally the rate of missing data is included in the
final column, illustrating the general very low rate of missing data. The one area
with a high level of missing data was educational attainment.
Missing Education
For the 1989-1991 wave, a number of the European Values Survey
countries only collected education data in terms of the age of completion of
education instead of highest level of education achieved. The table below
indicates the distribution of the missing variable by country and wave. Also in the
table is the r-square of a regression equation that estimates the “highest level of
education achieved” for years that the variables overlap in each country. The
regression equation uses age, income level, gender, age of completion of
education and intolerance as independent variables for the regression equation.
I used the application Amelia II (King, Honaker, Joseph and Scheve 2001),
to estimate the missing educational attainment variables both within years for
which the data was collected, and the waves and countries listed below in the
years where the data on attainment were missing. Amelia II works by estimating a
matrix for each of the variables, then once convergence has been achieved
repeats this process with 5 times working each time with a data set created by
random draws (with replacement) from the returned data. The program creates 5
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data sets with imputed responses in place of missing data (King et al 2001, ). This
method reduces the missing information that would be worsened by listwise
deletion, while preserving non-biased estimators for the model.

Table F.2: Imputed values for Educational Attainment
Country - wave

Educational Level
Attained, Mean
Imputed

St. Dev
Educational
Attainment

Reported Age
Education
Completed

R-Square
OLS
Predictor

Austria (2)

4.03

1.97

16.84

0.628

Belgium (2)

4.39

1.95

16.59

Bulgaria (2)

4.54

2

19.21

0.692

Czech Republic (2)

3.9

1.94

16.46

0.465

Finland (2)

5.7

1.91

21.78

0.323

France (2)

4.32

2.1

17.62

0.698

Germany (2)

4

2.23

16.84

0.525

Hungary (2)

3.86

2.08

16.29

Ireland (2)

4.16

1.99

16.53

0.706

Italy (2)

4.07

1.8

16.53

0.629

Malta (2)

3.85

1.94

15.81

0.58

Netherlands (2)

4.67

1.89

18.9

0.421

Poland (2)

4.14

1.99

17.47

0.426

Portugal (2)

3.5

2.38

15.2

Slovakia (2)

3.9

2.21

16.31

0.635

Slovenia (2)

4.57

2.31

19.39

0.559

Spain (2)

3.78

2.38

14.23

0.488

Sweden (2)

5.28

2.49

21.62

0.413

Great Britain (2)

4.05

2.4

16.47

0.352

Source: World Values Survey 1981-2008 Waves Official Combined ...
Using: Amelia II: A Program for Missing Data. (Honaker, King and Blackwell 2009)
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Overall, with the exception of item “educational attainment”, the dataset
has a very low rate of missing data. The missingness rate is low even for
composite, or factor variables containing several component indicators. Despite
the low rates of missing data for the data set, several significant relationships
existed between the Intolerance measure and missing data in several of the
demographic and theoretically important parts of the model. Because of this
minor problem with data not missing completely at random, the Amelia II missing
data Monte Carlo bootstrapping program was used to multiply impute the missing
items.
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APPENDIX G: DATA ASSUMPTIONS AND MODEL CONCERNS FOR MULTI-LEVEL

MODELS
The distributional and structural assumptions multi-level models reflect
assumptions of other classes of multiple regression and maximum-likelihood
models with a few unique caveats.
Data used in hierarchical linear models is expected to be normally
distributed variables the same as for other OLS or maximum-likelihood estimators.
Detection of violations of normal distributions will be necessary prior to estimating
models. Variables that are found to not have a normal distribution will either be
transformed to correct the violations or dropped from the model if there is no way
to retain the information without compromising the analysis. Additionally, the
transformed summed intolerance variable is closer to a gamma distribution, so
transformation of the variable using Box-Cox estimators was required.
Effective sample size is also a concern when conducting a multi-level
analysis. The level of intraclass correlation conditions the effective sample size of
a multi-level model generally reducing the sample to something substantially lower
than the raw N (Snijders and Bosker 1999). However, each participant in the
World Values Survey has a national sample of at least 950 respondents providing
some margin for inclusion of level 1 dependent variables. As of October 2011,
there was only data for individuals nested in 25 European Union member and
accession countries over several waves, meaning that the limit on available
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degrees of freedom for a group-level variables is a very tight 62 country-waves
with 72 waves available for a more limited model. This small number of countrywave cases permits inclusion of only the few most salient group-level random
effects variables for this analysis.
As this model will likely suffer from under-identification dealing with
problems associated with missing data is critical. Missing data is examined to
determine whether it is missing completely at random, or missing at random or
missing not at random. Data missing completely at random has no detectable
relationship with any other available data. Data missing at random has no
detectable relationship with the value of the data itself but is related to other values
in the dataset. Missing not at random is self-explanatory (McKnight, et al. 2007).
Depending on the volume of missing data and the pattern of missingness, the
decision to delete listwise or take advantage of a multiple imputation estimator to
fill-in missing data and maintain the ever important sample-size.
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APPENDIX H: TABLE OF INTOLERANCE
Table H.1: Intolerance by Country and Wave 1989-2008
Intolerance by summed race, immigrant status, AIDs and orientation
1989-1993 1994-1999 1999-2004 2005-2007

2008

Austria

1.04

0.62

0.90

Belgium

0.85

0.65

0.24

Bulgaria

2.03

1.59

Cyprus
Czech Republic

1.46

0.86

Denmark
Estonia

1.34

Finland

0.79

France

0.61

Germany

0.89

Great Britain

0.75

Greece

1.34

1.27

1.15

0.70

1.13

0.32

0.20

1.24

1.46

0.79
0.26

1.38

0.68

0.53

0.45

1.20

0.16

0.37

0.51

0.51

0.48

0.40

0.82

Hungary

1.86

Ireland

0.79

0.75

Italy

1.11

0.92

0.88

1.36

0.85
0.65
0.83

0.84

Latvia

1.31

0.89

1.10

Lithuania

1.86

1.56

1.70

Luxembourg

0.46

0.59

Malta

1.12

1.09

Netherlands

0.47

0.24

0.31

Northern Cyprus

0.46
1.68

Poland

1.55

1.40

Portugal

1.19

0.62

Romania

1.61

1.58

1.15

1.34
0.56

1.35

1.37

Slovak Republic

1.72

1.22

1.29

0.96

Slovenia

1.64

1.46

1.06

0.98

1.19

Spain

0.84

0.59

0.57

0.37

0.26

Sweden

0.51

0.27

0.18

0.12

0.27

Turkey

2.43

2.46

2.27

2.68

World Values and European Values Surveys, 1981-2007 Combined Waves Dataset,
and the 2008-2009 European Values Survey.
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APPENDIX I: INTRACLASS CORRELATION
Intraclass correlation and effective sample size for the summed intolerance
dependent variable and the bridging social capital(diffuse trust and memberships)
Calculating the unconditional intraclass correlation is an important measure
of the stratification structure of your data has an impact on the model. An
unconditional intraclass coefficient for Intolerance as nested in country-wave
groups is .133 indicating that 13% of variance in the intercept only model is
accounted for by the respondents being nested in country-waves, this is
effectively an ANOVA using country-wave as the classification variable. 13% is
sufficiently high to warrant a multilevel analysis.
The .133 intraclass correlation also provides a first look at the design
impact of the World Values Surveys sample as stratified by country and nested in
waves. Calculating the design effect with the unconditional intraclass correlation is
accomplished by simply finding its product with the group sample size (Hox ).
With this dataset weighted to 1000 cases per country per wave and 60 countrywaves there is an unadjusted sample of just under 60,000. The design effect with
the unconditional intraclass correlation coefficient of .133 in this case by the 1000
per group is 133. The effective sample size of an OLS model without group-level
explanatory variables is around 60000/133 = 451.
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The unconditional intraclass correlation coefficient for the bridging form of
social capital is a very high .25. Rendering a design effect of 250, and an effective
sample of 240 for OLS models without group level explanatory variables.
Including the indicators of education, RPE and per cap GDP into the full path
model results in a conditional intraclass correlation of .14, meaning that some of
the intraclass variance is accounted for and that the effective sample size for the
model used in the path analysis is over 7000.
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APPENDIX J: NOTES AND FIGURES FROM ANALYSIS
Religiosity by Country and Correlation With Intolerance
The correlation of religiosity to the summed measure of intolerance is .172
(p<.05). Indicating that across countries and waves higher levels of religiosity are
correlated with intolerance. The correlation also breaks down along the
dimensions of intolerance that were reported in the intolerance section, with a
higher correlation between religiosity and intolerance for the dimensions that
specifically capture disapproval of social behavior while there is still substantial
correlation between the types of intolerance themselves. In effect, religious people
are only slightly more likely than their peers to report intolerance towards racial or
immigration minorities, but far more likely to report intolerance of homosexuals or
AIDS sufferers than their fellows.
Table J.1: Correlations of Religiosity and Selected Intolerance Indicators.
Religiosity

Neighbors: People of a
Different Race.

Neighbors:
Homosexuals

Religiosity

1

.084**

205**

Intolerance Scale

.172**

.567**

.81**.

Neighbors: People of a
different race

.084**

1

.275**

Neighbors:
Homosexuals

.205**

.275**

1

Behavior vs. race
Intolerance

-0.036

.51**

-.24**

Spearman's rho non-parametric correlations. Pearson’s correlation for scaler variables.
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Analysis in the regression indicates that the correlations between religiosity
and the different forms of intolerance is largely an artifact of the grouping of
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intolerant and religious individuals within the same societies and the covariance
between religiosity and other indicators such as age in societies with weaker
distinctions between intolerance toward lifestyle versus racism and homophobia.
The hierarchical analysis of bridging social capital indicates that religiosity is
positively correlated with bridging social capital, but that indirect path is more than
suppressed by the reverse correlation in the indirect path.
Table J.2: Education Path by RPE with GDP Per Capita
OLS

β

Intercept

2.76

RPE

0.102 (1.2)

Ln GDP/cap

0.018 (.86)

R2

0.01

Dependent Variable= Educational Attainment
N= 82839, Deff= 85, Adjusted N=974 for Educational attainment.
All Standardized Regression Coefficients, t-scores from group level.
*significant at p<.05
Source: World Values Survey 1980-2005 combined dataset. World Values Association.

Table 4.4 presents the coefficients of the GDP per capita and relative
Table J.3: Regression Test of RPE and Bonding Capital
β
Intercept

0.121

Study

-0.046 (-1.9)

Education

-0.025 (-1.14)

RPE

-0.075 (-.37)

GDP per cap

-0.087 (-.55)
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Religiosity

-0.156 (-6.8)

Is Minority

0.026 (1.2)

R2

0.029

N= 79983, Deff= 40, Adjusted N=1999
t-scores for group-level variables estimated using N for degrees of freedom at each level.
Bonding Social Capital is on a scale of -1=intense<->1= weak.
Source: World Values Survey 1980-2005 combined dataset. World Values Association.
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Table J.4: Multi-level regression results
Model

Random Model 1
Intercept

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Fixed Effects
Intercept γ00

-0.20

-0.17

10.80

11.40

11.90

Gender (0=female, 1=male)

.27**

.28**

.28**

.28**

Minority Religion (0=min,1=maj)

0.01

Religiosity

.039**

.038**

.038**

.037**

Education

-.088**

-089**

-089**

-087**

.05**

.078**

.078**

.08**

-.018**

-.018**

-.017**

-.017**

Bridging Social Capital

-.31**

-.31**

-.29**

-.29**

Official Trust

.018**

Age (uncentered)

0.01**

.013**

0.13**

0.13**

-.035**

-.034**

-.035**

-.035**

-2.7**

-2.8**

1.20

1.14

1.50

-1.1**

-1.09

-1.13**

Soc Security Spending/GDP

-3.9*

-3.87

-4**

In-Migration Rate

-2.6*

Right-Wing Gov (5-year MA)

0.00

Right-Left Political
Income

Town Size (uncentered)
Unem (uncentered)
Relative Political Extraction
ln GDP/Capita

RPE x Bridging Capital

-1.3*

Random Effects
Residual

3.4

3.14

3.14

3.13

3.13

Random Intercept

.7**

.54**

.19**

.20**

.20**

.04**

.03**

Random Slope Bridging
Model Fit (smaller is better)
AIC

227193.00 222738.00 222684.00

222574.00

222605.00

BIC

227210.00 222756.00 222702.00

222600.00

222632.00

R2 estimated

0.10

0.19

0.18

0.18

Model Chi-square Difference

0.00

0.00

0.00

Worse fit

Individual N= 77,015, Group-level N = 72 . Mixed Regression, unstructured Random Effects
(variance components). Right-wing parties in percentage of total cabinet posts, weighted by days.
Source: own calculations for Turkey based on Schmidt and Beyer (1992); 1991 onwards: Political
Data Yearbook(s), EJPR.
Source: World Values Survey 1980-2005 combined dataset. World Values Association.
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Fixed Effects

Model 5

Model 6

Intercept γ00

-0.04

-0.21

Religiosity (centered)

0.03**

.04**

Gender (male)

.27**

Education (centered)

-0.087**

-.09**

Right-Left Political (centered)

0.082**

.08**

Income (centered)

-0.01**

-.017**

Bridging Social Capital (centered)

-0.28**

-.33**

Age (centered)

0.013**

.013**

Town Size

-0.037**

-.04**

Relative Political Extraction

1.87

1.90

ln GDP/Capita (centered)

-1.22**

-1.03**

Mig. rate
Soc. Security Spending/GDP

-2.24
-2.09

Local expenditure /total expenditure

-2.9
-0.036

RPE x Bridging Capital

-1.03*

-1.39*

Ln GDP x Bridging

-.15**

-.15**

Local Exp x Bridging

0.12

Random Effects
Residual

3.18

3.13

Random Intercept

.23**

.22*

Random Slope Bridging

-.025**

-.025**

Slopes by Intercepts Bridging

-0.005

-0.006

269040.00

226570.00

269077.00

226606.00

0.18

0.19

Model Fit (smaller is better)
AIC
BIC
Pseudo

R2

Individual N= 77,015, Group-level N = 72 . Mixed Regression, Unstructured Random
Effects (variance components). Right-wing parties in percentage of total cabinet posts,
weighted by days. Source: own calculations for Turkey based on Schmidt and Beyer
(1992); 1991 onwards: Political Data Yearbook(s), EJPR.
Source: World Values Survey 1980-2005 combined dataset. World Values Association.
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Model 8 t
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Model 9 t

Intercept

0.61

26.64

0.61 26.47

0.61

26.55

Male

0.08

20.15

0.08 20.15

0.08

20.16

-0.07 -12.33

-0.07 -11.85

-0.07

-11.52

Bridging Social
Capital
Religiosity

0.03

15.31

0.03 15.31

0.03

15.30

Political SelfPlacement

0.05

26.90

0.05 26.89

0.05

26.90

Age

0.07

35.48

0.07 35.48

0.07

35.48

Education

-0.08 -38.24

-0.08 -38.24

-0.08

-38.23

Ln GDP/cap

-0.24 -10.35

-0.23 -10.22

-0.24

-10.38

RPE

-0.02

-0.71

-0.01

-0.57

-0.02

-0.81

Bridging * GDP

-0.01

2.21

-0.01

2.36

-0.01

2.52

0.04

1.85

0.04

1.74

0.04

1.86

Bridging * RPE

-0.01

-0.97

RPE by Gov
right
Bridging Group

-0.02

-0.72
0.04

1.14

-0.01

-1.57

Gov-right 5
year MA

Bridging Group
* Bridging Ind.
Time EU
Random
Effects

Est.

Wald Z Est.

Wald Z Est.

Residual

0.376

231.428 0.376 231.428 0.376 231.428

Random
Intercept

0.042

6.238

0.042 6.198

0.042

6.237
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APPENDIX K: GROUP-LEVEL SCATTERPLOT OF INTOLERANCE BY GDP/CAP
3
y = -0.4423x + 5.0526
R² = 0.607
2

2

1

0
6.500

7.625

8.750

9.875

11.000

Figure K.1: Ln of per capita GDP by group mean Summed Intolerance, uncentered.
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APPENDIX L: PARTICIPATIE LADDER LEVELS
Dutch

English

Niveau 1: Geïsoleerd
• Heeft niet of nauwelijks contact met anderen dan
huisgenoten EN
• de contacten buiten de huisgenoten beperken
zich tot functionele contacten (winkelpersoneel,
hulpverleners, buschauffeurs etc.)
Voorbeelden niveau 1:
- Nauwelijks contacten buiten de deur
- Mantelzorg voor huisgenoten
- Alleen actieve contacten via internet/email
- Dakloos zonder contacten met niet-daklozen,
behalve hulpverleners

Level 1: Isolated
• Has little or no contact with people other than
household members AND
• contacts outside the household limited to
functional contacts (Shop assistants, social
workers, bus drivers, etc.)
Level 1 Examples:
- Hardly any contacts outside the home
- Care for family members
- Only active contacts via internet / email
- Homeless; no contacts with non-homeless,
except emergency

Niveau 2: Sociale contacten buiten de deur
• Heeft minimaal één keer per week fysiek contact
met mensen die geen huisgenoten zijn EN
• die contacten vinden niet plaats in
georganiseerd verband EN
• voert geen taken uit met verantwoordelijkheden
naar anderen (d.w.z. het is geen werk) EN
• die contacten beperken zich niet alleen tot
functioneel contact met winkelpersoneel,
hulpverleners et cetera

Level 2: Social contacts outside the
Household
• Has physical contact with people who are not
household members at least once a week
AND
• these contacts do not occur in an organized
context AND
• does not perform tasks with responsibilities to
others (I.e., it is not work) AND
• these contacts are not restricted to contact with
store clerks, workers etc.

Voorbeelden niveau 2:
- Mensen ontmoeten zoals buren, buurtbewoners
en ouders van vriendjes van kinderen
- Regelmatig activiteiten buiten de deur
ondernemen, zoals bezoek van vrienden,
bioscoopbezoek, museumbezoek etc.
- Regelmatige mantelzorg voor niet-huisgenoten
(die niet via een organisatie is georganiseerd)
- Individuele sporten zoals sportschool
- Neemt deel aan activiteiten in georganiseerd
verband maar minder dan 1 x per week
- Regelmatig kerk/moskeebezoek (minimaal 1x
per week)

Level 2 Examples:
- Meeting people like neighbors, neighbors
parents and friends of children
- Regular activities, including visits from friends,
cinema, museum visits, etc.
- Regular care for non-household members (Not
organized by an organization)
- Individual sports such as gym or fitness
- Participates in organized activities but less than
1 x per week
- Regular church / mosque attendance (at least
1x per week)
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Niveau 3: Deelname georganiseerde
activiteiten
• Neemt deel aan activiteiten in
georganiseerd verband zoals verenigingen of
opleidingen EN
• voert geen taken uit met verantwoordelijkheden
naar anderen (d.w.z. het is geen werk) EN
• neemt minimaal eens per week deel aan die
activiteit waarbij hij/zij in fysiek contact komt met
anderen
Voorbeelden niveau 3:
- Volgen van een
inburgeringsaanbod,
educatieaanbod of re-integratie-instrument zonder
werkcomponent
- Volgen van andere cursussen of opleidingen
zonder werkcomponent
- Lidmaatschap vereniging (regelmatig een
activiteit volgen waarbij je in contact komt met
andere mensen)
- Regelmatige sport beoefenen in georganiseerd
verband
- Vrijwilligerswerk (minder dan 1x per week
contact)

Niveau 4: Onbetaald werk
• Doet onbetaald werk; dat wil zeggen:
• heeft geen arbeidscontract EN
• voert taken uit en heeft daarbij
verantwoordelijkheden naar anderen EN
• heeft minimaal eens per week fysiek contact met
anderen bij het uitvoeren van het onbetaalde
werk.Voorbeelden niveau 4:
- Werken met behoud van uitkering (Work First,
participatiebanen e.d.)
- Duale inburgeringstrajecten met een
werkcomponent
- Re-integratie-instrument met werkcomponent
- Stages
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Level 3: Participation in organized activities
• Participates in organized activities such as
associations or training AND
• does not perform tasks with responsibilities to
others (I.e., it is not work) AND
• take part in that activity in which he / she is in
physical contact come with others at least once a
week.
Level 3 Examples:
- Tracking a range of integration, offer education
or rehabilitation tool without Work Component
- Tracking other courses or training
unemployed component
- Association Membership (regular activity
follow where you come into contact with other
people)
- Regular organized sport in link
- Volunteering (less than 1x per week contact)

Level 4: Unpaid Work
• Doing unpaid work, ie:
• has no employment contract,
AND
• performs tasks and thereby responsibilities to
others AND
• has at least once a week physical contact with
others when performing unpaid work.
Examples of level 4:
- Working with conservation benefits (Work First,
participation jobs e.d.)
- Dual integration programs with a Work
Component
- Re-integration tool with work component
- Internships
- Volunteer work (at least 1 x per week contact)
- Bol-training (training course with occasional
internship)
- GIT-projects (Integrated Pathways - vocational
training projects where a with training is combined
with learning the Dutch language)
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Niveau 5: Betaald werk met ondersteuning
• Heeft een arbeidscontract met een
werkgever of is zzp’er en ontvangt daarbij
ondersteuning, dat wil zeggen:
• maakt gebruik van gemeentelijke
participatie-instrumenten OF
• ontvangt een aanvullende uitkering OF
• werkt in WSW-verband (intern,
gedetacheerd of begeleid werken) OF
• volgt een reguliere opleiding met
arbeidscomponent, onder het niveau van de
startkwalificatie.
Voorbeelden niveau 5:
- WSW (intern/gedetacheerd/begeleid werken)
- Werk (parttime) met aanvullende uitkering van
gemeente of UWV
- Werkt met loonkostensubsidie
- Werk waarbij uitkering wordt verloond (o.a.
bepaalde vormen van Work First)
- Werk met apart ingekochte instrument nazorg
waarbij sprake is van echte ondersteuning
- Werk met externe begeleiding/jobcoach
- Werk en volgt daarnaast een inburgeringsaanbod

Niveau 6: Betaald werk
• Heeft een arbeidscontract met een
werkgever of is zzp’er EN
• ontvangt geen aanvullende uitkering van
gemeente of andere uitkeringsinstantie
EN
• wordt niet door anderen dan
leidinggevende of collega’s begeleid bij het
uitvoeren van het werk EN
• maakt geen gebruik van WSW of
gemeentelijke participatie-instrumenten.
Voorbeelden niveau 6:
- Baan met arbeidscontract
- Baan met arbeidscontract en pro forma nazorg1
- Zzp’ers
- Ondernemers
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Level 5: Paid work supports
• Has a contract with a employer or SOHO and
will then issue support, ie:
• uses municipal participation instruments OR
• receive an additional allowance OR
• work in connection WSW (internal, seconded or
supported employment) OR
• follows a regular training labor component,
below the level of the basic qualification.
Level 5 Examples:
- WSW (internal / seconded / supported
employment)
- Work (part time) with additional payment of
municipality or the UWV
- Works with wage
- Work with distribution is verloond (inter alia
certain types of Work First)
- Work with separately purchased tool aftercare
involving real support
- Work with external assistance / job coach
- Work and follows also an integration range
- Work and follows also an educational offer
- Bbl training (four days working in a teaching
facility and training days)
- Working with allowance and without
supplementary benefit
Level 6: Paid work
• Has a contract with a
employer or SOHO and
• does not receive additional payment of
municipality or other benefits agency AND
• will not be other than
supervisor or colleagues assisted in
perform the work and
• does not use or WSW
municipal participation instruments.
Examples of Level 6:
- Course of employment
- Course of employment and pro forma nazorg1
- Self-employed
- Entrepreneurs

